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I. INTRODUCTION
As summarized by the late Allan Ten in this issue,1 the history of the
treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered ("LGBT") 2 persons in
Florida has been marked by "witch hunts" for lesbian and gay teachers,
3
political attacks through voter initiatives,4 overtly discriminatory laws,5 and
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
A.B., 1975, Indiana University; J.D., 1978, Indiana University.
1. Allan H. Ted, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights in Florida, 23
NOVA L. REv. 793 (2000).
2. It must first be acknowledged that the legal treatment of lesbians and gays
sometimes raises different issues than it does for bisexual and transgendered persons. For
example, Florida's ban on "homosexual" adoptions would apparently not prevent a bisexual
person from adopting as long as that person was not currently engaged in a sexual relationship
with a person of the same sex. Because transgendered persons are discriminated against due
to their gender and sexual orientation, the application of laws, primarily aimed at
homosexuals, is not always clear. See generally Kristine W. Holt, Comment, Reevaluating
Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgendered Jurisprudence,
70 TEMP. L. REV. 283 (1997) (discussing the current public policy against transgendered
persons and how the policy has manifested itself under federal antidiscrimination case law).
However, for the most part, the laws and cases in Florida, which have addressed the issue of
homosexuality, also have relevance to bisexuals and transgendered persons, even if they are
not usually discussed directly in those cases and statutes.
3. See Ted, supra note 1, at 796.
4. For a discussion of anti-gay ballot measures, see Ted, supra note 1, at 829-48;
William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral
Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 583, 590 (1994)
[hereinafter Adams I].
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case law that has been mixed in the recognition of equal rights.6 This article
will address what has happened since Ten's untimely death in 1997,
describing the current legal and political climate for LGBT persons in
Florida, analyzing recent trends and suggesting future directions. As a
strong advocate for equal rights for LGBT persons, Ten would no doubt feel
encouraged by some of the political and legal developments in the last few
years, but he undoubtedly would still be concerned about some of the issues
that continue to be contested in the political and judicial spheres. Expanding
upon his excellent summary of the history of Florida's treatment of its
LGBT residents, this article shall attempt a critical analysis of the case law
generated by Florida courts and compare its treatment to that of other
jurisdictions in this country.
To maintain consistency with the scope of the historical article by Terl
and to keep this summary manageable, this article will focus on areas of the
law highlighted in the TerI article.7 This approach is also consistent with the
areas of the law that have generated the predominant amount of attention
from both advocates for equality for LGBT persons and their opponents in
the legislative and judicial arenas in the last three years." This emphasis
means that a few areas where some legal action has taken place will not be
discussed. Thus, for example, this article will not address case law in the
area of defamation in relation to homosexuality.9 In addition, this article
will not address issues concerning lesbians and gays in the school setting,
which, although important, has not seen any significant change in the law
since the Terl article was written.
10
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1999) (Florida's statute banning "homosexual"
adoptions); Id. § 741.212 (Florida's statute banning same-sex marriage); Id. § 800.02
(Florida's "sodomy" statute).
6. See Terl, supra note 1, at 821-31.
7. Id. at 793.
8. See id. at 821-51.
9. For an approach to the area of defamation, see Hoch v. Rissman, 742 So. 2d 45 1,
455-57 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants in
an action concerning statements made at a law firm seminar discussing "inside" information
about the tendencies and proclivities of lawyers and judges working in the area of workers
compensation, and holding that the statement "'if you wanted to prevail... before Rand
Hoch, you should send a boy in short pants"' constitutes slander per se as it "imputes conduct
or a condition incompatible with the proper exercise of his judgeship").
10. Allan Terl's article was written in 1997. The last major development concerning
gays and lesbians in the school setting is discussed in Ter, supra note 1, at 810-15, 832.
[Vol. 24:751
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II. CRIMINAL LAW-SODOMY AND HATE CRIME LAWS
Historically, the criminal law has been used as a weapon against
members of sexual minority groups, usually through the enactment of laws
outlawing sodomy or similar sexual practices." This type of criminal statute
still exists in a number of states. 2 On the other hand, the criminal law is
beginning to be used in a positive fashion to protect lesbians and gays from
violence motivated by animus against them.13 These laws, popularly referred
to as "hate crime" laws, are increasingly including sexual orientation in the
list of protected categories.'
4
As has been noted elsewhere, the battle for the rights of lesbians and
gays is often dependent upon a state's position concerning the
criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct. 1 Even though sodomy laws are
often not enforced against adults engaged in the prohibited sexual acts in
private, the laws have had a pernicious impact upon gays and lesbians in a
wide variety of legal contexts. Litigants in cases in jurisdictions with
sodomy laws in which homosexuality is an issue often are required to
discuss the impact of existing sodomy laws upon the legal issue before the
court. Thus, the cases concerning the recognition of the existence of lesbian
and gay student organizations have often had to address ar uments that the
organization could lead to the violation of criminal laws. Sodomy laws
11. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 6,1868, ch. 1637, § 7,1881 Fla. Laws 8, 374-76, repealed
by Ch. 74-121, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 371, 372. This section of the Florida Statutes, § 800.01,
was held unconstitutional in Brinson v. State, 278 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973),
and then repealed by the Florida Legislature in 1974.
12. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997); KAN. CiM. CODE ANN. §
21-3505 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1999); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.06 (West 1998). See also infra notes 23-27.
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1)(a) (1999) (stating that "[tihe penalty for any
felony or misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided in this subsection if the commission of
such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on... sexual orientation... of the
victim").
14. See, e.g., id.
15. See, e.g., Abby Rubenfeld, Lessons Learned: A Reflection upon Bowers v.
Hardwick, 11 NoVA L. REv. 59 (1986) (discussing the background, importance, and future
ramifications of the Bowers decision).
16. Dan Hawes, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 1999 Capital Gains and
Losses: A State by State Review of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, & HIV/AIDS-
Related Legislation in 1999 9 (1999). See also Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A&M Univ., 737
F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that university's justifications for refusing to officially
recognize homosexual student group were insufficient to justify infringement of the group's
First Amendment rights); Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding
that reliance on opinions by psychiatrists that homosexual student organization as campus
20001 753
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were sometimes cited as a reason for denying incorporation to groups.' 7 As
noted in the Terl article, the right of gays and lesbians to be admitted to
practice law in Florida was placed in issue because of Florida's sodomy
law.
18
In Florida, the criminal statute outlawing "unnatural and lascivious
acts"'19 is deemed to outlaw sexual conduct between members of the same
sex,2 although the Supreme Court of Florida has never stated definitively
that it covered private consensual same-sex conduct between adults. I
Although some have believed that the state's broad Privacy Amendment2
would negate this law's application to homosexual conduct, it has not yet
been so construed. If the statute does still outlaw private consensual same-
sex sexual activity, it places Florida in a minority of states.2 Presently,
organization would tend to perpetuate or expand homosexual behavior was insufficient to
justify governmental prior restraint on right of group to associate); Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that university's refusal to register
association on same terms and conditions as those applied to other student organizations
violated student organization's First and Fourteenth Amendments); Gay Students Org. of
Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that prohibiting organization
from holding social activities on campus denied members' right of association).
17. See In re Thom, 40 A.D.2d 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (overturning lower court
decision denying recognition of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, founded to
litigate, educate, and engage in public policy work for lesbians and gay men, as a public
interest organization), rev'd by Application of Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1973) (rev'd per
curium).
18. Terl, supra note 1, at 795, 806, 811-12, 851-53. For a discussion of this problem
in other states, see generally Eric H. Miller, Annotation, Sexual Conduct or Orientation as
Ground for Denial of Admission to Bar, 21 A.L.R. 4TH 1109 (1983).
19. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1999). For a discussion of the vagueness of many statutes
that outlaw same-sex sexual behavior, see Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992).
20. § 800.02. See Terl, supra note 1, at 794 n.7 (citing cases discussing the
application of the statute to members of the same sex).
21. See Cox v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 904 (Fla.
1995) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that, under the state's
interpretation of the statute, private, consensual sexual activity between adults of the same sex
was not covered).
22. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1980).
23. Sixteen states still have some form of "sodomy" statute in effect. See State-by-
State Sodomy Update (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.lambdalegal.orglcgi-bin/pages/
documents/record?record=275>. For a listing of the 16 states, see infra note 24. Contrary to
recent trends, Oklahoma increased the penalties for sodomy from ten to twenty years. OKLA.
STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 886 (West Supp. 2000). See also HAWES, supra note 16, at 120.
[Vol. 24:751
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sixteen states24 outlaw some types of private consensual sexual activity
between adults with fourz5 of these states limiting the bans to sexual acts
between members of the same sex.6 Florida is one of the thirteen states that
ban such activity between opposite-sex as well as same-sex couples.
27
Although Bowers v. Hardwick rejected a challenge to the constitutionality
of such laws under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution,29 a growing number of states have recognized
challenges pursuant to their state constitutions.
30
24. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and
Virginia. State-by-State Sodomy Update, supra note 23.
25. Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. Id
26. The Arkansas, Texas, Virginia, and Louisiana statutes are currently being
challenged in court. See State-by-State Sodomy Law Update, supra note 23. For a more in-
depth discussion of the challenges in Arkansas and Texas, see Lambda: Just Days Apart,
Courts in Texas and Arkansas Hear Challenges to Sodomy Law (visited Apr. 10, 2000)
<http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=490> (discussing the
background and current status of the Arkansas case of Picado v. Pryor, No. CV-99-7048 and
the Texas cases of Lawrence v. Texas, No. 14-99-0011 1-CR, and Garner v. Texas, No. 14-99-
00199-CR).
27. See FLRA STAT. § 800.02 (1999).
28. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Much legal scholarship has been generated by this decision,
most of it critical. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737
(1989); Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REv. 521 (1989).
29. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 638 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(disputing the denial of equal protection of homosexuals under the law).
30. See Powell v. State 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (holding sodomy statute violates
privacy guarantees in due process clause of state constitution); Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (holding sodomy statute violates privacy and equal protection
guarantees of state constitution); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (holding
sodomy statute violates privacy guarantees in state constitution and state's interest in
promoting either public health or morals was not a compelling state interest to warrant the
infringement of privacy rights); People v. Onofre 72 A.D.2d 268 (N.Y. 1980) (holding
sodomy statute violates federal constitution); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa.
1980) (holding sodomy statute violates equal protection clause of state constitution);
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding sodomy statute
violates privacy guarantees in state constitution). In 1999 a Baltimore circuit court found the
Maryland statute to be unconstitutional, and the Maryland Attorney General agreed to stop
enforcing the statute rather than appeal the decision. See Lambda Legal States: Maryland
(visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http:/www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/record?record=20>.
See also HAWES, supra note 16, at 10, 75. But see State v. Baxley, 656 So. 2d 973 (La. 1995)
(holding that a statute punishing solicitation of oral or anal sex for compensation did not
violate the state constitution's equal protection guarantee); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508
(Mo. 1986) (upholding sodomy statute); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App. Ct.
2000] 755
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Turning to the use of the criminal law to protect LGBT persons, Florida
is one of the states that provides increased penalties for and collects data
concerning crimes motivated by a bias against a person because of his sexual
orientation.31 The federal government requires the United States Department
of Justice to collect and report information concerning violent crimes related
to a number of categories, including sexual orientation, under the Hate
Crime Statistics Act. '"Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia
have established some sort of mechanism to respond to and/or record
information about hate crimes related to sexual orientation." 33 Although
34there are some criticisms of these types of statutes, there appears to be a
trend for their passage.
35
Florida therefore finds itself in regard to its approach to LGBT persons
in the criminal law area with one foot in the past and one tentatively stepping
out towards the future. Finding itself in a dwindling number of states,
mostly southern, that still criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual conduct
between adults, it remains tied to a tradition that most other states have
either chosen to abandon or are seriously reconsidering. On the other hand,
the legislature's inclusion of sexual orientation in its hate crimes legislation
places the state clearly within the trend toward this type of protective
legislation during the past decade.
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS/BALLOT INITIATIVES
Currently, eleven states and the District of Columbia ban discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in private employment through
36legislation. One hundred six municipalities and eighteen counties ban
1992) (declaring sodomy statute unconstitutional), rev'd State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941
(Tex. 1994) (holding that civil court lacked jurisdiction to consider constitutionality of
criminal statute). Challenges are currently underway in Arkansas, Virginia, Louisiana, and,
once again, Texas. See supra note 26.
31. FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1999).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994).
33. Wayne van der Meide, Legislating Equality, A Review of Laws Affecting Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgendered People in the United States 7 (1999).
34. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 462
(1999); Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 23 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 387 (1994).
35. See Kahan, supra note 34, at 462-63.
36. VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 4. The 11 states are: California, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. See also Summary of States Which Prohibit Discrimination
Based on Sexual Orientation (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.lambdalegal.orgcgi-
bin/pages/documents/record?record=185> [hereinafter Summary of States]. Through an
756 [Vol. 24:751
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sexual orientation discrimination in private employment.37 Eighteen states
and the District of Columbia prohibit such discrimination in public
38
employment. Nine states and the District of Columbia prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination in public accommodations and housing.39 With
the addition of local government ordinances, it is estimated that
approximately thirty-eight percent of the population of the United States is
therefore protected against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
in private employment.4° Most of these protections have been passed during
the 1990s, including ten of the twelve states that have enacted such
legislation.41
In Florida, the cities of Gainesville, Key West, Miami Beach, Tampa,
and West Palm Beach and the counties of Broward, Monroe, and Palm
Beach have passed laws banning discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.42 Alachua County passed such an ordinance in 1993, but it was
appellate decision, Oregon has declared sexual orientation discrimination to be illegal. See
Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435,442 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
university's denial of insurance benefits to employees' domestic partners violated privileges
and immunities clause of Oregon Constitution). In 1997, Maine outlawed sexual orientation
discrimination. Human Rights Act, ch. 205, 1997 Me. Legis. Serv. 205 (West) (codified as
amended at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (West Supp. 1999)). The 1997 amendment,
however, was repealed pursuant to a voter referendum which took place February 10, 1998.
See Lambda Legal States (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/
stateslrecord?record=19>. The amendment that would have banned sexual orientation dis-
crimination never went into effect because of a "people's veto." Id.
37. VAN DER MEDE, supra note 33, at 83-84. See also Summary of States, Cities, and
Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual orientation (visited April 10, 2000)
<http'/w~vw.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=217> [hereinafter Sum-
mary of States, Cities, and Counties].
38. VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 83-84. The 18 states are: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. See also Summary of States, Cities, and Counties, supra
note 37.
39. See Summary of States, Cities, and Counties, supra note 37. The nine states are
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
40. VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 11.
41. I. at9.
42. Gainesville, Fla., Code of Ordinances §§ 8-1 to 8-6, 8-21 to 8-22, 8-48 (1999);
Key West, Fla., Code § 72 (1999); Miami Beach, Fla., Code § 62-32 (1999); Tampa, Fla.,
Code of Ordinances §§ 12-1 to 12-114 (1999); West Palm Beach, Fla., Ordinance § 90-1
(1999). See also Lambda Legal Status: Florida (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.
Iambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/record?record--9>.
2000]
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repealed by a voter referendum in November 1994.43 A similar ordinance
was passed in 1998 in Gainesville, which is in Alachua County.
44
Hillsborough County passed an ordinance in 1991, but the County
Commission repealed it in 1995.45 As was noted in the Ten article,46 Dade
County passed an ordinance, 47 which was repealed by a voter referendum in
1977," and the Miami-Dade County Commission again considered
amending its antidiscrimination law to include sexual orientation more than
twenty years later.49 After first rejecting the amendment on a perfunctory
first reading, the Commission reversed itself and passed the ordinance in
December, 1998. Approximately a year after its passage, opponents have
received permission to seek signatures to place a referendum before the
voters to repeal the protection.' As has been true of similar measures
attempted across the state, this effort has been supported by the Florida
52Family Association, based in Tampa. Thus, as this article goes to press,
43. See Lambda Legal Status: Florida (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.lambda
legal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/record?record--9>.
44. GAINEsvILLE, FLA., CODE §§ 8-1 to 8-6, 8-21 to 8-22, 8-48 (1999) (enacted Dec.
14, 1998).
45. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE § 88-9, amended by ORDINANCE §§
88-26, 90-2, 99-1. The repeal was reported in County Kills Gay Rights Law, MIAMI HERALD,
May 18, 1995, at 5B.
46. Ted, supra note 1, at 803-04.
47. DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCE, § 1 A-I (1977) (formerly Ordinance §
77-4).
48. Carl Hiaasen, Gay Rights Law is Defeated, MIAMI HERALD, June 8, 1997, at IA.
49. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. lIA (1999) (amended on
Dec. 1, 1998). See also Ten, supra note 1, at 804.
50. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. llA (1999). Thirty
complaints were filed during the first year the ordinance was in effect, with one quarter of
those complaints being settled. Don Finefrock, Foes of Gay-Rights Law Starting Drive for
Repeal, THE MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 9, 2000, at B2.
51. Finefrock, supra note 50, at B2. Because the county's referendum laws require
signatures from only four percent of the registered voters, many observers felt that the group
would be able to get the measure placed on the ballot. Id.
52. The Florida Family Association has twice unsuccessfully attempted to repeal the
antidiscrimination ordinance in Tampa, but successfully helped to repeal an Alachua County
ordinance. Don Finefrock, New Fight Nears as Foes Target Rights of Gays, Lesbians, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 3, 2000, at lB. The same group also attempted to place a statewide referendum
on the Florida ballot that would have banned the passage of such laws in Florida. The
referendum is similar to Amendment 2 in Colorado, which was declared unconstitutional by
the United States Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). The Florida
measure was declared a violation of the single-subject matter requirement respecting ballot
measures. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to
Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1994). See Terl, supra note 1, at 841-42.
10
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Miami-Dade County is confronted with the possibility of a repeat of the
Anita Bryant campaign.
The threat of the ballot initiative against the LGBT community
continues across the country. 3 In spite of the Romer v. Evanss4 decision by
the Supreme Court of the United States, repeal efforts aimed at
antidiscrimination provisions that cover sexual orientation continue.55 In
addition, the a proval by voters on March 7, 2000 of California's
Proposition 22, the so-called "Knight Initiative" that seeks to limit
marriage to opposite sex couples, may spur more voter initiatives that limit
the rights of lesbians and gays in relation to marriage and other family
-57
issues. Although these other initiatives pose threats to lesbians and gays,
most involve passage of laws as opposed to constitutional amendments like
the Florida process, so the harm is arguably less serious from a legal
structure perspective.
In summary, in regard to antidiscrimination laws, Florida has seen
passage of local ordinances in most of its largest urban centers, although not
without controversy and debate.58  The state legislature has not seriously
53. For a critique of the harm caused by ballot initiatives against lesbians and gays,
see, Adams I, supra note 4, at 594; William E. Adams, Jr., Is It Animus or a Difference of
Opinion? The Problems Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34
WHIIAME L. REV. 449 (1998) [hereinafter Adams II]; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the Closet, 50 VAND. L. REv. 419 (1997);
Hans Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign
Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19 (1993); Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and
Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REv. 361 (1997); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
283 (1994). For a spirited defense against the critics of the initiative process in general, see
Clayton P. Gillette, Plebicites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government
Law, 86 MICH. L. REv. 942 (1988).
54. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
55. The State of Maine repealed its state statutory provision outlawing sexual
orientation discrimination by a vote of 52% to 48%. Adams I, supra note 53, at 461 (citing
Carey Goldberg, Forced to Act on Gay Marriage, Vermont Finds Itself Deeply Split, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at A2). During the 2000 elections, the city of Femdale, Michigan
repealed its antidiscrinination ordinance. Bill Laitner, Voters Say No to Rights Ordinance,
DErROrr FREE PRESS, Feb. 23, 2000, at B1.
56. 2000 Cal. Leg. Serv. Prop. 22 (West) (codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West
2000)) (enacting the California Defense of Marriage Act which states "[o]nly marriages
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California").
57. See VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 8.
58. See, e.g., BRoWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16 -150 (1999)
("Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999"); PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE §
15-58 (1999) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing practices);
MAMI-DADE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 11A (1999) (prohibiting discrimination based
20001
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considered such protection, however, unlike over half of the nation.5 9 As has
been indicated in this and the Terl article, the ballot initiative process has
successfully been used in Florida to repeal protections in various localities. 60
These campaigns are often divisive, frequently appealing to fear and
61prejudice.
IV. "FAMILY" LAW ISSUES
Whereas the antidiscrimination battles have mostly been waged in the
political arena, the fight for equality in the family law area has seen more
battles in the judicial arena. One notable exception is Florida's legislation
forbidding the recognition of same-sex marriage. 62 3 The Florida statute is
similar to those passed in twenty-nine other states and is also similar the
federal government's Defense of Marriage Act.a The relevance of this
on sexual orientation in public and private employment, public accommodations, and
housing).
59. In addition to the states that have passed antidiscrimination measures, 19 other
states considered such legislation in 1999, with bills making significant progress in at least
five of them. HAWES, supra note 16, at 7. In Hawaii, Maryland, and New York, one of the
two legislative bodies passed a nondiscrimination bill. Id. In Illinois a similar bill failed by
two votes in its House of Representatives. Id. In Delaware, the failure was by three votes in
its House of Representatives. Id.
60. See Terl, supra note 1, at 839.
61. See, e.g., Adams II, supra note 53, at 467-77.
62. FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
63. See ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1999); ALASKA CONST., art I, § 25; ALASKA STAT. §
25.05.013 (Michie 1999); ARrz. REv. STAT. ANN § 25-101 (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§
9-11-107, 109, 208 (Michie 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81r (West 1999); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Harrison 1999); HAW. CONsT.,
art. I, § 23 (amended 1997); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 572-1.6,572-12 (Michie 1999); IDAHO
CODE § 32-209 (1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
11-1-1 (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101
(1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020, .040, .045 (Michie 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. art.
86, 89, 3520 (West 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 701 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN.,
[FAMILY LAW] § 2-201 (1999); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1, .271, .272 (West 1999);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.021, 517.03 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (1999);
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103, 401 (Smith 1999); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.020
(Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (1999); OK.A.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 3, 3.1 (West 1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 1999); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1, 38 (Michie 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-104, 113, 306 (1999); "Ix. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (West 1999);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1999); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.010, .020 (West 1999).
64. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1999).
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legislation has been brought to the foreground again with the recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Vermont in Baker v. Vermont,65 which ruled that
LGBT couples are entitled to rights and benefits similar to those granted to
heterosexual spouses.66 The Supreme Court of Vermont left it to the
68legislature to devise a remedy,67 which it is currently debating. The article
by Mark Strasser in this volume addresses the same-sex marriage issue
across the country in more detail.69
The movement to provide benefits to same-sex couples similar to those
provided to married heterosexual couples has recently gained momentum
across the nation. Several states presently offer some type of benefit for
same-sex domestic partners. Sixty-four cities and nineteen counties across
the country do as well. 7 1 In addition, thirty-seven cities and four counties
offer some type of registry for same-sex couples who want to register as
domestic partners. The State of California has recently passed such a
registry.73
By comparison, as in the criminal law area, Florida finds itself
following some trends and behind others in the battles to recognize the long-
term relationships of same-sex couples. In spite of Florida's ban on same-
sex marriage, a bill to create a domestic partner registry with the extension
of health insurance and other benefits to the registrants was introduced in
1999,74 and similar legislation is proposed for the 2000 legislative session.!
On the local government level, Broward County has passed one of the
most progressive domestic partnership laws in the country, although it has
been challenged in court. Along with the cities of San Francisco,
65. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
66. Il at 889.
67. Ic at 886, 889.
68. See Carey Goldberg, Forced to Act on Gay Marriage, Vermont Finds Itself
Deeply Split, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 3, 2000, at Al.
69. See generally Mark Strasser, Loving, Baehr, and the Right to Marry: On Legal
Argumentation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 23 NOVA L. REv. 769 (2000).
70. See VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 85. The seven states are California,
Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Vermont.
71. Id. at 85-86.
72. Id. at 86.
73. Id.
74. Both versions of the bill died in committee in both the House and Senate. HAWES,
supra note 16, at 52.
75. S. 686, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000).
76. Broward County, Fla., Code of Ordinances § 162-150 (1999).
77. See Lowe v. Broward County, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 345 (17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 30,
1999) (denying Broward County's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing and finding that
plaintiff does have taxpayer standing to challenge, under Florida law, the constitutionality of
the County's Domestic Partnership Act); Lowe v. Broward County, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
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Sacramento, Davis, and Seattle, Broward County is one of the few
jurisdictions to require or encourageprivate employers to extend benefits to
the domestic partners of employees. Broward's program offers a bidding
preference equivalent to one percent to those employers that offer such
benefits to domestic partners to the same extent that they are offered to
legally married partners.79  There are also more limited registries and
benefits offered in Key West, Miami Beach, and Monroe County. 0 The city
of West Palm Beach permits bereavement leave for domestic partners. 1
Furthermore, a bill to provide benefits on a statewide basis is being proposed
82for the 2000 legislative session. At this point, seven states offer some type
of domestic partner employment benefits to same-sex partners. 3 California
has a domestic partnership registry.84 In addition, forty-one municipal
governments have domestic partnership registries and eighty-three offer
some type 8of employment benefit to the domestic partner of their
employees. 5 Seventeen percent of the population in the United States now
live in a state, county, or city with a domestic partner registry.
86
Without legal recognition of their relationships, same-sex couples find
themselves forced to attempt to fit themselves into existing legal categories
503 (17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 30, 1999) (entering summary judgment in favor of Broward County
and finding that the County's Domestic Partnership Act neither recognized a new marital
relationship nor encroached upon an area exclusively reserved to the state). See also HAWEs,
supra note 16, at 51. Lowe is currently on appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Florida under case number 99-1664. Florida Courts (visited Apr. 13, 2000) <http:lwww.
lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/ cases/record?record=1 17>.
78. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16 -157 (1999) (stating
"[e]xcept where federal or state law mandate to the contrary, in the purchase of personal
property, general services, or professional services ... by means of competitive bid or
proposal procedure, a preference in an amount of one (1) percent of the bid or proposal price
may be given to a Contractor providing for nondiscrimination of benefits for Domestic
Partners").
79. Id. See also VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 17.
80. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE § 72.32-.34 (1999); MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 62-127
(1999); MONROE COuNTY, FLA., CODE § 14 (1999). See also VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33,
at 40-42.
81. West Palm Beach, Fla., Ordinance § 90-1 (1990).
82. S. 686, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2000).
83. VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 85. The seven states are California, Delaware,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Vermont. Id. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §
22873 (West 1999) (permitting employers to offer health benefits to employees' domestic
partners).
84. CAL. FAM. CODE § 298.5 (West 1999).
85. See VAN DER MEIDE, supra note 33, at 17. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16 -157. (1999).
86. Id.
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when those relationships end. There are three reported appellate cases
where Florida courts expressly address the lejal rights between same-sex
couples who have dissolved their relationship. 7' In Posik v. Layton,8 the
Fifth District Court of Appeals upheld a cohabitation agreement between a
lesbian couple in which one of the parties, a physician, agreed to provide
"support" in the form of liquidated damages should she engage in any of a
number of specified acts that would in essence cause the relationship to
end.8 9 Although the court was careful to note that Florida recognizes no
rights arising from a nonmarital relationship merely because it is similar to a
marriage in most relevant respects, it was willing to enforce a contract
between two parties who sought to undertake rights and obligations between
each other, as long as the agreement was not "inseparably based upon illicit
consideration of sexual services."' 9 The court held that, pursuant to the
Statute of Frauds,91 the contract must be in writing.92 In a custody dispute
between a "biological" mother and a "psychological" mother, the Fourth
District Court of Appeals argued that the latter lacked standing to obtain
custody, or force visitation from the biological mother when the relationship
between the two lesbian partners ended.93 The court noted that the Supreme
Court of Florida had recognized in Von Eiff v. Azicri,94 that Florida's
constitutional right to privacy precluded intervention into the parent's
fundamental rights absent a showing of demonstrable harm to the child.95
Prior to this case, the First District Court of Appeals rejected the claim of a
nonbiological lesbian parent that there is a right to shared parental
responsibility or visitation.96 The concurrence in Kazmierazak noted that the
problem for the lesbian co-parent was primarily a result of the statutory ban
against homosexual adoptions.
97
In addition to ruling on disputes between same-sex partners, Florida
appellate courts have also considered cases between lesbian mothers and
their heterosexual partners. As noted in the Ted article,98 a series of three
87. See Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Packard v.
Packard, 697 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
88. 695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
89. Id. at 760-63.
90. Id. at 762.
91. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1999).
92. Posik, 695 So. 2d at 762.
93. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
94. 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
95. Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 107.
96. Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
97. See Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 111 (Gross, J., concurring).
98. See Ten, supra note 1, at 826-28.
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cases from the Panhandle region of the state generated concern in the LGBT
community across the state and nation. 99 In Ward v. Ward,1°° the trial court
removed custody of a child from a lesbian mother to a father who had
murdered his former wife. 1 1 The appellate court, however, went to some
length to deny that its decision was based upon the sexual orientation of the
mother. The other two cases, Maradie v. Maradie103 and Packard v.
Packard, 4 also involved trial court decisions that awarded custody to the
nongay parent because of the sexual orientation of the lesbian mother. 15 The
Maradie case resulted in reversal because the trial court had judicially
noticed that "a homosexual environment is not a traditional home
environment, and can adversely affect a child."' 6 The court specifically
rejected the opportunity to determine "whether trial courts can deprive a
mother of custody of her child solely because the mother is a lesbian."' 7 In
Packard, the appellate court reversed a trial court finding in favor of the
husband based upon the fact that he would provide "a more traditional
family environment" without more specific factual findings to demonstrate
upon what this conclusion was based.108  Unfortunately, without a more
direct admonition to the trial court, it reinstated its original order, but was
more careful in its opinion on remand.1 9 Despite the controversy and
attention given to these cases, the narrowly-drawn opinions have made it
difficult to measure their ultimate impact. Although all three refused to let
stand decisions unsupported by little more than conclusory declarations that
arguably demonstrated homophobic thinking, the appellate courts in each did
not explicitly reject the consideration of sexual orientation as a factor in
custodial fitness or clarify its relevance in a custodial dispute. A new case is
currently awaiting decision from the Second District Court of Appeal. In
99. See Packard v. Packard, 697 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Ward v.
Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
100. 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
101. Id. at 252.
102. Id. "Although this case involves the modification of primary residential custody
from a mother who is a lesbian, the focus of this case is not on the mother's sexual orientation,
but on the best interests of the child." Id.
103. 680 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
104. 697 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997). This case is also interesting
because the wife had engaged in a sexual menage a trios with her husband and her lesbian
lover during the marriage. Id. at 1293. The trial court apparently did not discuss this aspect
of the father's sexual conduct in determining which household was more "traditional." Id.
105. Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 541; Packard, 697 So. 2d at 1293.
106. Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 541.
107. Id.
108. Packard, 697 So. 2d at 1293.
109. Id.
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Doe v. Doe,110 the trial court, amongst other findings, felt that the stigma and
insults that a child of a lesbian mother would suffer in fact justified
placement of the children with the father."' This case oddly parallels
another Florida case, Palmore v. Sidoti, 2 in which the Unites States
Supreme Court rejected this "stigma" argument in a race discrimination
context.!1
3
In the adoption area, challenges to Florida's ban against adoption by
homosexuals continue 1 4 At this point, Florida is the only state that bans
homosexuals from adopting by statute,115 although some other states are
currently contemplating similar measures. 6 New Hampshire, the only other
state to have a statutory ban on homosexual adoptions, repealed its measure
in 1999.117 The Florida statute has been challenged in court a number of
times. A trial court in Key West found the statute unconstitutional, but the
state neither defended nor appealed the decision.118 The next case to
challenge the statute was HRS v. Cox,119 which denied the Due Process and
Privacy claims of the petitioners, but remanded the Equal Protection Claim
110. See Lambda Legal Case: Doe v. Doe (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http:llwww.
lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/eases/record?record=102>. At the request of the litigant in this
case, the names of Doe have been used to preserve anonymity.
111. Id.
112. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
113. Id. at433.
114. See generally Tiffani G. Lee, Note, Cox v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services: A Challenge to Florida's HomosexualAdoption Ban, 51 U. MiAMI L.
REv. 151 (1996) (discussing the legislative history of Florida's gay exclusion statute and the
constitutional claims raised in Cox); Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Adoptions of Child by Same-
Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R. 5Thi 54 (1995) (discussing reported cases throughout the country
regarding the issues surrounding same-sex adoptions). See also infra note 123.
115. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1999) (providing "No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.").
116. HAWES, supra note 16, at 9. During 1999, nine states considered some type of
ban on "'homosexuals' or unmarried couples from adopting... becoming foster parents, or
gaining custodial rights." Id In addition, Arkansas has banned homosexuals from being
foster parents through the child welfare regulatory process and Utah has used the same type of
process to prohibit unmarried couples from adopting or serving as foster parents. Id. at 6.
117. 1999 N.H. Laws ch. 18 (H.B. 90) (codified as amended at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 170-B:4 (1999)).
118. Seebol v. Farie, 17 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1331 (Fla. 16th Cir. Ct. 1991), reprinted
in State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1221-29 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
119. 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
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for trial.120 Weary from the delays and harassment resultant from this
litigation, Cox decided to voluntarily dismiss the case after the remand. This
case was followed by a challenge in Broward County filed by June Amer. In
Amer v. Johnson, 12 the trial court found the statute to be constitutional. 122
The decision has not been appealed. Another case has been filed in the
Southern District of Florida more recently by the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Children First Project at Nova Southeastern University. 123
A number of things are noticeable in the family law area. Florida has
joined the trend to explicitly express opposition to same-sex marriage.' 2 A
number of local governments within the state have adopted measures
however, that provide various types of recognition to same-sex couples. 15
Pending the sinature of Utah's governor to legislation banning adoption by
homosexuals, 16 Florida is alone in its statutory ban. Its decisions in the
child custody area are not unlike those in a number of other states. One of
the things most striking about the child custody area of the law is the near
invisibility of LGBT families in the reported opinions. Not only is the
number of opinions small, they are all from the last decade. If one were to
base one's conceptualization of reality by looking at the Southern Reporter,
one might think that lesbian and gay families did not exist until the 1990s.
The failure to recognize parental rights for LGBT parents in the adoption
and second parent cases have a seriously detrimental impact upon the
formation and continuation of LGBT families in Florida. Aside from the
adoption challenges and the refusal to recognize the rights of nonbiological
parents, the other reported appellate opinions in recent years have arguably
been more helpful, but they have been cautious, and it is therefore difficult
to measure their ultimate impact.
120. Id. at 903. For a lengthier critique of this case, see William E. Adams, Jr., Whose
Family Is It Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt
Children, 30 NEw ENG. L. REV. 579 (1996).
121. Amer v. Johnson, No. 92-14370 (11) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1997) (final order
upholding constitutionality of statute).
122. Id.
123. See Lofton v. Butterworth, Case No. 99-10058-Civ-King (S.D. Fla. filed May 26,
1999). See also HAWES, supra note 16, at 51.
124. See FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999) (providing "Marriages between persons of the
same sex entered into in any jurisdiction, whether within or outside the State of Florida, the
United States, or any other jurisdiction ... are not recognized for any purpose in this state").
125. See, e.g., MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE §§ 62-126 to 62-129 (1999); MONROE
COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 14 (1999). See also supra notes 76, 80, 81.
126. H.B. 103, 2000 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2000). See also William E. Adams, Jr., Whose
Family Is it Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt
Children, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 579 (1996).
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V. FUTURE TRENDS
According to one organization that studies trends in the states
concerning legislation effecting LGBT persons, the number and percentage
of favorable bills for such persons in state legislatures has increased over the
last few years.1 27 In addition, there is evidence of a trend toward the
favorable legislation actually being passed or moving farther in the process
than in previous years. 1s Part of this has arguably been the result of the
election of lesbian or gay state legislators.2 9 On the other hand, the
increased pressure to pass legislation to protect the free exercise of religion
also may pose problems as some may interfere with existing civil rights
protections for the LGBT community. 13  Florida considered such a bill in
1999.131
If the rights of LGBT persons are to advance in Florida, some of the
protections must undoubtedly emerge through the legislative process. Not
only have Florida courts seemed reluctant to take bold steps to recognize
rights for LGBT persons, it is also questionable whether rights gained
through the judicial process without popular support can endure. If the
experience of other states is applicable, 32 legislative progress may be
accelerated by the election of legislators who are openly lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgendered, although this should not be deemed a necessary
prerequisite. At present, Florida has four openly lesbian or gay elected
judges and two city council persons.1
However, for significant progress to be made within the near future, thejudiciary also has a role to play. This is particularly true in areas of the law,
127. In 1999, 214 favorable and 81 unfavorable bills were introduced in state
legislatures across the country. HAWES, supra note 16, at 4. In 1996, the numbers were 61
and 99, respectively. Il
128. Id. at 4-5. A number of states either passed or moved hate crimes and civil rights
bills farther in the legislative process than ever before. Id.
129. Some believe the passage of the employment nondiscrimination measure in
Nevada and the repeal of the adoption ban in New Hampshire was in part the result of the
work of openly-gay or lesbian legislators. See id.
130. HAWES, supra note 16, at 12. See also David Kushner, Free Exercise, Fair
Housing and Marital Status-Alaska Style, 12 ALASKA L. Rv. 335 (1995).
131. HAWES, supra note 16, at 12.
132. Supra note 129.
133. HAWES, supra note 16, at 175-78. An openly gay man ran for and won the
election for the Mayor of the town of Wilton Manors in Broward County, Florida. Lisa
Arthur, Gays Raising Their Political Profile in Wilton Manors Council Election, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 7, 2000, at B3. As a result of his election, the municipality became the second
one in the country to have a gay majority on its governing body. Id. The author is also
personally acquainted with a newly-elected city commissioner in the town of South Miami,
who recently ran a campaign as an openly-gay candidate.
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such as the family law, where judges are granted broad discretion. As can be
seen from the Packard case above, an overly cautious opinion may permit
trial judges to make decisions without having to justify their possible biases
with careful, considered factual findings supported by recognized scientific
evidence, as opposed to stereotypical fears and misgivings.
Such unlimited discretion should not avoid serious scrutiny where the
discretion is used to the disadvantage of a group that has been subjected to a
long history of state-supported legal animus. As the Terl article makes clear,
such is the history of the treatment of lesbians and gays in Florida in social,
political, and legal spheres. Despite the pockets of progress in its urban
centers, the state itself remains remarkably unfriendly to its LGBT citizens.
Except for its hate crimes provisions, Florida's state laws are mostly hostile
or unsupportive. One of thirty states to ban same-sex marriages, Florida
remains in the minority on other issues. It is nearly alone in its statutory ban
on adoptions, and it is also one of a shrinking number of states with its ban
on adult consensual same-sex activity. Its failure to seriously consider an
antidiscrimination statute finds the state once again trailing most of the
country in considering an issue that could assist LGBT persons.
This history and current state of affairs should cause the courts to
seriously consider the role that the state's past practices have on current
legal doctrine. Whether it is considering the "sodomy" statute, the adoption
ban, or the consideration of the wide variety of family issues that courts will
most likely be facing as the numbers of lesbian and gay families continues to
grow, the courts should contemplate the impact of its history in regard to
LGBT litigants. This is especially true of the adoption statute, which was134
passed during the height of the Anita Bryant campaign. The prejudice and
resultant stigmatization of LGBT Floridians is one that must not be ignored
if the state is to transcend its past. Although its laws and judicial
interpretations do not make its approach particularly unusual for a southern
state, one must ask whether such an increasingly urban, cosmopolitan state,
which would like to portrayed as a trend-setter and center of culture and
commerce, wants to find itself so situated in the twenty-first century.
134. See ch. 77-140, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 466, 466 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3)
(1977)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held, in Loving
v. Virginia,' that states were precluded from prohibiting an individual from2 3
marrying someone of a different race. In Baehr v. Lewin, a plurality of the
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the Hawaii same-sex marriage ban
implicated equal protection guarantees, remanding the case to give the state
an opportunity to establish that it had a compelling interest in maintaining
such a ban.4 Commentators have criticized Baehr, claiming that: 1) the
plurality's reliance on Loving was misplaced because that case allegedly had
no bearing on the issue before the court; and 2) the plurality's reasoning
would suggest that the state was precluded from enacting any marital
restrictions, for example, prohibitions on incestuous or polygamous
marriages. 5 Yet, a consideration of several cases in which interracial
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A., Harvard College; M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Chicago; J.D., Stanford Law School.
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id. at 12.
3. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993).
4. Id. at68.
5. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and
Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219 (1998); David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the
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marriage bans have been challenged helps to illustrate why cases involving
such challenges are much more relevant than commentators are willing to
admit, and why a state's being required to recognize same-sex marriages
would not entail that incestuous or polygamous marriages would also have to
be recognized.
Part II of this article discusses some of the various respects in which
Loving and Baehr are in fact analogous, commentators' claims to the
contrary notwithstanding. Part mH discusses the rhetorical claim that
recognition of same-sex marriages would entail that no marital prohibitions
are constitutionally permissible, concluding that this involves a
misunderstanding of the relevant law and is only a repetition of the kinds of
false claims that were made when theorists argued that interracial marriages
should not be recognized. The cases involving interracial marriage are
important to consider because they illustrate both how marital laws can
invidiously discriminate to deny people their fundamental rights and how
existing marital laws can be struck down without thereby establishing that no
marital restrictions are constitutionally permissible.
I1. THE LOVING ANALOGY
In Loving v. Virginia,6 the United States Supreme Court struck down
Virginia's ban on interracial marriage because it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Realizing that
Loving might carry great "rhetorical punch" in the same-sex marriage debate,
commentators discuss respects in which the statutory scheme in Loving was
different from the statutory scheme in Baehr.8 Yet, many of the differences
trumpeted by commentators are legally irrelevant, and those differences that
are legally relevant are often misrepresented either in how or in why they are
important. These exaggerations and misrepresentations only serve to
underscore the strength of the Loving analogy. While there of course are
differences between the Loving and Baehr cases, those differences are much
less legally significant than commentators are willing to admit.
Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201
(1998).
6. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. Id. at 12.
8. See Coolidge, supra note 5.
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A. Making Marriage a Crime
Commentators rightly point out that Loving involved a criminal
conviction, while Baehr did not.9 Thus, at issue in Loving was not only the
refusal of the State of Virginia to recognize the marriage of Mildred Jeter
and Richard Loving,10 but also the state's having convicted each of them of
attempting to marry a partner of a different race. In contrast, in Baehr, the
plaintiffs had sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Hawaii
statute, but had neither been charged with nor convicted of having
committed any crime.
1 2
Surprisingly, commentators fail to explain why that difference is im-
portant and why it should have any role in determining whether Loving casts
any light on the issues implicated in the same-sex marriage debate. Yet, to
point to differences without explaining how or even whether they are
important 3 is to offer rhetoric rather than legal argument. 4 Indeed, when
the claim is that cases are analogous rather than identical, it is of course
possible to identify differences between the cases and, thus, the essential part
of the analy'sis is in explaining why the identified differences are legally
significant. When this essential element is left undone, no headway can be
9. See id. at 219; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Liberty And Marriage-Baehr and
Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12 BYU . PUn. L. 253, 254 (1998) (pointing out that the
Lovings had been convicted of a crime).
10. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 (discussing the statutory scheme which "automatically voids
all marriages between 'a white person and a colored person' without any judicial proceeding")
(citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57 (1960)).
11. See id. at 4 n.3.
12. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-49 (plaintiffs were seeking a declaration of
unconstitutionality and an injunction prohibiting the future withholding of marriage licenses
on that sole basis).
13. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 220 (discussing "important differences between
Loving and Baehr' without explaining how many of those differences are legally significant).
14. Ironically, some commentators fail to explain the legal significance of their points
and, at the same time, claim that their opponents are failing to offer legal argumentation. See
generally id. at 201-04 (stating that those advocating 'same-sex marriage' are not making a
legal argument).
15. It is for this reason, among others, that much of the natural law debate about
same-sex marriage is disappointing. Not only do theorists like Professors Finnis, George,
Bradley, and others offer arguments which are internally inconsistent, but many of these
commentators seem to ignore that these discussions have very little to do with the laws that
states actually have enacted. See generally Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex
Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 51 (1998); Mark Strasser, Marital Acts, Morality, and the
Right to Privacy, 30 N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). Other commentators also do not seem
to appreciate that the discussions of natural law should be made in light of existing laws and
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made in determining whether one case casts light on how another case
should be decided.
Consider what the argument focusing on the fact of criminal conviction
in one case and not the other might look like and how it might be supported.
Commentators might suggest that the fatal weakness in Loving was that Ms.
Jeter and Mr. Loving had been charged with and convicted of having
attempted to marry each other when the law had precluded their marrying.
However, if this argument is to have import for the discussion at issue, these
commentators must argue that the conviction was the fatal weakness rather
than a fatal weakness. Otherwise, for example, the fact that Virginia
unconstitutionally limited the right to marry and in addition
unconstitutionally criminalized the attempt to marry someone of a different
race would hardly undermine a claim that a different state's limitation on the
right to marry was unconstitutional, even if that latter state did not, in
addition, criminalize the attempt. Thus, those pointing out that Loving
involved a conviction and Baehr did not, are implicitly suggesting that the
fact of criminalization is somehow essential and that Virginia's laws may not
have been held unconstitutional if only the state had not criminalized the
attempt to marry. Were that an accurate description of the law,
commentators might claim with plausibility that Hawaii's refusal to permit
same-sex marriages was constitutionally permissible, given that the state did
not also criminalize the attempt to marry. However, that is a
misinterpretation of the relevant case law and thus cannot be used to support
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.
To understand why, it is be helpful to consider the arguments that may
be offered to support the claim that Loving's fatal weakness involved the
convictions. Commentators may claim to find implicit support for that
interpretation when examining two cases involving Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statutes. In Naim v. Naim,16 the Supreme Court refused to
hear a challenge to Virginia's holding that an interracial marriage was void
because, the Court suggested, the case was "devoid of a properly presented
federal question."' 7 In Naim, no criminal charges had been filed and the
only issue was whether the court below had erred when holding that the
interracial marriage at issue was void.18 However, in Loving, where a
policies if indeed we are discussing whether the state should recognize same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Forum: Sexual Morality and the Possibility of "Same-Sex
Marriage" Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM J. JURIS 51 (1997). Professor
Koppelman spends remarkably little time discussing why these natural law arguments
(regardless of their internal benefits and drawbacks) have anything to do with existing laws
and policies. Id.
16. 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
17. Id. at 985.
18. Id.; see Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749,750 (Va. 1955).
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conviction was at issue, the Court heard the case and invalidated the
statutory scheme that had not been disturbed in Naim.19 It might be thought
that the distinguishing feature of the two cases is that a criminal conviction
was involved in one and not the other, and that it was this feature that
mandated the result in Loving.
Support for such a view might be found in Justice Stewart's Loving
concurrence where he emphasized that the Constitution prohibits making the
criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.20 Thus, were one
only to consider the Court's claim in Naim that no federal question had been
presented by the state's refusal to recognize an interracial marriage, 2' the
fact that there was a federal issue presented in Loving, and Justice Stewart's
concurrence, one might conclude that the Lovings' having been convicted
was legally significant. However, there are fatal weaknesses in such an
interpretation, since it neither accounts for the Loving opinion itself nor for
the Court's subsequent right to marry jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice
Stewart's having only concurred in the judgment is a strong signal that the
above interpretation simply misrepresents the propositions for which Loving
stands.
Justice Stewart's Loving concurrence is better understood in light of his
concurrence in McLaughlin v. Florida.22 At issue in McLaughlin was
Florida's making interracial fornication and adultery a separate crime which
was to be more severely punished than intra-racial fornication and adultery.
23
The Court struck down Florida's statutory scheme.24 In his concurrence,
Justice Stewart made clear that "it is simply not possible for a state law to be
valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend
upon the race of the actor."' 5
The State of Florida had argued that its criminal statute bolstered its
anti-miscegenation statute, that its interracial marriage ban was "immune
from attack under the Equal Protection Clause," and that the state's
interracial cohabitation law was "ancillary to and serve[d] the same purpose
as the miscegenation law itself."'  Basically, the State of Florida argued that
it prohibited interracial marriage, that the state's prohibition of such unions
19. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
20. Id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
21. The Court's actual claim had been that no federal question had properly been
presented, perhaps leaving room for an eventual challenge, although that possibility will not
be explored here.
22. 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 185 n.1 (specifying different crimes and penalties).
24. Id. at 196.
25. Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 195.
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was clearly constitutional, and that the state's prohibiting non-marital
interracial sexual relations served the same purposes as did the state's
prohibiting such marriages.27
The United States Supreme Court rejected Florida's argument, although
in doing so, the Court neither said that states were precluded from
prohibiting interracial marriages nor that states were precluded from using
criminal statutes to bolster their marriage laws.29 The Court instead took a
different tack, suggesting that the state's goals could be as well served by
other existing laws. 30 The Court pointed out that other statutory provisions
"which are neutral as to race express a general and strong state policy
against promiscuous conduct, whether engaged in by those who are married,
those who may marry or those who may not," and that the existing statutes,
"if enforced, would reach illicit relations of any kind and in this way protect
the integrity of the marriage laws of the State, including what is claimed to
be a valid ban on interracial marriage."31 Thus, the Court suggested that
Florida could serve its goals of deterring interracial marriages, assuming for
the sake of argument that such a goal was legitimate,32 by enforcing its
"neutral" statutes prohibiting non-marital relations and its marriage laws,
making it impossible for interracial couples to have marital relations.3 The
McLaughlin Court struck down the statute at issue because the state had
failed to establish that the statute was "a necessary adjunct to the State's ban
on interracial marriage," given the existing laws which might have been used
to deter the non-marital conduct.
34
The McLaughlin Court's ruling made it clear that Florida would be able
to punish interracial couples who had married and then had sexual relations,
since the state's anti-miscegenation law35 would make the marriage null and
of no legal effect, and the sexual relations might then be treated as either
fornication or as lewd and lascivious behavior. Further, on at least one
27. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 195.
28. See id. at 196. The Court expressly refused to express "any views about the
State's prohibition of interracial marriage." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196.
32. See id. at 195 (noting hypothetically that "even if we posit the constitutionality of
the ban against the marriage of a Negro and a white..
33. Id.
34. Id. at 196.
35. Ch. 59, § 13, 1832 Fla. laws 374,376, repealed by, ch. 69-195, § 1, 1969 Fla. Laws
770,771.
36. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 185 n.1 for a specification of the elements of each
crime.
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reading of McLaughlin, Florida could have adopted a different tack to
achieve its goals without offending constitutional guarantees.
Suppose that Florida had feared that its existing punishments of
fornication and adultery were not sufficiently severe to deter individuals
from having interracial sexual relations. Presumably, this was at least one of
the reasons that the state had made such relations a separate crime subject to
a more severe penalty. Suppose further that the state had expanded the range
of possible punishments for committing fornication or adultery to include the
possible penalties that might have been imposed under the statute
criminalizing interracial relations at issue in McLaughlin.3 7 By taking the
above steps, the state would have been able to impose the same penalties as
it did under the statutory scheme found unconstitutional in McLaughlin and,
according to one formulation of Justice Stewart's view, might nonetheless
not have violated the Constitution.
Bracketing Justice Stewart's comments for a moment, the statutory
scheme described above would have been much more difficult to challenge
than the one at issue in McLaughlin, since this amended scheme would not
have involved facial discrimination. Certainly, if under that modified
scheme the only individuals charged with and convicted of these crimes
were married to someone of another race, then the Court might have held
that equal protection guarantees had been violated because the law had been
"applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights.
38
However, because the imposition of particular penalties might seem so
fact-dependent and because many types of couples might be convicted of
such crimes, it would be harder to establish that there had been selective
prosecution if the state was less blatant with respect to its prosecution
choices. Even if, for example, it could be established that interracial couples
were receiving more severe penalties than were intra-racial couples for
having committed adultery or fornication, the Court might turn a blind eye to
such evidence.39 In any event, Justice Stewart's articulated worry that the
criminality of the act cannot depend upon the race of the actor would not be
at issue in this modified statutory scheme, since adultery, fornication, and
lewd and lascivious behavior would all be prohibited regardless of the races
of the parties. If his sole constitutional worry was that the criminal statute
explicitly incorporated race, then the same invidious results might have been
achieved more subtly without implicating his constitutional concerns.
37. See id. (discussing the penalties).
38. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373-74 (1886).
39. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987) (stating "[thus, if we accepted
McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision,
we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty") (footnote omitted).
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It is, of course, not suggested that Florida should have adopted the
above scheme but merely that Justice Stewart's stated objection would be
easy for a state to avoid, while both preventing interracial marriage and
punishing those who attempted to contract such marriages. Yet, the Loving
opinion precluded far more than did Justice Stewart's concurrence. Not only
does the opinion preclude a state's explicitly criminalizing the attempt to
marry someone of a different race, but it also precludes a state's barring
interracial couples from marrying.4 4 Thus, while both McLaughlin and
Loving struck down criminal statutes,41 Loving did far more than that, since
it also invalidated the laws barring interracial marriage then existing in
several states.42
The Loving Court offered two bases upon which the Virginia anti-
miscegenation law would have been struck down even had there not in
addition been statutes criminalizing the attempt to marry someone of a
different race.43 The Court wrote that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men," suggesting that the state's denial of the Lovings'
right to marry violated due process guarantees 44 and that "restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.,
45
Arguably, the proper interpretation of Loving can only be established
upon an examination of subsequent decisions concerning the right to marry
generally or, perhaps, the Loving decision specifically. Yet, the subsequent
case law also establishes that Loving was about more than merely preventing
states from criminalizing the attempt to marry a partner of a different race,
since in subsequent case law Loving stands for the proposition that "the right
to marry is of fundamental importance." 46 Thus, while it is true that Loving
involved criminal convictions and Baehr did not, and it is of course true that
a year's imprisonment is not to be treated lightly,47 it is simply wrong to
40. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
41. See Robert A. Destro, Symposium, Law & the Politics of Marriage: Loving v.
Virginia After 30 Years, Introduction, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1207, 1213 (1998) (pointing out
that both cases involved criminal statutes).
42. See id. at 1207-08 (suggesting that several states had anti-miscegenation laws).
43. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
44. Id. (stating that "[t]hese statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
45. Id.
46. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that "the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right to marry") (citing
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)
(stating that "[t]he leading decision of this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia").
47. The Lovings were sentenced to one year in jail. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. The
776 [Vol. 24:769
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss3/1
Strasser
suggest that the fatal weakness of the Virginia statutory framework was that
criminal penalties were involved. If Virginia had merely refused to
recognize the Lovings' relationship, 48 the state's law would still have been
unconstitutional.49 Thus, while it is true that criminal penalties were at issue
in Loving but not in Baehr, that has nothing to do with whether Loving is
instructive with respect to how Baehr should be decided.
Ironically, had the difficulty presented by Loving been that there is
something wrong with using criminal statutes to buttress the marriage laws,
this would have had implications for other state statutes. Consider state
statutes that preclude marriages between individuals closely related by blood
and that also criminalize the violation of those incest statutes.50 Were states
precluded from passing criminal laws to bolster their marriage statutes, then
it would seem that those laws would be unconstitutional. The point here, of
course, is neither that incest and anti-miscegenation laws are analogous 51 nor
that the Constitution precludes states from using criminal statutes to bolster
their marriage laws, but merely that a blanket rule suggesting that criminal
laws could not be used to bolster such laws would have wider implications
than originally thought.
sentences were suspended for a period of 25 years on the condition that they leave the state
and not return together during that time. Id.
48. See Kohm, supra note 9, at 256-57 (suggesting that an important distinction was
that in Loving, state proceedings were instituted against the couple, whereas in Baehr, the
state had merely refused to "sanction certain relationships"); see also Coolidge, supra note 5,
at 219 (distinguishing between Loving and Baehr by suggesting that in Hawaii "the marriage
law is positive, not prohibitory"). Professor Coolidge implies that nothing was amiss in the
Hawaii case because "[i]n Hawaii, no one was charged with a felony; the State simply sent
them a polite letter and returned their marriage applications." Coolidge, supra note 5, at 219.
49. Ironically, Professor Kohm recognizes that Loving is about the right to marry
rather than about the right to have state proceedings instituted against one when one does
marry. See Kohm, supra note 9, at 254 (noting that the Loving Court held that "liberty and
freedom to marry is indeed a fundamental right"). She nonetheless distinguishes between
Baehr and Loving by discussing whether proceedings had been instituted against the couple.
See id.
50. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-3(a), (c) (1975) (specifying the family members
whom individuals cannot marry and the kind of felony that would be committed for attempting
to contract such a marriage); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106 (a), (b) (Michie 1987) (specifying
which marriages would violate the incest prohibition and specifying the criminal penalty for
attempting to contract such a marriage); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.020 (West 1999) (specifying
the marriages that would violate incest prohibition and the type of felony involved in the
attempt to contract that marriage).
51. For a discussion of the historical claim that they were analogous, see infra notes
125-28 and accompanying text.
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B. On Using the Courts to Vindicate Rights
Some commentators imply that there is something illicit in using the
courts to vindicate one's right to marry, suggesting that those who want the
right to marry a same-sex partner should try to convince their legislators that
the marriage laws should be changed rather than thwart the democratic
process by making use of the courts. Thus, these commentators imply that
would-be married same-sex couples who are currently unable to convince
the legislature of the wisdom of recognizing same-sex marriage should
simply keep trying until they ultimately are successful or, perhaps, until they
are no longer interested in marrying.5 These commentators fail to mention
that the same argument might be offered in all of the cases challenging
marital regulations and is no more correct in this context than it was in those.
Ironically, those who claim that Loving and Baehr are so different fail
to mention that this is a respect in which the cases may be thought to be
analogous. Thus, it could be argued that the Lovings were trying to
circumvent the democratic process by using the courts to have their marriage
validated. Indeed, one of the arguments offered by the State of Virginia was
that the "Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature." 54 The
United States Supreme Court wisely rejected the invitation to do so,
notwithstanding the view offered by the Supreme Court of Virginia that
striking down an anti-miscegenation law "would be judicial legislation in the
52. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 235 (complaining that same-sex marriage
proponents want "to use Loving to remove the current debate about marriage from the
democratic process"); Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to
Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 739-40
(1998) (implying that there is something illicit in having the courts recognize same-sex
marriage because they are not "politically accountable to the people"); and Lynn D. Wardle, A
Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 5
(1996) ("[clonstitutionalizing same-sex marriage raises serious concerns about the delicate
balance of federalism, about judicial overreaching, and about principles of representative
government, in addition to concerns about the revolutionary effects of same-sex marriage").
Cf Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics of
Marriage Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1998) (complaining that if the Hawaii
Supreme Court were to uphold the trial court's having found that the state same-sex marriage
ban was unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds, the court might thereby "foreclose an
important public debate").
53. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex
Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 57 (1996) (suggesting that such marriages should not be
recognized because a majority of Americans have not been persuaded that such unions should
be legalized).
54. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
[Vol. 24:769
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss3/1
Strasser
rawest sense of that term. 5  The Court further rejected the view that the
arguments against such marriage bans "are properly addressable to the
legislature, which enacted the law in the first place, and not to this court,
whose prescribed role in the separated powers of government is to
adjudicate, and not to legislate. 56
The United States Supreme Court decided that it was appropriate for
the judiciary to examine the statutory scheme at issue in Loving, given the
fundamental nature of the interest at stake.57 The Court made clear that the
"freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and
women]. '' 8 Furthermore, this freedom was simply too important to be
withheld until the legislature could be convinced to change the anti-
miscegenation law.
59
Zablocki v. Redhaile involved a challenge to a Wisconsin statute
precluding noncustodial parents from marrying under certain conditions.
61
One infers that these commentators would suggest that Mr. Redhail should
not have tried to vindicate his right to marry his pregnant financee through
the courts, but instead should simply have spoken to the members of the
legislature.62 After all, to make use of the courts to establish one's right to
marry is to suggest that "citizens [are] too dangerous to be trusted
with... judgments about the common good. ' 63
At least one of the difficulties with these commentators' position is that
it undervalues the importance of the right at issue. As the Loving Court
suggested, challenges to marriage regulations should not be viewed as if they,
were cases involving mere economic regulation in which "the Court has
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the
discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures."' 64
The Loving Court described marriage as involving a "fundamental
55. Loving v. Virgina, 147 S.E.2d 78,82 (Va. 1966).
56. Id.
57. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (stating "[t]o deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law").
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61. Id. at 374-75.
62. See id. at 379 (appellee and the woman he desired to marry were expecting a child
in March of 1975 and wished to be lawfully married before that time).
63. Coolidge, supra note 5, at 236.
64. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9.
2000]
31
: Nova Law Review 24, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Nova Law Review
freedom' '65 and, as the Zablocki Court subsequently made clear, "the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals."66 Were individuals
precluded from making use of the courts to vindicate their marriage rights,
one of the checks built into our legal system would be destroyed, namely,
making sure that when a statutory classification "interfere[s] directly and
substantially with the right to marry," 67 the classification will not be upheld
"unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests.
68
It is, at the very least, surprising and disappointing that commentators
would suggest that it is somehow hypocritical to vindicate one's right to
69equal treatment through the courts. In a country in which the electorate of
one state recently tried to amend their state constitution to include a
provision adversely affecting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals "not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else,, 70 it is
nothing short of amazing that commentators would nonetheless suggest that
members of that group who make use of the courts to protect their rights are
somehow doing something hypocritical and inappropriate.
C. Classifications Based on Race and Sex
Commentators make a variety of disingenuous arguments when
comparing Loving and Baehr. Nonetheless, it is not argued here that there
are no important differences between the two cases. On the contrary,
differences do exist, although they tend to be represented by commentators
in a way that obscures rather than clarifies the issues. For example, Loving
involves a classification based on race,72 whereas Baehr involves a
classification based on sex.73 That difference is not necessarily important-
in some states, sex-based classifications are subjected to the same degree of
65. Id. at 12.
66. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
67. Id. at 386-87.
68. Id. at 388.
69. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 236 (noting "[t]he plaintiffs claim that their goal is
to be treated as equal citizens, yet their attorneys want to withdraw the resolution of the
question from their fellow citizens").
70. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
71. See, e.g., supra notes 9-51 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
whether a conviction is a issue, given that Loving precludes anti-miscegenation statutes even
if there are no criminal statutes to bolster that law); supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the claim that same-sex couples circumvent the political process when the same
claim might have been made in Loving and other cases).
72. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
73. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 49.
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scrutiny as are race-based classifications because of state constitutional
protections. 74 However, the United States Constitution imposes a lower
level of scrutiny on statutes incorporating sex-based classifications than it
does on statutes incorporating race-based classifications. Thus, a statute
incorporating the former might pass constitutional muster, even if an
analogous statute incorporating the latter would not.75 However, even the
above difference is often characterized in a misleading, if not simply
inaccurate, way.
Consider the claim that same-sex marriage bans classify on the basis of
sex because the sexes of the respective parties is what precludes them from
marrying-a man may marry a woman, but not a man; and a woman may
marry a man, but not a wonan.7 6 A separate question is whether the state
interest in classifying on the basis of sex is sufficiently important for such a
classification to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Thus, it is one thing to
say that a statute classifies on the basis of sex and a different one to say that
a statute invidiously discriminates on the basis of sex, but it should not be
difficult to understand how a statute which says that a marriage may only be
between a man and a woman" at the very least does the former.
Nonetheless, some commentators reject that contention. For example,
Professor Duncan suggests that "[d]ual-gender marriage laws do not classify
on the basis of gender," since they "merely define marriage as a relationship
between one man and one woman and apply the same neutral rules to both
men and women."78 He suggests that "[p]roperly understood, the same-sex
marriage issue is about an eminently reasonable distinction drawn on the
basis of sexual orientation."
79
74. See id. at 67 (holding that the state constitution requires that sex-based
classifications, like race-based classifications, be subjected to strict scrutiny).
75. See Kohm, supra note 9, at 260-61 (stating "[tihe central problem in making the
Loving analogy to same-sex marriage petitions is that race is afforded the strictest scrutiny for
constitutional protection, while gender or sex is not and has never been afforded the strictest
scrutiny under the federal constitution"); see also Wardle, supra note 53, at 83 ("[i]n terms of
the history, purpose, and application of the Fourteenth Amendment, race and gender are not
fungible categories because race triggers the strictest standard of judicial scrutiny, whereas
gender discrimination invokes an intermediate, albeit heightened, standard of judicial
review").
76. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60; see also Wardle, supra note 53, at 83 (describing the
argument that "since conventional marriage laws allow a man, for example, to marry a woman
but not a man, they discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause"). Professor Wardle does not subscribe to that argument. See Wardle, supra note 53,
at 83 (describing the argument as "flawed").
77. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (Supp. 1998).
78. Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer. Homosexual Marriage and Moral
Discernment, 12 BYU . PUB. L. 239, 243 (1998).
79. Id.
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Professor Duncan's view seems to conflate the two questions that the
Baehr plurality was keeping separate: 1) whether the classification was sex-
based; and 2) whether the sex-based classification was legitimate8s
Surprisingly, he realizes that the classification focuses on whether the parties
who wish to marry are of the same-sex--dual-gender laws are at issue.
81
However, because the classification is allegedly reasonable, the nature of the
classification itself somehow changes from being sex-based to being
orientation-based instead.82 Yet, whether a classification is sex-based rather
than orientation-based has nothing to do with whether the classification is
wise or even constitutional, and thus the implicit suggestion that the
reasonableness of the classification determines its nature is simply mistaken.
Suppose that two heterosexuals wished to marry because they wished to
secure particular government benefits that they might not otherwise be able
to secure.83 The question for Professor Duncan would be whether these
individuals could marry. If not, for example, because the statute expressly
states that only a man may marry a woman and only a woman may marry a
man, then it seems clear that the statute is sex rather than orientation-based.
Further, if that couple could marry, notwithstanding the explicit textual
requirement that they be of different sexes, then a different problem would
be presented-a statute allegedly "fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, because it would "prohibit same sex marriages on the part of
professed 85 or nonprofessed heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals, or
asexuals," would nonetheless have been "applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights. 86
Consider a different example. Suppose that a gay man and a lesbian
wished to marry each other, perhaps as a way of securing government
benefits. The dual-gender law would not preclude their marrying,
notwithstanding their having the 'wrong' sexual orientation and
80. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (pointing out that the dissent has misunderstood the
opinion, since the plurality has merely said that the statute involves a sex-based classification
and is remanding the case for a determination of whether that classification is invidious).
81. See Duncan, supra note 78.
82. See id.
83. See Sondrea Joy King, Note, Ya'll Can't Do That Here: Will Texas Recognize
Same-Sex Marriages Validly Contracted in Other States?, 2 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 515, 551
(1996) (posing a hypothetical of two heterosexual women who wish to marry for economic
benefits).
84. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
85. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting).
86. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
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notwithstanding the allegedly "eminently reasonable distinction drawn on
the basis of sexual orientation." °
Two issues should not be conflated: 1) the nature of the classification;
and 2) the purpose behind the statute. The purpose behind the adoption of a
sex-based classification may be to disadvantage individuals with a particular
sexual orientation. In that event, the constitutional issue requiring analysis
would be whether it is acceptable to employ a sex-based classification to
achieve the allegedly important goal of, for example, establishing or
reinforcing the societal view that heterosexuals are superior to lesbians,
gays, and bisexuals.88 While many would argue that this is exactly the sort
of societal goal that Romer suggests is illegitimate,89 Professor Duncan
seems to disagree.
90
To determine whether the sex-based classification implicated in dual-
gender statutes promotes sufficiently important goals, the asserted state
interests must be subjected to judicial scrutiny. However, as the Supreme
Court made clear in United States v. Virginia,91 "[plarties who seek to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for that action."92  Thus, even though heightened
scrutiny is not as stringent as strict scrutiny, it should not be thought that it
involves a standard that is easy to meet.
Commentators deny that the sex-based classification implicated in
same-sex marriage bans involves an invidious distinction.93 After all, the
87. Duncan, supra note 78, at 243.
88. See id. at 239-40. (discussing the "radical and dangerous agenda' which seeks to
"reflect the alleged equal goodness of homosexuality and heterosexuality").
89. See Matthew Coles, The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343,
1361 (1997) (noting "[t]o the Court, sexual orientation discrimination is the moral (if not the
legal) equivalent of race and sex discrimination"); Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal
Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453, 454
(1997) (stating that "[i]n striking down Colorado's Amendment 2 for seeking to impose
second-class status on gays and lesbians, the Supreme Court illuminated the core of equal
protection: government must respect the principle that all persons have equal intrinsic worth").
90. See Duncan, supra note 78, at 246 (claiming that Romer did not "hold that laws
that make distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation or relationships are tainted by animus
or dislike for a politically unpopular group," and that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional
"only because no legitimate state interest came close to fitting the Amendment's nearly
infinite path of disadvantage").
91. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
92. Id. at 531 (citations omitted).
93. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 208 (suggesting that the distinction is not
invidious); see also Wardle, supra note 53, at 62 (arguing that "laws permitting only
heterosexual marriage could survive strict judicial scrutiny").
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statutes treat men and women in precisely the same way,94 since each is
precluded from marrying someone of the same sex. 95 Yet, that alone will not
suffice to establish the permissibility of the statute, since the Court has
already made clear that "[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities,, 96 and, in fact, the Court
rejected the analogous argument in Loving.97 Thus, the State of Virginia
argued that while its anti-miscegenation statutes employed racial
classifications, the "reliance on racial classifications, [did] not constitute an
invidious discrimination based upon race" because they applied equally to
whites and blacks.98 Because the classification (allegedly) was not
invidious, the state claimed that "the question of constitutionality... [was]
whether there was any rational basis for a state to treat interracial marriages
differently from other marriages." 99 However, the Court rejected "the notion
that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications
is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's
proscription of all invidious racial discriminations." °
One way to understand the difference between the views expressed by
the Court and the State of Virginia in Loving helps illuminate one of the
points of disagreement between the plurality and the dissent in Baehr.
Basically, the State of Virginia had argued that because the classification
was not invidious, the Court should defer to the legislature. °1 The Court
rejected that analysis because of the type of classification at issue. 10
Consider the disagreement between the plurality and the dissent in
Baehr. The Baehr plurality determined that the statute incorporated a sex-
based classification and then remanded the case for a determination of
whether the classification was invidious.1°3 Judge Heen, in dissent, decided
94. Blair, supra note 52, at 1238 (arguing that "[s]ex discrimination simply does not
enter into Hawaii's marriage law: women and men are treated precisely the same").
95. See Jay Alan Sekulow & John Tuskey, Sex and Sodomy and Apples and
Oranges-Does the Constitution Require States to Grant a Right to Do the Impossible? 12
BYU J. PuB. L. 309, 323 (1998) (stating that "[t]he obvious rejoinder to this argument is that
state marriage laws treat men and women alike: Billy may no more marry Bobby than Sue
may marry Linda. Thus, these laws discriminate against neither men nor women.").
96. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
97. Allison Moore, Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination Principles, 34
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 163, 163 (1999) (noting that "Loving involved a law that was in fact
neutral as between black and white persons who married interracially-punishing them
equally for miscegenation").
98. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
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that the classification was not invidious and thus saw no reason to remand
the case for an examination of the state's asserted interests.104 Judge Heen
was determining whether heightened scrutiny was appropriate in light of
whether he believed the classification invidious instead of imposing
heightened scrutiny to determine whether an invidious distinction had been
made.105 Yet, as the Baehr plurality recognized, the relevant jurisprudence
requires that when a statute incorporates a sex-based classification, the court
should impose heightened scrutiny to determine whether that classification is
invidious.'06 The court should not decide whether the classification is
invidious, and then decide what level of scrutiny to impose.1
7
Certainly, Judge Heen is not the first to claim that same-sex marriage
108bans do not violate equal protection guarantees. Of course, the same
might be said of the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia
regarding whether interracial marriage bans violated equal protection
guarantees. 1°9 For example, about eighty years before Loving was decided,
the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed whether the Equal Protection
Clause precluded states from prohibiting interracial marriages." 0 The court
considered the state's anti-miscegenation statute, which read:
If any white person and any negro, or the descendant of any negro
to the third generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each
generation was a white person, intermarry, or live in adultery or
fornication, with each other, each of them must, on conviction, be
imprisoned in the penitentiary, or sentenced to hard labor for the
county for not less than two, nor more than seven years."
The court wrote:
What the law declares to be a punishable offense, is, marriage
between a white person and a negro. And it no more tolerates it in
one of the parties than the other-in a white person than in a negro
or mulatto; and each of them is punishable for the offense
prohibited, in precisely the same manner and to the same extent.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id.106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (finding no equal
protection violation).
109. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
110. See Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).111. Id. at 191.
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There is no discrimination made in favor of the white person, either
in the capacity to enter into such a relation, or in the penalty.
12
Basically, the court suggested that because both whites and blacks were
prohibited from intermarrying and because whites and blacks would be
subjected to the same penalties for violating the statute at issue, there was no
equal protection violation.!
13
It is not as if such reasoning would only have been offered in the 1800s.
The Supreme Court of Virginia manifested its aRproval of such reasoning in
Naim v. Naim in 1955. Pace v. Alabama was cited in Naim with
approval. 16 The Pace Court had denied that equal protection guarantees
were violated by a statute punishing interracial fornication or adultery more
severely than intra-racial fornication, suggesting, "[w]hatever discrimination
is made in the punishment prescribed ... is directed against the offence
designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The
punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the
same."" 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia expressed its approval of its own Naim
decision in Loving v. Virginia, Is expressly stating that it could "find no
sound judicial reason.., to depart from [its] holding in the Naim case."'"19
Further, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's claim in
McLaughlin that the "narrow view of the Equal Protection Clause
[articulated in Pace] was soon swept away,"' 120 the Court refused to hear a
case in 1954 in which Alabama's anti-miscegenation statute was at issue and
in which the court specifically cited Pace to support its upholding the
statute.'21
112. Id. at 192.
113. See id. at 197 (stating that "[n]o amendment to the Constitution, nor any
enactment thereby authorized, is in any degree infringed by the enforcement of the section of
the Code, under which the appellant in this cause was convicted and sentenced"); see also
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (Ind. 1871) (noting that "[i]t is quite clear to us, that neither
the fourteenth amendment nor the civil rights bill has impaired or abrogated the laws of this
State on the subject of marriage of whites and negroes").
114. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand 90 S.E.2d
849 (Va. 1956) (adhering to previous decision in 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955) (lacking a
properly presented federal question)).
115. 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
116. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 754.
117. Pace, 106 U.S. at 585.
118. 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966).
119. Id. at 82.
120. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 190.
121. See Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114, 115 (Ala. Crim. App. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 888 (1954).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia was probably as surprised by the Loving
Court's holding that the anti-miscegenation statute at issue involved
invidious discrimination, as were a variety of commentators by the Baehr
plurality's holding that Hawaii's same-sex marriage ban implicated equal
protection guarantees and hence might be invidious.12 Nonetheless,
commentators distinguish between Loving and Baehr by claiming that the
former obviously was invidious and the latter obviously is not. It was not
obvious at the time how Loving would be decided and, more importantly for
purposes here, at best premature to have decided the question in Baehr
before the state's interests had even been articulated. The point here of
course is not that Loving was wrongly decided, but that the whole point of
the remand in Baehr was to find out whether in fact the distinction was
invidious.12 To conclude that the Hawaii statute was constitutional, without
even examining whether Hawaii could identify important legitimate interests
is simply to ignore the applicable test. It simply will not do merely to assert
that such laws are permissible or, perhaps, that such legitimate state interests
exist or that the statutes are sufficiently closely tailored, since that kind of
analysis is merely rhetoric and the antithesis of legal argument.1 24
III. INCEST AND POLYGAMY
Some commentators suggest that if the Constitution precludes states
from enacting same-sex marriage bans, then the Constitution precludes states
from prohibiting any marital unions including incestuous or polygamous
ones. However, this involves a misunderstanding both of why the state
might be precluded from enacting same-sex marriage bans and of what
arguments might be made to justify particular marital restrictions.
A. The Slippery Slope Argument
A variety of commentators seem to believe that if the Constitution
requires the recognition of same-sex marriages, then it requires the
122. The plurality remanded the case to give the state an opportunity to demonstrate
that the ban "furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgements of constitutional rights." See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
123. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 208 (discussing with approval Judge Heen's Baehr
dissent in which Jude Heen suggested that the Virginia law was based on invidious racial
discrimination and the Hawaii law was not based upon invidious sex discrimination).
124. For an extensive analysis of some of the legal issues surrounding same-sex
marriage, see MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTrrUTION
(1997) and MARK STRASSER, THE CHAULENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST
PRINCIPLES AND CONSTnUTONAL PROTECTIONS (1999).
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recognition of all marriages. '2 Yet, such a claim involves a variety of
misconceptions, as becomes apparent when one considers how the argument
has been used in the past.
It should not be surprising that slippery slope concerns were articulated
when the issue was whether interracial marriages should be recognized. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee suggested that if interracial marriages validly
celebrated in other states were recognized by Tennessee, "we might have in
Tennessee the father living with his daughter, the son with the mother, the
brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock, because they had formed such
relations in a State or country where they were not prohibited"' 26 and,
further, that the "Turk or Mohammedan, with his numerous wives [could]
establish his harem at the doors of the capitol, and we [would be] without
remedy." 127  Thus, the court apparently believed that the recognition of
interracial marriages would dictate that incestuous or polygamous marriages
would also have to be recognized.
12
Worries of the Supreme Court of Tennessee notwithstanding, the
Constitution's requiring the recognition of interracial marriages does not
imply that all marriages must be recognized and, in fact, has not led to the
abolition of all marital restrictions. The questions at hand whenever a
marital regulation is challenged are simply whether there are sufficiently
important state interests promoted by banning the union at issue and whether
the statute is sufficiently tailored to promote those interests. Where no
important state interests are implicated or the statute at issue is not
sufficiently tailored to promote important interests, the marital prohibition
will not pass constitutional muster. Where the interests are sufficiently
important and the statute sufficiently tailored, the Constitution will not stand
in the way, even if the Constitution does provide a bar with respect to other
marital classifications.
125. See Coombs, supra note 5, at 231 (describing the claim offered by others that
recognition of same-sex marriage "sends us down a slippery slope that would also protect
incest or polygamy"); Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus,
and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 FORDHAm L. Ray. 1241, 1249 (1998) (discussing the "familiar
invocation of the slippery slope: recognizing same-sex marriage would open the door to the
recognition of all manner of relationships, including incest, polygamy, and bestiality").
126. See State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872).
127. Id.
128. Different issues are implicated when the question is whether to recognize a
marriage validly celebrated elsewhere rather than whether to allow the celebration of the
marriage locally. See generally Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent
Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 339 (1998).
However, that is not relevant for the point being made here.
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B. Equal Protection
It is especially ironic that the specter of incestuous and polygamous
unions has been raised in light of the Baehr decision. The Baehr plurality
denied that the same-sex marriage ban implicated substantive due process
guarantees. 129 According to the Baehr plurality, the reason that same-sex
marriage bans should receive heightened scrutiny is that they involve sex-
based classifications. 130  If the recognition of same-sex marriages is to
challenge marital restrictions of incestuous or polygamous relationships,
then it must be established how the recognition that same-sex marriage bans
classify on the basis of gender somehow establishes (or at least makes more
likely) a similar claim about incest or polygamy regulations. Of course, even
if such a case could be made, that would merely imply that the state's
reasons for prohibiting polygamous or incestuous marriages would have to
be examined with heightened scrutiny.l
It might be thought that polygamy restrictions implicate equal
protection guarantees on the basis of religion and, thus, should be subjected
to strict scrutiny. 32 Whether the Constitution requires the recognition of
same-sex marriages on equal protection grounds would hardly affect either
whether strict scrutiny would be imposed when polygamy restrictions were
at issue, or whether such restrictions would be struck down were such
scrutiny imposed.
Arguably, the recognition of same-sex marriages would affect whether
polygamous or incestuous unions will be permitted because the latter are no
more offensive than the former and, thus, if the former must be recognized
then the latter must be as well. However, even were that an accurate
description of public opinion, more would have to be asserted, namely, that
there should be a new criterion for whether marriages should be
recognized-the offensiveness criterion. It would not matter what legitimate
state interests were supported by a particular regulation or how closely
129. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 (stating that "[a]ccordingly, we hold that the applicant
couples do not have a fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage arising out of the
right to privacy or otherwise").
130. See id. at 67.
131. For a discussion of why polygamous marriages should not be recognized, see
Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex
Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (1997).
132. See Keith Jaasma, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Responding to Smith;
Reconsidering Reynolds, 16 WmTrMR L. REV. 211, 257 (1995) (suggesting that restriction of
religiously motivated polygamy should be subjected to strict scrutiny).
133. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) (suggesting
that the state has a compelling interest in maintaining its ban on polygamy), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 849 (1985).
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tailored the relevant law was. The only question would be how offensive
that union was to the general populace, perhaps as determined by a Gallup
Poll. Yet, if this purports to represent current law or even what the law
should be, "the statement carries its own refutation."' 34  This is a
constitutional democracy in which the will or tastes of the majority are
subject to limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.
The offensiveness criterion has been suggested in the past. When
justifying the refusal to recognize an interracial marriage, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee described certain incestuous and polygamous relationships and
then suggested that "none of these are more revolting, more to be avoided, or
more unnatural than the case before us [an interracial marriage].' 13  That
court's analysis should sound a cautionary note, since the recognition or
adoption of an offensiveness criterion would mean that a whole host of
potential marital unions might be at risk, those involving individuals of
different races, religions, or generations might all be found too offensive
(according to the tastes of some) to be permitted.136 The right to marry is
simply too important to be left to the whims of the general populace.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some commentators suggest that Loving and Baehr are not analogous.
However, the differences they cite are often irrelevant and, even when
relevant, are often misrepresented in importance or implication. Certainly,
bans of interracial and same-sex marriages can be differentiated. The
important question is whether those distinctions are relevant to the issues at
hand and a surprising number of commentators seem to believe that such a
basic element of the analysis need not be offered when same-sex marriage is
at issue.
The history of this country's treatment of interracial marriage bans has
many important lessons, including how equal protection guarantees can be
distorted beyond recognition and how permitting states to enact marriage
regulations without having to articulate the interests thereby served can lead
to the perpetuation of invidious distinctions. Many of the arguments
currently offered in an attempt to establish that same-sex marriages should
not be recognized echo the kinds of fallacious arguments that were used in
attempts to prevent the recognition of interracial marriages. Those
134. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,443 (1934).
135. Bell, 66 Tenn. at 11.
136. A separate issue is whether marriages that were already contracted could be
invalidated. That involves a separate question which is beyond the scope of the current
discussion. For a discussion of that issue, see generally Mark Strasser, Constitutional
Limitations and Baehr Possibilities: On Retroactive Legislation, Reasonable Expectations,
and Manifest Injustice, 29 RuTGERS L.J. 271 (1998).
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arguments were rightly rejected as invalid decades ago and they have not
somehow acquired validity over the intervening 
years.W t a
The constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans can only be determined
once states assert their reasons for enacting such statutes. One of the
benefits of subjecting these statutes to even heightened scrutiny is that the
state is forced to articulate the interests allegedly thereby served, and both
the importance of the interests and the methods for attaining them are then
subjected to examination. The Court has made clear that when sex-based
classifications are at issue, the "justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. ' 38 Further,
those justifications "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females,"' 139 and the
differences between men and women must not be cause for "denigration of
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on [their]
opportunit[ies]."'40
If a justification is to be genuine rather than merely hypothesized, one
would expect that the asserted state interest in preventing same-sex partners
from marrying would also play a role in preventing others from marrying. If
a state interest asserted in cases involving same-sex couples, for example,
the alle ed importance of the parties' being able to procreate through their
union, plays no role in other marital regulations, then one has reason to
believe that the interest asserted is not a genuine interest of the state. Of
course, an interest can be genuine but nonetheless impermissible because not
legitimate. If, for example, the real reason for same-sex marriage bans is to
impose a stigma on lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, then the statute may well
be closely tailored to promote an illegitimate end, but is nonetheless
unconstitutional. If the reasons offered for same-sex marriage bans are
invented rather than genuine or are genuine but illegitimate, the Equal
Protection Clause will not allow these marital restrictions to stand. If the
arguments against same-sex marriage currently put forward are the best that
can be offered, then there is reason to believe that same-sex marriage bans
should be found unconstitutional and to hope that such marital unions will
soon be recognized.
137. Id.
138. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. For such an argument, see generally John Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual
Orientation," 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1049 (1994).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sodomy laws, which criminalize private consensual behavior between
adults, engender the irrational prejudice that underlies all discrimination
against gay men and lesbian women.' "As long as these laws exist, gay men
and lesbians are labeled as criminals because they are violating the law
whenever they engage in the very acts that define them as gay men and
lesbians."2 Contemporary practice has extended their application to lesbian
mother child-custody cases, challenges to the validity of the will of a gay
man or lesbian, and even to contract disputes.3
II. BEFORE 1970
The American colonies imported their sodomy laws from English
common and statutory law.4 Florida's original sodomy law, phrased in terms
of "crimes against nature," dates back to 1868. 5 In 1917, the legislature
modified the statutes to include an additional prohibition against "unnatural
and lascivious" acts.6 Each time rights for lesbians and gay men come into
question, those opposed to such rights quickly remind us of the statutory
criminality of such behavior, as though it were the exclusive domain of
lesbians and gay men. Because of the breadth of the definition, such statutes
cover the sexual practices of many heterosexuals as well as gays and
lesbians.
7
1. See generally Abby R. Rubenfeld, Lessons Learned: A Reflection Upon Bowers v.
Hardwick, 11 NOVA L. REV. 59 (1986).
2. Id. at 60.
3. Id. at 60-61.
4. Richard T. Jones, Note, Sodomy-Crime or Sin?, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 83, 85
(1959).
5. See Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1971).
6. Ch. 17-7361, § 1, 1917 Fla. Laws 211,211. Although "unnatural and lascivious"
acts were added to the Florida Statutes in 1917, the sodomy statute containing the "crimes
against nature" language existed until 1974, when it was finally repealed. See ch. 74-121, § 1,
1974 Fla. Laws 372, 372.
7. Prior to 1956, the Supreme Court of Florida had dealt with 13 cases involving the
"crime against nature." Of these, six dealt with heterosexual encounters and two with older
men and younger boys. The first case in Florida involving the "crime against nature"
contained the brutal language, "[t]he creatures who are guilty are entitled to a consideration of
their case because they are called human beings and are entitled to the protection of the laws."
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Apart from Florida's sodomy law, the documentation history of the
rights of lesbians and gay men in Florida began in 1954.8 The City of Miami
in Dade County enacted an ordinance prohibiting alcoholic beverage
licensees either from knowingly employing "a homosexual person, lesbian or
pervert" or from selling or serving alcoholic beverages to homosexuals or
allowing them to congregate or remain in the licensee's place of business.
9
Mayor Abe Aronovitz urged passage of the ordinance to halt the gathering of
"perverts" along what had become known as "Powder Puff Lane."'
0
In 1955, civil rights attorney Harris L. Kimball was arrested for lewd
and lascivious conduct after having sex with another man on a deserted
stretch of lakefront late at night in Orlando." Within thirty days, disbarment
proceedings began against him on the ground that he had violated a state law
prohibiting homosexual relations 12 and thereby engaged in behavior contrary
to good morals and Florida law.13 His conduct was deemed unprofessional,
and the Supreme Court of Florida disbarred him in 1957.14
In 1956, the Florida Legislature, not content with its sodomy statute,
started down a long road of repression the first of several Florida Legislative
Investigative Committees ("Investigative Committee'. 5 Initially, under the
chairmanship of Representative Henry Land, the seven-member
Investigative Committee dealt primarily with race relations. However the
chairmanship of the Investigative Committee later changed to Senator
Charley Johns.17 When the Investigative Committee "became mired in legal
battles with the determined members of the NAACP, with people who
fought the intrusion with everything they had, the [Investigative Committee]
Ephraim v. State, 89 So. 344, 344 (Fla. 1921), overruled in part by Franklin v. State, 257 So.
2d 21 (Fla. 1971). There were numerous other cases that dealt with the issue of criminalizing
same-sex behavior between consenting adults. See Floyd v. State, 79 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1955)
(reversing denial of appellate bond); State v. White, 68 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1953) (reversing
quashing of the information); English v. State, 164 So. 848 (Fla. 1935), overruled in part by
Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971); Jackson v. State, 94 So. 505 (Fla. 1922),
overruled in part by Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
8. MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANcE 5135 (1954) (codified at MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 4-13
(1967)).
9. Id.
10. Ordinance Would Kill Pervert Bars' Permits, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 10, 1954, at
4A.
11. See Florida Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
12. Homosexual Lawyers Keep Fighting Barriers, N.Y. TIO, Feb. 3, 1989, at B11.
13. Kimball, 96 So. 2d at 825.
14. Id.
15. Ellen McGarrahan, Florida's Secret Shame, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 8, 1991, Tropic,
at 9.
16. Democrat, Orange County.
17. Democrat, Starke.
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turned its attention elsewhere--to people without recourse. To people who
could not fight back. To gays."
18
The Investigative Committee "employed a network of spies... [and]
informants .... Traveling undercover, the spies went to parties, parks,
public restrooms-anywhere and everywhere homosexual men and women
were known to socialize." 19 Informants "lured people to places where the
[Investigative Committee] staff waited, hidden, with cameras.... At the
appropriate moment, the [Investigative Committee] staff person would step
out of his hiding place with a flashbulb and camera." 2 Investigative
Committee members, targeting college students and educators, rented hotel
rooms near campuses in Gainesville and Tampa, and a Investigative
Committee informant hosted parties in Tallahassee.21 "At the parties, the
conversations in the back bedroom were bugged.... All the information the
guests gave-believing the host was sexually interested himself in one of
their friends-was recorded, then turned over to campus police. After the
parties, people were summoned.. ." by the campus security chief and, after
questioning, expelled from college.2
An analysis of the Johns Investigative Committee concluded that "[i]t is
impossible to know how many people exactly, the [Investigative
Committee] forced from Florida schools." In the Spring of 1959, the
Investigative Committee "forced 16 faculty and staff from the University of
Florida .... Over the next five years, the Johns [Investigative Committee
hunted out homosexual men and women in schools throughout the state."
The Investigative Committee turned its attention to professors' ideas as well
as their personal lives.Y It focused specifically on "the use of beatnik
literature in the classroom. And that, in turn, caught Florida's attention."
'
Its report in that regard "stirred concern about the [Investigative
Committee]'s tactics in a way its entrapment of homosexuals never did."7
By April 1963, seventy-one teachers had their teaching certificates
revoked, and the Investigative Committee forced the removal of thirty-nine
deans and professors from universities.2 Interviews of between 200 and 250
18. McGarrahan, supra note 15, at 9.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. McGarrahan, supra note 15, at 9.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. McGarrahan, supra note 15, at 9.
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teachers resulted in the Investigative Committee turning over a list of 123
suspect teachers to the Florida Department of Education."
In 1963, the Florida Legislature authorized continuation of the
Investigative Committee, with a legislative mandate including the "direction
to investigate and report on 'the extent of infiltration into agencies supported
by state funds by practicing homosexuals, the effect thereof on [those]
agencies and the public, and the policies of various state agencies in dealing
therewith."' 30 Although Representative Richard 0. Mitchell 31 chaired the
Investigative Committee, its membership still included Senator Johns.
The reconstructed Investigative Committee issued its report in January
1964.32 The first few pages featured a photograph of two naked men
embracing and kissing, and another of a young man wearing only a pouch G-
string while in rope restraint.33 The final page before the bibliography
featured twenty photographs of one or more naked or virtually naked boys
apparently no more than ten years old.34
The report recited that "[s]ince 1959, [Investigative Committee]s have
been amassing information on homosexual activities within the state."
35
Under the heading "Who and How Many Are the Homosexuals?," the report
made "informed guesses" and then concluded that "the Biblical description
of homosexuality as an 'abomination' has stood well the test of time."
36
Under the heading "The Special World of Homosexuals," the report
described "'gay' society" as "well organized... extending from homosexual
hangouts in public rest rooms to the offices of several national organizations
through which articulate homosexuals seek recognition of their condition as
a proper part of our culture and morals and appreciation of their role in our
history and heritage."
37
The report described "gay marriages," noting that while male/male
unions rarely lasted over a prolonged period, female/female "marriages"
have been known to remain stable over long periods of time, perhaps
because women have an "inborn desire" for a more settled existence and
29. Id.
30. HOMOSEXUALITY AND CIIzENSHIP IN FLORIDA, REPORT OF THE FLORIDA
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE (Jan. 1964) [hereinafter FLIC REPORT] (on file with
author's estate).
31. Democrat, Leon County.
32. FLIC REPORT, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. FLIC REPORT, supra note 30.
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"because two women living together are less apt to cause comment within a
community than would two men. 38
Under the heading "Why Be Concerned?," the report spoke of "those
afflicted with homosexuality. 39 It advised of several courses which those
"entangled in the web of homosexuality" may take.40 They may "come out"
by becoming "full-fledged homosexuals... who [go] out for chickens by
becoming an active recruiter of extremely young boys. 4 1 The report also
suggests that "willingness to be a passive partner in homosexual acts can be
the key to an ever-available flow of money and gifts." 42
Under the heading "What to Do About Homosexuality?," the report
advised that "[iun Florida, homosexuality is not treated as an entity by
existing laws, but rather individual acts are specified as illegal in those
sections of the Statutes dealing with sex offenses." 43 It disclosed that
"[m]any homosexuals are picked up and prosecuted on vagrancy or similar
nonspecific charges," with incarceration not a satisfactory answer in many
cases "for indeed prison life produces its own specialized brand of deviates,
known as 'institutional homosexuals,' who would not, in freedom, consider
homosexual activity, but in prison turn to it in search of escape from sexual
tensions. ' 44
Summarizing recent legislative activity on the issue at that time, the
report advised that "[t]he Florida Legislature in 1963 ... enacted legislation
directing the Division of Mental Health and Division of Corrections ... to
plan for the construction of facilities at the prison system's new receiving
and treatment center 'for the care of child molesters and criminal sexual
psychopaths."'' 45 It went on to report that "[t]he same legislative session
revised the Statutes relating to the revocation of teaching certificates to make
more certain the withdrawal of teaching Wivileges from those against whom
homosexual charges have been verified."
One of the Investigative Committee's recommendations included that
"the closet door must be thrown open and the light of public understanding
cast upon homosexuality in its relationship to the responsibilities of sound
citizenship." 47 It recommended that the State Board of Education retain at
the earliest practicable time qualified personnel "for the purpose of refuting
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. FLIC REPORT, supra note 30 (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. FLIC REPORT, supra note 30.
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or affirming allegations of homosexuality involving teachers in the public
schools."48 It also recommended and initiated the formulation of legislation
providing for "[a] Homosexual Practices Control Act for Florida..."
recognizing that "the problem today is one of control and that established
procedures and stem penalties will serve both as encouragement to law
enforcement officials and as a deterrent to the homosexual hungry for
youth." 49
The Investigative Committee even consulted with several Floridians to
elicit their opinions on the formulation of effective legislation, including
consideration of,
1. Mandatory psychiatric examination prior to sentencing of every
person convicted of a homosexual act with a minor and
discretionary pre-sentence examination of others;
3. Providing for the confidentiality of information relating to the
first arrest of a homosexual similar to that now in effect in juvenile
cases....
4. Creation of a central records repository for information on
homosexuals arrested and convicted in Florida [with] such records
[being] open to public employing agencies.
5. Placing sole jurisdiction of a second homosexual offense in a
felony court and providing appropriate penalties upon conviction.
50
The Investigative Committee concluded that a law embodying such
elements would
serve to radically reduce the number of homosexuals preying upon
the youth of Florida, would stiffen the state's hand in dealing with
those homosexuals apprehended and would provide an element of
protection for those homosexuals whose first public venture is
relatively mild and whose ability to earn a living or provide for a
family would be destroyed by exposure.51
The 1964 report invited and received public outrage, particularly
because of the inflammatory nature of its photographs. 2 It was "hurriedly
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FLIC REPORT, supra note 30.
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withdrawn [from public distribution] by Gov. Farris Bryant.5 3 The state
attorney in Dade County banned the pamphlet from general distribution.
4
In 1965, the Investigative Committee ceased operation.55 "Its staff
walked out after members-led by Johns-ordered an investigation of Gov.
Bryant's handling of a racial crisis... [clearly intending] to use the
[Investigative Committee] to brand Bryant as an integrationist."5 6 That same
year, the legislature "simply declined to renew fundin, for the [Investigative
Committee]-without much fanfare or public debate."
Almost thirty years later, a journalist who had been a reporter in
Tallahassee during the height of the Johns Investigative Committee's work
summarized its work as "[a] war on privacy, human rights and fair play....
They ruled lives, destroyed careers, poisoned institutions. They casually
employed 8police-state tactics, browbeating victims with threats and
coercion.
' 5
The Investigative Committee did not stand alone, even from the early
days of its work. The City of Miami and even the media trampled on
lesbians' and 5ays' privacy rights and undertook steps to publicly identify
homosexuals. The Miami News listed the names and addresses of those
arrested in raids for operating an establishment for deviates. 60 Metro-Dade
police admitted that they maintained a list of 3000 local persons suspected of
being "practicing homosexuals."
61
In February 1966, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") of
Florida filed suit challenging the 1954 City of Miami ordinance prohibiting
all involvement by homosexual persons in selling or buying alcoholic
beverages. 62 Only four months later, Dade Circuit Judge Carady Crawford
found the ordinance had a rational relation to public health, morals, safety
and general welfare.
63
The next year, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed Judge
Crawford, noting that the "object of the ordinance as a whole is to prevent
53. Dade Bans State Sex Report, MIAMI NEWS, Mar. 18, 1964, at 1A (on file with
author's estate).
54. Id.
55. See McGarahan, supra note 15, at 9.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Frank Trippett, Gay-Bashing by Florida's Good 01' Boys, MIAMI HERALD, July
25, 1993, at IC.
59. See Metro Has List of Homosexuals, MIAMI NEWs, Apr. 25, 1962, at Cl; Trail
Bar Raided as Deviates' Den, MIAMI NEWS, Apr. 17, 1960 (on file with author's estate).
60. Trail Bar Raided as Deviates' Den, supra note 59.
61. Metro Has List of Homosexuals, supra note 59, at Cl.
62. City Bar Law is Challenged, MIAMI NEWs, Feb. 12, 1966, at 3A.
63. Homosexual Law OK, Court Says, MIAMI HERALD, June 11, 1966, at 2B.
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the congregation at liquor establishments of persons likely to prey upon the
public by attempting to recruit other persons for acts which have been
declared illegal by the Legislature."' ' The appeal to the United States
Supreme Court failed when the Court declined to review the case.
65
II. THE DECADE OF THE 1970S
The overt repressiveness of the 1960s continued well into the next
decade, but some tempering influences began to surface. In 1970, the
Florida Board of Regents adopted a policy of prohibiting recognition of gay
organizations at any state university "on the grounds that it violates the spirit
of the Board of Regents and the Florida statutes."66 Between 1970 and
1974, a group calling itself the "People's Coalition for Gay Rights"
petitioned for recognition at the Florida State University ("FSU"). 7 Upon
reviewing applicable case law, the FSU attorney issued a recommendation,
68
echoed by the FSU President,69 that the gay group be recognized, yet we
have no record of any implementation of their recommendations.
In December 1970, Hillsborough County Court Judge William C.
Brooker denied the petitions of two lesbian couples for marriage licenses.7°
He noted that Florida law did not specifically prohibit homosexual unions,
but he reasoned that "[t]he main object of marriage is the procreation of
progeny, and it would therefore be contrary to public policy to grant them
the licenses applied for."
71
In 1971, the Florida Legislature made the "abominable and detestable
crime against nature" a second-degree felony, and an "unnatural and
72lascivious act" a second-degree misdemeanor. Later that year, the Supreme
Court of Florida declared void on its face that aspect of Florida's sodomy
statute which proscribed the commission of the "abominable and detestable
64. Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(discussing FLA. STAT. § 800.01-.02 (1967)).
65. Fred Bruning, Top Court Upholds Miami Law, MiAMI HERALD, Jan. 16, 1968, at
8B.
66. Pat Land, Anti-Gay Forces Already at Work in Florida Legislation, THE WEEKLY
NEws, Feb. 4, 1981, at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id. (discussing Memorandum from FSU Attorney to FSU President (July 31,
1974)).
69. Id. (discussing Letter from FSU President to Chancellor of the State University
System (Sept. 17, 1974)).
70. Judge Blocks 2 Marriages, ADVOCATE, Jan. 6, 1971, at 6.
71. Id.
72. Ch. 71-136, §§ 777-78, 1971 Fla. Laws 552, 858 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
800.01, .02 (1971)).
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crime against nature," holding it unconstitutional for vagueness and
uncertainty in its language and, thus, a denial of due process to a criminal
defendant.7 Careful to state with specificity that it did not sanction
historically forbidden sexual acts, homosexuality or bestiality, the Supreme
Court of Florida found that the statutory language did not meet the
recognized constitutional test "that it inform the average person of common
intelligence" what conduct the statute prohibited.74 The court anticipated
and recommended a legislative study of the subject and pointed out that
pending further legislation on the subject, society would continue to have
protection from "this sort of reprehensible act" under the "unnatural and
lascivious" provision.
In August 1971, a Dade Circuit Court held a Miami or, more likely,
Miami Beach ordinance prohibiting the wearing of clothing of the opposite
sex unconstitutional in a case in which the defendant spent six months in jail
76awaiting trial. Circuit Court Judge Thomas Testa found the law
unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, but the ruling was of little impact
due to lack of an appeal.77
In December 1971, Judge Donald B. Bamack declared the 1954 Miami
liquor control ordinance unconstitutional in a criminal case against four
bartenders accused of serving drinks to homosexuals. 78 The court said that
the ordinance "prohibited the presence and consumption of alcoholic
beverages by alleged homosexuals regardless of whether their public
behavior was proper and lawful." 79
During the 1972 legislative session, Florida lawmakers introduced bills
to replace Florida's voided "crime against nature" law with a slightly milder
prohibition, exempting persons married to each other.81 The legislatureadjourned without reconciling the differing language between the House and
73. Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971).
74. Id. at 22.
75. Id. at 24.
76. Cross-Dress Ban Illegal, ADVOCATE, Oct. 27, 1971, at 3 (on file with authors
estate).
77. Id.
78. Raul Ramirez, Law Upset Forbidding Serving Homosexuals, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 10, 1971, at 2B.
79. Id.
80. Sponsored by Representative Jeff Gautier (Democrat, Miami) and Senator T.
Truett Ott (Democrat, Tampa), respectively.
81. Bill Would Reinstate Tough Law in Florida, ADVOCATE, Feb. 16, 1972, at 2 (on
file with author's estate).
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Senate versions of the bills and, thus, the effort to strengthen Florida's laws
against sodomy failed for that year. 2
In June 1972, shortly before the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions, which were held in Miami Beach that year, the ACLU of
Florida challenged two Miami Beach anti-gay ordinances." The first
ordinance made it illegal for a man to impersonate a woman?'4 The second
ordinance outlawed a person wearing "a dress not becoming to his sex."85
United States District Judge William Mehrtens found the ordinance vague
and overly broad.86  In March 1973, Hillsborough County Judge Arden
Merckle found unconstitutional the proscription against "unnatural and
lascivious" acts, which then represented Florida's only sodomy statute. 7
Later in 1973, the string of court decisions against Florida's sex laws ended
abruptly with a decision from the Supreme Court of Florida holding that
policing authorities could prosecute an act of sodomy under a misdemeanor
statute proscribing "unnatural and lascivious acts. 88 The court said that an
ordinary citizen could easily determine what character of act those words
described. 9
In 1974, the Florida Legislature repealed the "crimes against nature"
provision which had already been declared unconstitutional, but it left intact
the "unnatural and lascivious act" provision.90 That manner of sodomy
remains a second-degree misdemeanor today, punishable by imprisonment
not to exceed sixty days or a fine not to exceed $500.91 During the same
session, the legislature considered revisions to the state's Human Rights Act.
As a result of a series of five public hearings held around the state, "sexual
82. Florida Sodomy Law Dies in Legislative Deadlock, ADVOCATE, May 10, 1972, at
2 (on file with author's estate).
83. Robert Elder, Gay Activists' Suit Attacks Female Impersonation Law, MIAMI
HERALD, June 22, 1972, at 2D.
84. MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE § 25-50 (1964).
85. Id. § 25-52.
86. Impersonation Laws Killed, MIAMI HERALD, June 23, 1977, at 2B (on file with
author's estate). Miami Beach was supposed to be the venue for other suits as well. In May
1973, two Miami Beach homosexuals filed suit against the local police chief charging him and
his officers with "'maliciously' harassing them and depriving them of their constitutional
rights." Robert Fabricio, Homosexual Harassing Charged in Beach, MIAMI HERALD, May 27,
1973, at 2B.
87. Judge Axes 4th Florida Sex Statute, ADVOCATE, Apr. 11, 1973, at 1 (on file with
author's estate).
88. Florida High Court Upholds Sex Law, ADVOCATE, Aug. 15, 1973, at 7 (on file
with author's estate).
89. Id.
90. Ch. 74-121, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws 371, 372.
91. FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1999). See also FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082(4)(b), .0831(1)(e)
(1999).
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preference" was added to the draft "bill of rights" as a basis for prohibiting
discrimination. However, the Human Rights Commission later deleted the
92provision.
In May 1975, Dade County Court Judge Morton Perry declared
unconstitutional that part of the state's 100-year-old sodomy law that
proscribed "unnatural and lascivious" behavior which had remained even
after earlier rulings by the Supreme Court of Florida and the legislature's
revision of the state's sodomy laws.93 The state originally charged sixty-four
men with "attending a party where homosexual activities were taking
place.. ." but dropped the charges against forty-three of them before trial.
The court said that the legislature "should redefine ... 'unnatural and
lascivious' behavior."
95
In July 1975, perhaps in deference to Judge Barmack's ruling three and
one-half years earlier, or perhaps as an early sign of changing attitudes
toward lesbians and gay men, Miami finally repealed its 1954 ordinance.
9 6
On January 18, 1977, after the second reading before a packed, decidedly
anti-ordinance crowd,97 the Dade County Commission adopted an ordinance
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation" by a vote of five-to-
three.99 It extended Dade's nondiscrimination protections in the areas of
employment and housing, and public accommodations. 1°  By mid-April,
Circuit Court Judge Sam I. Silver had found the new ordinance
constitutional.10
The subject of a massive petition drive, the ordinance suffered bitter
attacks from the religious right and, most notably, from singer Anita
92. Rights Bill May Take Another Year to Pass, ADVOCATE, Apr. 10, 1974, at 7 (on
file with author's estate).
93. Joe Oglesby, Homosexual Charges Tossed Out, MIAMI HERALD, May 9, 1975, at
6B.
94. 43 Charges Dropped in Homosexual Case, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 9, 1975, at 4B.
95. Oglesby, supra note 93, at 6B.
96. MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCE 5135 (1954) (codified at MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 4-13
(1967), repealed by MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCE 8426 (1975)).
97. The initial introduction came in the waning days of 1976. One Year After: Dade
County-History of an Ordinance, THE WEEKLY NEWS, June 6, 1978, at 3 [hereinafter One
Year After].
98. DADE COuNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE ch. llA, § 1 (1977) (formerly Ordinance No.
77-4).
99. One Year After, supra note 97, at 3.
100. John Arnold, Gay Rights Referendum Set June 7, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16, 1977,
at lB. See Adon Taft, Churchgoers, Ministers, Split in Views of Gay Rights Issue, MIAMI
HERALD, May 22, 1977, at ID.
101. James Buchanan & John Arnold, Gay Law is Constitutional, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
16, 1977, at lB.
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Bryant,1°2 who adopted the slogan "save our children."' 0 3 Pursuant to pro-
visions of the Metro Charter, the Metro Commission either had to repeal the
new provision or submit it to the voters at referendum.04 The same five
member majority of the Metro Commission who voted for the ordinance in
the first place voted to send the issue to referendum rather than repeal it.1
0 5
In early May, a three judge panel of the Third District Court of Appeal re-
fused, without comment, to stay the referendum then scheduled for June 7.106
There followed one of the most bitter campaigns ever to face an
electorate.1' 7 Public officials and religious leaders lined up on both sides of
the issue.10s Local media took editorial positions.1 9 Charges of lies and
deception abounded." 0 Violence against gays increased noticeably."1
Voters repealed the ordinance by a margin of better than two-to-one in a
June 7, 1977, special election." Bryant called it a victory for "God and
decency" and praised the vote for the "normal majority.""n3
Seemingly as an outgrowth of the state and national attention to Dade
County that year, the Florida Legislature enacted a change to Florida's
marriage laws, adding, as a requirement for the issuance of a marriage
license, that one party be male and the other party female.11 From the samelegislature came a prohibition against adoption by homosexuals." 5  "No
102. Id.
103. Robert Hooker, Askew Would Vote 'No' on Gay Rights; Miami Gays Seethe,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 30, 1977, at IA.
104. John Arnold, Ruvin Swing Vote May Throw Gay-Rights Issue to Voters, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 17, 1977, at 2D.
105. John Arnold, Dade Will Be Gay-Rights Battlefield, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 20,
1977, at IA.
106. Gayle Pollard, Court Won't Delay Gay Rights Vote, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 1977,
at 4B.
107. See generally Hooker, supra note 103, at 1A.
108. Hooker, supra note 103, at IA. Taft, supra note 100, at ID.
109. See Editorial, An Unneeded Ordinance, MIAMI HERALD, June 5, 1977, at 2E; Is
This Law Really Necessary? (WTVJ television broadcast, 1977); For Repeal (WTVJ
television broadcast, 1977).
110. See generally Editorial, An Unneeded Ordinance, MIAMI HERALD, June 5, 1977,
at 2E.
111. Andy Rosenblatt, Campaign to Find Gays' Attackers Stepped Up, MIAMI HERALD,
July 20, 1977, at lB.
112. Carl Hiaasen, Gay Rights Law is Defeated, MiAMI HERALD, June 8, 1977, at IA.
113. Id. Carl Hiaasen, 'Decency' is Winner,' Anita Says, MIAMI HERALD, June 8,
1977, at IA.
114. Ch. 77-139, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 465, 465 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.04
(1977)).
115. Ch. 77-140, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws, 466, 466 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 63.042
(1977)).
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person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt, if that person is a
homosexual. ' 16 State Senator Alan Trask' 7 sponsored both the marriage
and adoption laws.
Almost in tandem, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners questioned the
"good moral character" of openly gay applicant Robert F. Eimers, active in
the Dade County effort, for admission to The Florida Bar.11s Florida's first
supreme court ruling that homosexuals have any manner of rights against
discrimination, notwithstanding their sexual orientation, sprang from this
action.119 The Board deadlocked and "informed the Supreme Court of
Florida that after months of 'tortuous debate' it could not reach a deci-
sion."'
120
The Board submitted to the Supreme Court of Florida the question of
[w]hether an applicant with an admitted homosexual orientation
who is fully qualified for admission to The Florida Bar in all other
respects can qualify for admission under the provisions... [which
place] a strict prohibition against any recommendation by the
Board... for a person not determined to be of good moral
character.121
The court found that the Fourteenth Amendment required an examination
"whether there is a rational connection between homosexual orientation and
fitness to practice law."' 22 Although responding affirmatively, the court
limited its response "to situations in which the applicant's sexual orientation
or preference is at issue... [without addressing] the circumstance where
evidence establishes that an individual has actually engaged in homosexual
acts."3
Succeeding months brought with them a sequence of proposed
ordinances-both repealing and granting rights-which never achieved
passage. Also in 1977, the Board of County Commissioners in Broward
County had before it a proposed "cabaret" amendment to the ordinance
regulating establishments serving alcoholic beverages.' 24 The amendmentwould have prohibited the operation of such an establishment "to become a
116. Id.
117. Democrat, Winter Haven.
118. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 358 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1978).
119. Seeid. at8.
120. Florida Gay Rights Victory, THE WEEKLY NEws BULLETIN, Mar. 21, 1978, at 16.
121. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 358 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1978).
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. at 8.
124. See A Commentary on the Proposed Broward Cabaret Ordinance, THE WEEKLY
NEWS BULLETIN, Nov. 8, 1977, at 7 (on file with author's estate).
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place of habituation for thieves, prostitutes, homosexuals or other disorderly
persons."'' 5 The Board of County Commissioners apparently failed to enact
the amendment.126
In August 1977, just two months after the repeal of the Dade County
civil rights ordinance, the media reported an indirect effort to establish
sexual orientation nondiscrimination in Palm Beach County. 127  It came
through an ordinance proposed to "'assure equal opportunity in employment
to all persons regardless of race, sex, color, age, handicaps, religion, national
origin, marital status or political affiliation."'  The report continued that
"buried deep in the ordinance.., is a six-line provision that may endanger
the entire proposal," making it unlawful to discriminate in employment "for
any reason, except where such reason is directly related to the job being
applied for or being performed." 129 The proposed ordinance did not mention
the word "homosexual" and one otherwise supportive county commissioner
questioned whether the proposal extended to sexual orientation.! The
proposal failed, 131 but not before the deletion of the original draft's inclusion
of lesbians and gay men, because members of the Human Resources
Committee were "unwilling to become embroiled in a Dade-like gay rights"
controversy.132 Also in 1977, activists in Gainesville, in Alachua County,
asked the City Commission to add the words "sexual and affectional
preference" to the city's antidiscrimination ordinance, but commissioners
voted down the proposal by a vote of four-to-one.
133
In June 1978, one of the leaders of the failed effort to retain the 1977
Dade County ordinance raised the possibility of a rerun of that battle.134 The
new proposal was included within a larger package to provide
nondiscrimination protections on not only "'affectional and sexual
preferences"' but also on other bases such as creed, political affiliation,
pregnancy, personal appearance, and lifestyle. 135 It further proposed free bus
125. Id.
126. Letter from Assistant Broward County Attorney Edward G. Labrador, to Alan Ted
(Oct. 7, 1996) (on file with author's estate).
127. See Mary Voboril, Gay Rights May Be Secured by Proposal in Palm Beach,
MIAmi HERALD, Aug. 4, 1977, at 14A.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Letter from Tammy K. Fields, Assistant County Attorney for Palm Beach County,
to Alan Terl (Nov. 21, 1996) (on file with author's estate).
132. Gay Rights Dropped From Two More Laws, ADVOCATE, Oct. 19, 1977, at 12 (on
file with author's estate).
133. Wrap-up, THE WEEKLY NEWs, May 14, 1990, at 2 (on file with author's estate).
134. Sam Jacobs, New Vote Sought on Gay Rights, MiAmi HERALD, June 7, 1978, at
lB.
135. Id.
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service for the elderly, the disabled, and those on welfare, and would have
established several nude beaches in Dade County', all in a rather awkward
effort to generate wider support for the proposals.
Community response clearly differed from 1977. The county
commissioner who authored the 1977 ordinance refused to support the new
effort.137 Fund-raising and other supportive efforts failed.' 38 Approval of the
petitions did not come for four months on the ground that the county had yet
to see and approve the wording.139 However, on October 3, 1978, Dade
County election officials advised that they had verified the necessary
signatures to put the "Full Equality Ordinance" on the ballot, and the Metro
Commission placed the issue on the November 1978 ballot.'"'
Circuit Judge John Gale dismissed a suit to remove the revised,
proposed ordinance from the ballot, finding it not sufficiently confusing to
require its removal from the ballot. The Catholic Archdiocese of Miami
publicly announced its opposition to the ballot proposal, taking the same
anti-lesbian/gay rights position it had for the 1977 election. 42 The measure
was defeated by a vote of fifty-eight-to-forty-two percent,143 a significantly
closer margin than that by which the voters rejected the 1977 proposal.
Proponents publicly spoke of yet a third effort, 45 yet the Dade County
Coalition for Human Rights ("DCCHR"), which with others had effectively
led the 1977 effort, refused by unanimous vote of its general membership to
support the proposed referendum effort.146 By mid-November 1979, the
Dade County Attorney had not yet approved the proposed wording of the
petitions, and promoters accused the Dade County Public Attorney of trying
136. Id.
137. Paul Kaplan, 'Closetitis' Blamed for Failure of Gay Rights Party, MIAMI NEWS,
June 8, 1978, at 5A.
138. Id.
139. Morton Lucoff, Drive to Put New Gay Rights Law On Ballot is Delayed, MIAMI
NEWS, June 7, 1978, at 5A.
140. Full Equality Ordinance Will Be On Ballot, Nov. 7, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Oct. 10,
1978, at 4 (on file with author's estate). See Morton Lucoff, Gay Rights Back on Dade Ballot,
MIAMI NEWs, Oct. 4, 1978, at 12A.
141. Gay Rights on Ballot, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 1978, at lB.
142. Charmayne Marsh, Catholic Church Again Opposes Gay-Rights Law, MIAMI
NEWs, Oct. 21, 1978, at IA.
143. Letter to the Editor, THE WEEKLY NEWs, Nov. 28, 1978, at 23.
144. Joanne Hooley, Voters Nay the Gays But Both Sides Call It a Victory, MIAMI
NEWs, Nov. 8, 1978, at IA (on file with author's estate).
145. Kunst Pushes Third Gay Rights Vote, KEY WEST CrrlzEN, Aug. 19, 1979, at 2.
146. See Mike Chase, Coalition Won't Support Kunst, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Nov. 7,
1979, at I.
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to sabotage the referendum effort.147 Within a matter of weeks, the County
Attorney approved the language of the petition.148 DCCHR reluctantly
reversed its position at a meeting of January 31, 1980, yet clearly its
endorsement of the referendum effort came despite opposition by the same
individuals who had led the unsuccessful 1977 and 1978 efforts. r4 9 No one
seems to have gathered the signatures necessary to place the issue back on
the ballot, and the issue did not resurface in Dade County for the next
seventeen years.
In 1979, the decade ended on a bleak note. Relying on evidence that
society condemns homosexuality, Circuit Judge R.A. Green, Jr., awarded
custody of a lesbian's three daughters to their father, a Washington State
resident living with a woman outside of wedlock. 50 Judge Green did this
notwithstanding the fact that the mother had asserted that she would leave
her lover in order to gain custody.
s5
IV. THE DECADE OF THE 1980S
The 1980s opened with one of the most significant advances for human
rights in the history of Florida's jurisprudence. In 1980, Florida voters
approved the "Right of privacy" amendment to the state constitution.152 The
amendment provides in pertinent part that "[e]very natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's
life except as otherwise provided herein... ."153 Both the legal and the
lesbian and gay communities saw the privacy amendment as a potential
source for future protection from police harassment for victimless crimes,
including consensual sex between adults in private.' 54 Until a few weeks
before the election, the amendment generated little controversy; several
people then identified it as a gay issue and campaigned around the state
opposing it, apparently becoming at least in part responsible for opposition
147. Leanne Seibert, CURE Must Reword Ordinance, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Nov. 14,
1979, at 1.
148. Paul H. Butler, Kunst Petition Gets O.K., THE WEEKLY NEws, Nov. 28, 1979, at
1.
149. William L. Coulter, No, No, Robert!, THE WEEKLY NEWs, Feb. 6, 1980, at 11.
150. Lesbian's Daughters Awarded to Father, ADVOCATE, July 12, 1979, at 7 (on file
with author's estate).
151. Id.
152. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
153. Id.
154. Florida Privacy Act Might Help Gay Rights, ADVOCATE, Dec. 25, 1980, at 11 (on
file with author's estate).
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by some of the state's major newspapers.1 55  Ultimately, the amendment
passed comfortably.
In February 1981, United States District Judge Ben Krentzman issued a
temporary restraining order prohibiting Polk Community College from
refusing to recognize a gay student group. 56 The court stated that it is "very
nearly always in the public interest to permit the free expression of
constitutional rights."
15 7
Despite the Privacy Amendment, the 1981 session of the Florida
Legislature saw new efforts at restricting the rights of lesbians and gay men.
State Senator Alan Trask, 158 who had sponsored the 1977 bills to prohibit
homosexuals from marrying1 5 9 and adopting,16 introduced legislation which
would have prohibited establishing gay organizations on the campuses of the
161 162state's community colleges. 1 The bill was withdrawn later in the session.
However, later in the session, Senator Trask also introduced an anti-gay
amendment to an appropriations bill.163 The amendment would have denied
state funding to schools which "'recommend or advocate sexual relations
between unmarried persons."' "64 In remarks accompanying the filing of the
amendment, the sponsor specifically referred to Lesbian and Gay Awareness
Week, celebrated at FSU.r65 The final version of the Senate's appropriations
bill that year did include the "Trask Amendment ' 16 and another amendment
sponsored by Senator Jack Gordon 67 directing that $50,000 of the amount
appropriated be "used, if necessary, to defend the State of Florida against
any lawsuits arising from any proviso which may be declared in violation of
the Florida Constitution or the United States Constitution."68 By raising the
155. Id.
156. In the Public Interest, THE WEEKLY NEws, Feb. 25, 1981, at 3 (on file with
author's estate).
157. Wall v. District Board of Trustees of Polk Community College, Case No. 81-125-
Civ.-T-K (on file with author's estate).
158. Democrat, Winter Haven.
159. See supra note 114.
160. See supra note 115.
161. S. 108, 13th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1981).
162. What!?!? No More Slow Dancing?, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Apr. 29, 1981, at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Anti-Gay Amendments Passed at State and National Level, THE WEEKLY NEWS,
June 24, 1981, at 3.
167. Democrat, Miami Beach.
168. Senator Gordon's Amendment, TYIE WEEKLY NEws, June 24, 1981, at 12 (on file
with author's estate).
[Vol. 24:793
61
: Nova Law Review 24, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
2000]
specter of potential lawsuits, the Gordon Amendment 69 was designed to
weaken the Trask Amendment and scare off its proponents. Representative
Tom Bush170 introduced a companion to the Trask Amendment into the
Florida House, and the legislature adopted the so-called "Bush-Trask
Amendment" to the House appropriations bills.171 Governor Bob Graham
allowed the amendment to remain in the state budget bill, which he signed
into law on June 30, even though he expressed doubts about its
constitutionality.1
72
In May 1981, the United States District Court in Orlando refused to
grant a temporary injunction against the refusal of both the University of
Central Florida ("UCF') and the Florida Board of Regents to allow the use
of UCF's campus as the site for the Sixth Annual Florida Conference for
Lesbians and Gay Men. 17 Judge George Young found that there had never
been a clear agreement or understanding reached regarding the facility's use
and that the University had not been fully informed about how large the
gathering would be.174 The suit died because the conference was held a few
days later at an alternate location. 175
By July 198 1,176 Florida Commissioner of Education, Ralph Turlington,
filed suit to overturn the Bush-Trask Amendment because he believed it
violated gay people's rights to freedom of speech. 177  The Bush-Trask
Amendment also came under fire in a suit by the Florida Task Force, 178 on
the basis that it illegally attached substantive law to an appropriations bill.
179
Before these cases reached trial, two significant developments occurred.
Reaching the question unanswered in the Eimers case, the Supreme
Court of Florida attempted to determine "to what extent the Florida Board of
Bar Examiners, in furtherance of its effort to determine the fitness of
applicants for admission to the Florida Bar, may inquire into an applicant's
169. $50,000, In Case, THE WEEKLY NEws, May 20, 1981, at 3 (on file with author's
estate).
170. Republican, Fort Lauderdale.
171. The Bush Amendment, THE WEEKLY NEws, May 20, 1981, at 12.
172. Brian Jones, Bush-Trask in Court, THM WEEKLY NEWS, July 8, 1981, at 3.
173. Gay Community Services of Central Florida, Inc., and the Florida Task Force, the
state's lesbian/gay rights lobby, sponsored the conference. FLA Conference to Change Sites,
TIIE WEEKLY NEws, May 20, 1981, at 3.
174. Letter from Jere M. Fishback, Esq., counsel for the Plaintiffs, to Alan Terl (Aug.
29, 1996) (on file with author's estate).
175. Id.
176. Jones, supra note 172, at 3.
177. See Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982).
178. It's State v. State in Bush-Trask, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Aug. 12, 1981, at 3.
179. Task Force Refuses Quick Ruling on Lawsuit, TiE WEEKLY NEWS, Sept. 30, 1981,
at 6 (on file with author's estate).
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sexual conduct. 180 On inquiry by the Board, an applicant had "admitted a
continuing sexual preference for men but refused to answer questions about
his past sexual conduct and indicated that he had no present intention
regarding future homosexual acts. He did state that he would obey all the
laws of Florida." 181 In a footnote, the court declined to respond to the
applicant's contention that Florida's proscription of unnatural and lascivious
acts cannot constitutionally apply to private consensual conduct between
adults.1
82
In a per curiam opinion citing the Eimers case and from which two of
the seven justices dissented, the court held that "[t]he investigation
performed by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners should be limited to
inquiries which bear a rational relationship to an applicant's fitness to
practice law."' 83 It continued: "Private noncommercial sex acts between
consenting adults are not relevant to prove fitness to practice law." 184
Notwithstanding the ruling, allegations surfaced in August 1981 that the
Florida Board of Bar Examiners continued to question lawyers about
homosexuality. 185
In August 1981, officials at FSU proposed, and then withdrew, an order
to require some faculty members and campus groups to sign a pledge to
uphold the Bush-Trask Amendment."' Instructors of five noncredit courses,
taught at the Center for Participant Education ("CPE"), all of which
contained material relating to homosexuality, were singled out to sign the
oath.'87 Officials withdrew the proposal after protests by the ACLU of
Florida and the CPE.
1 88
In September 1981, Education Commissioner Turlington's challenge to
the Bush-Trask Amendment went to trial. 189  Circuit Judge John Rudd
allowed future American Bar Association ("ABA") President Talbot
"Sandy" D'Alemberte to join the plaintiffs' side, argued by former ABA
180. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 403 So. 2d 1315, 1316 (1981).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1317.
184. Id.
185. Brian Jones, Examiners Still Questioning Gays, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Aug. 26,
1981, at 3.
186. Sex Loyalty Oaths at FSU, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Sept. 2, 1981, at 3 (on file with
author's estate).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Judge to Rule 'Within Days' On Trask-Bush, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Sept. 16, 1981,
at 3 (on file with author's estate); Judge Upholds Trask-Bush Law, THE WEEKLY NEws, Sept.
23, 1981, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
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President Chesterfield Smith."9 Later that month, Judge Rudd ruled that the
legislature acted within the state and United States Constitutions when it
passed the amendment.191 The Florida Task Force's challenge to the law
remained pending but before the same judge. 92
In October, Education Commissioner Turlington appealed Judge
Rudd's ruling. 93 Lawyers for Turlington said that the constitutional issues
were so grave that the state's highest court should quickly review the case. 94
The District Court of Appeal agreed and certified the case to the Supreme
Court of Florida.
95
Later that month, United States District Court Judge Ben Krentzman,
sitting in Tampa, ruled, in a suit brought by a University of South Florida
("USF") student group formed to advocate sex between unmarried persons,
that the Bush-Trask Amendment could not block the annual budget of the
university.1 6 Ironically Judge Krentzman's ruling a year earlier had paved
the way for introduction of the Bush-Trask Amendment.1 97
The end of 1981 saw Senator Trask once again in action, as he filed
legislation which would make fornication a crime once again. 9  The bill
aimed to overcome the Supreme Court of Florida's striking of part of
Florida's sodomy statute as unconstitutional in 1979, by defming
"fornication" as sexual intercourse other than between a man and his wife.1
By early 1982, members of both houses of the legislature had introduced
190. See Judge Upholds Trask-Bush Law, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Sept. 23, 1981, at 3 (on
file with author's estate).
191. Id.
192. Id. In September 1981, two men were arrested at the Fort Lauderdale Airport
after a Sheriffs deputy objected to two men kissing goodbye as one was about to depart. Two
Men Face Criminal Charges After Airport 'Goodbye Kiss,' THE WEEKLY NEWs, Sept. 30,
1981, at 3 (on file with author's estate). A scuffle ensued, and the two men were later found
guilty of battery on a police officer, resisting arrest without violence, and disorderly conduct
by Circuit Judge John G. Ferris. Id. During the two-day, nonjury trial, the arresting officer
testified that he would not have asked a man and a woman to stop kissing and hugging
because that's "proper." Airport Kissing Trial Ends with Probation for Defendants, THE
WEEKLY NEws, Apr. 7, 1982, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
193. Bush-Trask Headedfor State Supreme Court, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Oct. 7, 1981, at
3 (on file with author's estate).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Sex in Court! Judge Blocks Bush-Trask Law, THE WEEKLY NEws, Oct. 14, 1981,
at 3 (on file with author's estate).
197. See Bush-Trask Headed for State Supreme Court, supra note 193, at 3.
198. S. 91, 14th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982); News Analysis, T1-E WEEKLY NEws, Dec.
2, 1981, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
199. Id.
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bills2w to repeal Florida's existing and constitutionally flawed fornication
law.201 Senator Trask had also introduced a watered down version of the
earlier Bush-Trask Amendment.2°2 The revised bill would have financially
penalized schools where student organizations on campus advocated
breaking the law as defined by state statutes. 2°3
On February 4, 1982, the Supreme Court of Florida unanimously held
the Bush-Trask Amendment unconstitutional as an abridgment of the right to
free speech.2 4 The opinion, written by Chief Justice Joseph A. Boyd, was
direct and straightforward. "The right of persons to express themselves
freely is not limited to statements of views that are acceptable to the majority
of people.... A state cannot abride freedom of speech on campus any
more than it may do so off campus."
The supreme court's ruling came in Commissioner of Education
Turlington's challenge to the amendment.206 The Bush-Trask Amendment
died without ever being enforced, essentially because of the federal ruling in
Tampa." 7
On the same day as the supreme court issued its ruling, however, the
University of Florida Lesbian and Gay Society ("UFLAGS") learned that it
would lose its office space in the student union, the only welcoming place on
campus for gay students at the University of Florida ("UF').2 8 The Bush-
Trask Amendment apparently played no part in the decision to oust
UFLAGS-rather, the administration claimed UFLAGS did not serve the
interests of a sufficiently large group of students. 2°
Back in Tallahassee, Senator Trask changed the direction of his 1982
watered down version of the Bush-Trask Amendment. 210 Rather thanwithholding funds from state learning institutions which permit groups that
200. H.R. 336, 14th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982) (sponsored by Representative Andy
Johnson (Democrat, Jacksonville)); S. 762, 14th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982) (sponsored by
Senator Jack Gordon (Democrat, Miami Beach)).
201. Florida Task Force News, THE WEEKLY NEws, Feb. 3, 1982, at 16 (on file with
author's estate).
202. S. 442, 14th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982).
203. Id.
204. Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 461-62 (Fla. 1982). See Trask-
Bush Proviso Struck Down, THE WEEKLY NEws, Feb. 10, 1982, at 3 (on file with author's
estate).
205. Lewis, 416 So. 2d at 461-62.
206. Id. at 458.
207. S. 442, 14th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982).
208. UFLAGS Refused Office Space on Gainesville Campus, THE WEEKLY NEWs, Feb.
17, 1982, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
209. Id.
210. Trask Introduces 'New & Improved' S.B. 442, THE WEEKLY NEws, Mar. 3, 1982,
at 3 (on file with author's estate).
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advocate unlawful or disruptive activities, the further revised version211
proposed to expel and bar from admission, to any state college or universit,
for two years, any student who engaged in "disruptive activities."
Activities which could result in the banning of a student included violations
of criminal law, such as existing laws against homosexual activity.2 13 On
March 4, 1982, the Senate Education Committee rejected Trask's bill.214
In April 1982, UFLAGS filed suit in federal court, alleging
discrimination, violation of free speech and association rights, and violation
215of equal protection guarantees. One day before the first scheduled hearing
216in the case, it settled and UFLAGS regained its office space.
The 1982 legislature ended with the demise of attempts in both houses
to repeal Florida's fornication law.217 The House bill failed in committee;
Senator Gordon's bill was never heard by committee after the House
failure.218 A four-year gap in official attention to lesbian/gay issues followed
the 1982 legislative session. This may well have resulted from the
resignation in disgrace of State Senator Trask from the legislature,2 19. the
defeat of Representative Tom Bush in his 1982 campaign for a seat in the
Florida Senatem ' and a slow-starting, but ever-increasing awareness of, and
preoccupation of the lesbian/gay community with the emerging threat posed
by the illness ultimately labeled Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS").
One exception to this gap occurred in December 1982, when the
Supreme Court of Florida allowed the readmission of Harris Kimball to The
Florida Bar, but only upon his successfully passing The Florida Bar
Examination.2 Kimball had objected to a referee's recommendation to that
effect, and without discussing the cause for Kimball's disbarment, the court
211. See Bush-Trask Headedfor State Supreme Court, supra note 193, at 3.
212. See Trask Introduces'New & Improved' S.B. 442, supra note 210, at 3.
213. Id.
214. SB-442 Killed in Senate Committee, TME WEEKLY NEws, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14 (on
file with author's estate).
215. UFLAGS Sues University of Florida Over Office Ouster, THE WEEKLY NEWs,
Apr. 14, 1982, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
216. UFLAGS Retakes Office Space at U of F, THE WEEKLY NEws, May 19, 1982, at 3
(on file with author's estate).
217. S. 91, 14' Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1982). See also Florida's Sex Laws, THE
WEEKLY NEws, June 25, 1982, at 10 (on file with author's estate).
218. Florida's SexLaws, supra note 217, at 10.
219. Facing Senate Investigating Committee, Trask Decided Not To Seek Reelection,
THE WEEKLY NEWs, June 16, 1982, at 3 (on file with author's estate); Gilbert Hoping To Try
Trask, THm WEEKLY NEWS, Sept. 8, 1982, at 6 (on file with author's estate).
220. Gay Voters Flex Muscles, Tm WEEKLY NEws, Nov. 10, 1982, at 3 (on file with
author's estate).
221. In re Petition of Kimball, 425 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1982).
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agreed with the referee, relying on the terms of the disbarment and the rules
for readmission. 
2
In June 1985, a federal jury awarded $100,000 to two men who had
sued the City of DeLand claiming the city violated their civil rights when it
refused to issue them an occupational license for a hair styling salon at their
residential address. 3  The jury found that the city had "willfully and
intentionally deprived plaintiffs of due process of law in denial of an
occupational license" and "willfully and intentionally deprived [one of the
plaintiffs of his] right of privacy and/or freedom of association."' 4
Unexpectedly, the next chapter in this history occurred because of the
lead of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC").
Recognizing an increasing pattern of insurer discrimination against persons
with AIDS and those then perceived as being at highest risk for AIDS-gay
men,22 the NAIC on December 11, 1986, while meeting in Orlando, 22
adopted guidelines recommended by its Advisory Committee on AIDS.m
Those guidelines included a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in deciding who must undergo HIV antibody testing as a
part of the insurance application process . 2- NAIC's adoption of the
guidelines, significant in terms of policy direction, carried no real authority
in any particular state unless and until that state adopted the guidelines as
policy.229
In July 1987, the Florida Insurance Commission formally proposed the
adoption of the NAIC nondiscrimination guidelines, including the sexual
222. Id. at 534.
223. Two Hair Stylists Get $100,000 in Suit Against DeLand, THE WEEKLY NEWS, June
12, 1985, at 22 (on file with author's estate).
224. Id.
225. See Allan H. Ten, Emerging Issues of AIDS and Insurance, 12 NOVA L. REV.
1291 (1988).
226. Insurance Commissioners Ban Discrimination of Gay Clients, THE WEEKLY
NEWS, Dec. 17, 1986, at 24 (on file with author's estate).
227. National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Proposed Bulletin on
"Medical/Lifestyle Questions and Underwriting Guidelines" (extended to apply specifically to
HMOs in June 1988) (on file with author's estate).
228. Id.
229. In February 1987, the Florida Right to Privacy Coalition was formed by
representatives of the Florida ACLU, Florida N.O.W., the National Lawyers Guild, the Florida
Young Democrats, and a variety of civil rights/civil liberties and political groups for the
specific purpose of repealing the state sodomy statute. Coalition Seeks To Build Privacy
Momentum, THE WEEKLY NEWs, Feb. 25, 1987, at 8 (on file with author's estate). Neither a
repeal of the legislation nor a court challenge ever materialized.
[Vol. 24:793
67
: Nova Law Review 24, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
2000]
orientation provision.23° Before the proposed rules could take effect,
however, the Florida Legislature made the rules unnecessary.
Sensing a need to deal with AIDS in a comprehensive manner, rather
than allowing the courts to shape Florida's AIDS law on a case-by-case
basis, the leadership of the Florida House of Representatives in 1987-1988
appointed a Legislative Task Force on AIDS.231 Chaired by Representative
232Lois J. Frankel , the Task Force tackled virtually every issue then
intertwined with AIDS in an enlightened manner.2 33 Its work product, the
Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988,2 4  included the sexual orientation
nondiscrimination recommendation of the NAIC.235  Accordingly, the
Florida Legislature took the first step toward rights for lesbians and gay men
in over a decade. A similar provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act extended
the nondiscrimination requirement to health maintenance organizations.
2 36
The 1988 session of the legislature also considered the first attempt at
hate crimes legislation for Florida.237 Its coverage included sexual
orientation, and the Senate bill passed in that chamber's Criminal Justice
238Committee. However, even the lobbyist for the Florida Task Force saw
only a slim chance for full passage that year,239 and the bill did not become
law.24
In 1989, after a gap of a dozen years, a local ordinance protecting
against sexual orientation discrimination was proposed. 24' For the first timesince the 1977 repeal of the Dade County ordinance and the failed 1977
230. INFoRMATIoNAL BuLLETIN No. 87-206 (July 9, 1987) (on file with author's
estate).
231. Id.
232. Democrat, West Palm Beach.
233. For a detailed discussion of the enactment of the 1988 Omnibus AIDS Act, its
legislative history and the subsequent amendments to it, see ROBERT CRAIG WATERS, AIDS
AND FLORIDA LAw (D&S/Butterworth Legal Publishers 1989-1995).
234. Ch. 88-380, §§ 47, 53, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2031-34, 2038 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 627.429 (1989)); Ch. 88-380, 88 51, 54, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2035-38 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 641.3007 (1989)).
235. Id.
236. Id. (codified at FIA. STAT. § 641.3007(4) (1989)).
237. S. 698, 20th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1988) (introduced by Senator Carrie Meek,
Democrat, Miami); H.R. 575, 20th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1988) (introduced by Representative
Elaine Gordon, Democrat, North Miami).
238. Budget Clears State House, Senate; Florida Hate Crimes Bill Discovered, THE
WEEKLY NEWS, May 25, 1988, at 3, 38 (on file with author's estate).
239. Id.
240. State Releases Final AIDS Budget; Hate Crime Bill Dies, THE WEEKLY NEWS,
June 22, 1988, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
241. Tampa Human Rights Drive, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Jan. 18, 1989, at 20 (on file
with author's estate).
Teri
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
efforts in Palm Beach County, Gainesville, and Dade, the City of Tampa
242began a legislative trend. Local activists and political leaders sensed that
the time might be right to again raise this issue, which had previously caused
such agony for so much of Florida.z43 Shortly thereafter, the same forces
proposed an ordinance for Hillsborough County as well. Quickly following
suit, activists and political leaders in Palm Beach County felt that the climate
was right there too, and introduced a sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinance that same year.2" In January 1989, the Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Committee ("IRRC") of The Florida Bar, for the first time,
245endorsed a ban on sexual orientation discrimination.
Also in early 1989, the ACLU of Florida formally set as a priority in its
litigation program, a challenge to the constitutionality of the state's statutory
prohibition against adoptions by homosexuals.246 Over the next two years,
the ACLU screened potential plaintiffs in an effort to design the best
possible test case.247
In February 1989, another group outside Florida took action which
would form one of the bases for still further development of these
proposals.248 The ABA, long considered a bastion of conservatism and the
status quo, surfaced as an organization willing to take a noteworthy lead on a
variety of progressive issues.249 On its third consideration of this issue in
seven years, the ABA House of Delegates passed a sexual orientation
nondiscrimination policy by a better than two-to-one vote.25 1 The policy, in
large part, reflected the findings of an analytical report which documented
the need for such policies and which further refuted all of the reasons
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. County Eased Into Rights Leadership, BOCA RATON NEws, Feb. 11, 1990, at IA
(on file with author's estate).
245. Florida Bar Association Considers Anti-Discrimination Rule for State Legal
System, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Jan. 25, 1989, at 16 (on file with author's estate).
246. See ACLU Seeking Gays Looking to Adopt, a news release of the ACLU of
Florida, Feb. 25, 1989 (on file with author's estate); ACLU Seeks Gay People To Adopt, THE
WEEKLY NEWS, Mar. 1, 1989, at 34 (on file with author's estate).
247. ACLU Seeking Gays Looking to Adopt, supra note 246, at 34.
248. American Bar Association Calls for Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination
Against Lesbian/Gay People, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Feb. 15, 1989, at 14 (on file with author's
estate).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. The resolution read: "BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association
urges the Federal Government, the states and local governments to enact legislation, subject of
such exceptions as may be appropriate, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in employment, housing and public accommodations. 'Sexual orientation' means
heterosexuality, bisexuality and homosexuality." Id.
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regularly cited by the opponents to sexual orientation nondiscrimination
proposals. Among the sponsors was the Dade County Bar Association.
With a more organized approach than had occurred in the prior year, a
coalition of individuals from groups including the Anti-Defamation League
of the B'nai B'rith, the ACLU, and lesbian/gay rights activists, proposed that
Florida join the federal government and multiple other states, which had
already enacted in various forms, reporting of special protections against and
enhanced penalties for hate crimes evidencing prejudice on specified
prohibited bases, including the sexual orientation of the victim.2
-
The 1989 legislative session indeed enacted the Florida Hate Crimes
Act, but it dealt only with crimes evidencing prejudice based on race, color,
ancestry, ethnicity, religion, or national origin of the victim.5 3  Crimes
evidencing prejudice on the basis of the sexual orientation of the victim had
fallen to the cutting room floorn 4
Largely on the impetus of the newly-adopted ABA policy, local
activists went to the Broward County Human Rights Board ("BCHRB") and
asked it to propose a local ordinance for Broward County. The BCHRB
held one public hearing and endorsed the proposal by a vote of twelve-to-
four, thus providing the first vote by a public body supporting a local sexual
orientation nondiscrimination ordinance since the Dade County enactment
more than a decade earlier. 6 Only after making the proposal did the local
activists recognize that the BCHRB lacked the power to act as requested.
The Broward County Human Rights Act, to which sexual orientation
nondiscrimination protections would be added under the proposal, was not a
local ordinance, but a state law enacted by the Florida Legislature for the
benefit of only Broward County, subject to ratification by the Broward
County electorate.258 Amendment of the act would therefore require a
change in state law and approval by the voters at a countywide referendum.
252. In April 1989, after months of quiet groundwork by area lesbian and gay activists,
the Hillsborough County Commission voted four-to-two to refer a proposed sexual orientation
nondiscrimination amendment to the County's Human Rights Ordinance to the County's legal
department for an opinion. Hillsborough Co. Commission To Consider Pro-Gay Ordinance,
1E-m WEEKLY NEws, Apr. 26, 1989, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
253. Ch. 89-133, §1, 1989 Fla. Laws 381, 381 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.085
(1989), amended by ch. 99-172, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 964, 964).
254. Chip Halvorsen, Progressive 'AIDS Glitch Bill' Passes, THE WEEKLY NEWS, June
7, 1989, at 3.
255. Steve Bousquet, Gays Seek Stronger Bias Law, MIAMI HERALD, July 19, 1989, at
IBR.
256. Steve Bousquet, Board Urges Expanded Gay Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12,
1989, at 1BR.
257. Ch. 93-386, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 204,205.
258. Bousquet, supra note 256, at 1BR. The act was approved by a majority of the
voters in the general election of November 6, 1984.
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In late-October 1989, by a vote of six-to-one, the Broward County
Commission sent the proposed addition of sexual orientation
nondiscrimination coverage forward to the Broward County Legislative
Delegation with a resolution calling for the necessary change to state law
and the requisite referendum.2 9 By January 1990, the Broward Legislative
Delegation had voted twelve-to-four to sponsor the Broward proposal as a
local bill, 26 and the measure encountered only token opposition in the full
legislature. 26' The referendum was set for the primary election in September
1990.
In August 1989, Hillsborough County activists successfully took the
first step on their road towards a sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinance. 262  By a vote of four-to-three, the Board of County
Commissioners agreed to hold a public hearing on the proposal.
263
In September 1989, activists in Dade County began an unsuccessful
effort to add coverage for sexual orientation discrimination to the Dade
County antidiscrimination ordinance.2' They needed to collect sufficient
petition signatures to get the Board of County Commissioners to place the
issue on the ballot.265 By late-October of that year, however, volunteers had
collected only 500 of the 30,000 signatures necessary to force the Metro
Commission either to enact a sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance
266
or to put the issue to a public vote.
Also in September 1989, the Legislation Committee of The Florida Bar
had before it the request of The Florida Bar's Committee on Individual
Rights and Responsibilities to support sexual orientation nondiscrimination
legislation. The process required two steps. First, it requires a finding that
the legislation is related to the purposes of The Florida Bar and, second, a
259. Steve Bousquet, County Backs Vote On Gay Bias, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 25, 1989
at 1BR.
260. Id.
261. The Florida House of Representatives initially approved the bill by a vote of 109-
to-zero. Steve Bousquet, State House OKs County Referendum on Gay Rights, MIAMI
HERALD, May 18, 1990, at.7BR. The county's three Republicans cast negative votes with the
House clerk after the roll call vote. Steve Bousquet, 3 Broward Republicans Voted Against
Gay-Rights Referendum, MIAMI HERALD, May 19, 1990, at 2BR. The Florida Senate
approved the bill by a vote of 38-to-zero. Senate OKs Gay-Rights Bill, SuN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale), May 29, 1990, at IA (on file with author's estate).
262. See Hillsborough Activists Win "Small Victory;" County Commission Schedules
Rights Hearing, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Aug. 23, 1989, at 3.
263. Id.
264. Dade Gay Cop/Activist Launches New Rights Drive, THE WEEKLY NEws, Sept.
13, 1989, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
265. Id.
266. Debbie Sontag, A Cop's Crusade, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 17, 1989, at 1G.
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vote on the substance of the proposal.2 7 A motion to find the proposal lay
within The Florida Bar's proper subject matter jurisdiction but died for lack
of a second.
In October of 1989, after a six-hour public hearing before a crowd of
500, the Hillsborough County Commission rejected its proposed sexual
orientation nondiscrimination ordinance by a vote of five-to-two. 2m The city
of Tampa followed suit within two weeks, with the City Commission
rejecting its proposed sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance by a
vote of four-to-two with one abstention.2
9
In November 1989, news surfaced that the Polk County Sheriff required
gay male and lesbian inmates at the county jail to wear what the sheriff
called "pink tags."' ' 0 Sheriff's officials segregated homosexual men and
women from the rest of the inmates and made them wear pink bracelets
ostensibly for their own protection, arguing that they were subject to
beatings from heterosexual inmates271 The practice had apparently gone on
for ten yearsY 2 By January 1990, as a result of the public outcry, the Sheriff
discontinued the practice and allowed inmates who previously fell into the
pink-tagged homosexual category to request placement in protective custody
if they felt endangered after the change. 73
V. THE DECADE OF THE 1990S
A. Litigation
In September 1990, the ACLU of Florida filed its first challenge to the
discriminatory adoption statute.274 The plaintiff, Ed Seebol, was a single,
gay man with an unquestionably substantial and respectable reputation in the
community and served as executive director of AIDS Help, Inc., in Key
267. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR Rule 2-9.3 (1999).
268. Gay Rights Plan Fails on 5-2: Hillsborough Rejects Anti-Bias Proposal, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1989, at lB.
269. Karen Dukess, Tampa Turns Down Gay-Rights Measure, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1989, at lB.
270. Polk County Sheriff Requires Gay, Lesbian Prisoners to Wear Degrading 'Pink
Tags,' THE WEEKLY NEWS, Nov. 22, 1989, at 3.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Memorandum from Captain Dale C. Tray, Assistant Director, Detention Bureau,
Polk County Sheriff's Office to Concerned Personnel (Jan. 12, 1990) (on file with author's
estate).
274. ACLUIFIorida Sues HRS Over Denial of Adoption Bid by 'Ideal' Gay Applicant
Due to Sexual Orientation, THE WEEKLY NEWs, Oct. 3, 1990, at 10 [hereinafter
A CLU/Florida].
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West.275 Seebol had even indicated his willingness to adopt a difficult to
place "special needs" child, but the local office of the Florida Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS"), 276 which oversees the adoption
process, turned him down, specifically because he noted his sexual
orientation on his application.
277
On March 15, 1991, Judge M. Ignatius Lester of the Circuit Court for
the 16th Judicial Circuit for Monroe County ruled in the Seebol case,
holding Florida's statutory prohibition against adoption by homosexuals
unconstitutional as violative of the state's guarantees of equal protection of
the laws of due process of law, and of the state constitutional right to
privacy.27 HRS had not defended the suit. The Attorney General of Florida
had not defended the constitutionality of the statutory provision. Hence-
forth, there was no appeal. Thus, the ruling stood as precedent, but only in
Monroe County.
279
On the heels of the Seebol decision, a gay male couple from Sarasota
stepped forward to serve as the~laintiffs in a second challenge to Florida's
statutory adoption prohibition.2w Both had filed adoption petitions which
HRS denied because they disclosed their homosexuality.28 1 On their behalf,
the ACLU of Florida filed Cox v. Health & Rehabilitative Services.282 This
time, HRS actively defended the case. It argued, among other things, that
allowing adoptions by homosexuals would deprive a child of an "opposite
sex role model," and that having homosexual parents "limits the child's
choice of sexual preference" and "does not appear to be in the child's best
interest.'83 In March 1993, Judge Scott M. Browning followed the
reasoning of the Seebol decision and found that the statutory prohibition
against adoption by homosexuals unconstitutionally violated the rights of
275. Id.
276. Currently, the Department of Children and Family Services.
277. Letter from Carmen Dominguez Frick, District Legal Counsel, HRS District XI, to
Edward Seebol (May 10, 1990) (on file with author's estate). See also ACLU/Florida, supra
note 274, at 10.
278. Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (16th Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991).
279. As early as 1986, the ACLU of Florida had sought plaintiffs willing to challenge
Florida's legislative prohibition against adoption by homosexuals. Ready to Adopt? Time to
Call ACLU, Ti-i WEEKLY NEWS, Nov. 26, 1986, at 10 (on file with author's estate). The
failure to identify an appropriate plaintiff put the effort on hold for several years. Id.
280. Sarasota Couple to Sue HRS Over Their Rejection as Adoptive Parents Because
of Their Sexual Orientation, THE WEEKLY NEws, May 22, 1991, at 13.
281. Id.
282. 627 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), reversed and remanded 656 So. 2d
902 (Fla. 1995).
283. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1220. See also HRS Lays Out Reasons for Banning Gay
Adoptions, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, at 4B.
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equal protection, due process, and the constitutional right to privacy.'" The
court pointed out that the law encourages homosexuals to lie. 5 Within a
286month, HRS announced that it would appeal the circuit court's decision.
On December 1, 1993, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled in the
appeal of the Cox case.m All eleven judges of the Second District, sitting en
banc, overturned the circuit court ruling which had found the statutory
prohibition against adoption by homosexuals unconstitutional.288 The court
criticized the trial court's failure to take testimony and its reliance instead on
assorted academic treatises, but it nevertheless said that whether
homosexuals should be allowed to adopt is an issue for the legislature rather
than for the courts.289 The Second District Court of Appeal ruling also
suggested a possible setback in the then-pending third ACLU case filed to
challenge the adoption prohibition of June Amer.29 The ACLU of Florida
immediately appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida.29, Among those
filing amicus briefs was the Florida Catholic Conference.
2 92
In late-April 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida sent Cox293 back to the
Sarasota County Circuit Court to hear more evidence to decide whether the
statutory prohibition against adoption by homosexuals violates state
constitutional rights.294 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of
Florida approved the decision of the district court of appeal except those
portions which did not remand the equal protection issue to the trial court for
further proceedings.295  The decision thus effectively upheld the
284. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1210. See also 2nd Judge Rejects Gay Adoption Ban,
ORLANDO SENTm , Mar. 6, 1993, at B3.
285. See Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1210.
286. Health Officials Seek Gay Adoption Ruling, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 2, 1993, at 6B
(on file with author's estate).
287. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
288. Id. at 1220.
289. Id. at 1213. See also Ban on Gay Adoptions is Upheld, MAMI HERALD, Dec. 3,
1993, at 5B (on file with author's estate).
290. Trevor Jensen, Court Ruling May Work Against Lesbian's Bid to Adopt, SUN-
SENTiNEL (Fort Lauderdale), Dec. 3, 1993, at 4B.
291. Cox v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
1995).
292. Can State Continue to Prevent Gay Adults from Adopting Children?, DAILY
BusINEsS REv Ew, Feb. 24, 1995, at A28 (on file with author's estate).
293. The appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida was taken only by Cox, Jackman
having abandoned his interest in the case. Initial Brief of Petitioners, Cox v. Florida Dep't of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82967).
294. Cox, 656 So. 2d at 903. See also Gay Adoption to be Reheard, MLAMI HERALD,
Apr. 28, 1995, at 5B (on file with author's estate).
295. Cox, 656 So. 2d at 903.
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constitutionality of the statute against the challenges on the basis of the
privacy and due process guarantees of the Florida Constitution. 2% Justice
Gerald Kogan, in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part and in
which Justice Harry Lee Anstead concurred, disagreed with the majority's
failure to further analyze the due process aspects of the case and would have
remanded on that issue as well.297
In December 1995, the Cox case was voluntarily dismissed before the
mandated retrial could begin. 29  News reports termed the reasons "purely
personal," citing the partners separation after a seven-year relationship and
implying that the strain of the legal battle and the media attention to them
may have contributed to that development. 299
In June 1992, the ACLU of Florida had filed the third in its series of
challenges to Florida's statutory prohibition against adoption by
homosexuals. 300 This case was brought in Broward County on behalf of
June Amer, who, like Ed Seebol before her, had expressed an interest in
adopting a "special needs" child.30' The ACLU had placed its suit on behalf
of June Amer on the back burner while the courts dealt with Cox. 302 By late-
1995, with that case having concluded, the ACLU moved the Amer matter
into the lead in this effort.
3
During the course of the Amer litigation, two other cases came into
prominence, although having little effect on Amer as they dealt with foster
parents. In August 1992, the Florida ACLU filed suit on behalf of a lesbian
couple, Bonnie Lynn Matthews and Elaine Kohler, from whom HRS took a
six-year-old boy who had been in their foster care.3° Notwithstanding the
fact that the plain language of the discriminatory adoption provision, enacted
in 1977, refers only to adoption, state social workers "told the couple to
forget about being foster parents."305  During the same month, lesbian
Sharon McCracken in Broward County received a license to be a foster
296. Id. See also LEGAL DRECTOR'S Acrivrry REPORT, ACLU OF FLORIDA (May
1995) (on file with author's estate).
297. Cox, 656 So. 2d at 903-04. See also Supreme Court Looks at Law Preventing
Gay Adoptions, FLORIDA BAR NEws, June 1, 1995, at 16 (on file with author's estate).
298. Two Men Give Up Fight to Adopt Handicapped Kids, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 15,
1995, at 5B.
299. Id.
300. See Amer v. Johnson, No. 92-14370(11) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept. 5, 1997).
301. Id. See also Lesbian Sues HRS for Blocking Adoption, THE WEEKLY NEWS, June
10, 1992, at 12 (on file with author's estate).
302. Jaime Abdo, Lesbian Leads Battle to Adopt, SUN-SENTNEL (Fort Lauderdale),
Dec. 18, 1995, at 3B.
303. Id.
304. Lisa Demer, Lesbian Couple Sues Over Loss of Foster Child, TAMPA TRIMUNE,
Aug. 15, 1992, at 1.
305. Id.
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parent.306 The action came only after she threatened suit.3°7 News reports
credited her with being the first openly gay person to be granted such a
license.308 HRS officials distinguished the cases, saying that it would treat
an unmarried heterosexual couple living together the same as it had the
Tampa lesbian couple.309 However, in a sworn statement in the Tampa case,
an HRS official made clear that "in this district, we would not be licensing
homosexuals. 310
In May 1993, the circuit court in Hillsborough County delivered a split
decision in the Matthews v. Weinberg foster care case.311 Holding that the
state cannot decide whether to grant a foster parent's license based solely on
a person's "sexual status," the court nevertheless upheld an HRS rule against
licensing unmarried couples as foster parents.312 The ACLU appealed the
latter aspect of the ruling.313
In October 1994, the Second District Court of Appeal struck down
HRS' policy that prohibited unmarried couples-homosexual or
314heterosexual-from becoming foster parents. Its decision was based on
HRS' failure to follow rule-making procedures required under Florida law.315
While the ruling applies only to the fourteen county jurisdictions within the
Second District, there was wide acknowledgment that the case would carry316
great legal weight throughout the state. In January 1995, the original
plaintiffs in the case, the unmarried lesbian couple who sought foster care
306. Wendy Bounds, Lesbian is Stalled in Effort to Become a Foster Mother, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 1, 1992, at 1BR.
307. Id.
308. Lesbian Wins License to be Foster Parent, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992,
at lB.
309. Lisa Demer, Gay Couples Can't Parent, Says HRS, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Sept. 1,
1992, Florida/Metro Section at 1.
310. Lisa Demer, HRS Counselor Says Homosexuals Barred as Foster Parents, TAMPA
TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 1992, at 1.
311. See Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
Mike Mahan, Appeal Heard for Unmarried Foster Parents, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 14,
1994, at 3B.
312. Matthews, 645 So. 2d at 490. See also Sue Carlton, Order Mixed on Foster
Parent Rules, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 26, 1993, at lB.
313. Matthews, 645 So. 2d at490. See also Mahan, supra note 311, at3B.
314. Matthews, 645 So. 2d at 490.
315. Id.
316. Court Rules in Favor of Lesbians in Fight Over Foster Rights, TAMPA TRIBUNE,
Oct. 1, 1994, at 6. Also in October 1994, an effort to get the Gainesville City Commission to
rescind its 1992 recommendation that the Alachua County Commission not enact sexual
orientation nondiscrimination procedures met with no success. Chad Terhune, City to
ReconsiderAnti-Gay Statement, GANESVILLUE SUN, Oct. 26, 1994, at lB.
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approval, appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida in an attempt to ain a
ruling on the eligibility of unmarried couples to serve as foster parents.
Other cases related to battles by parents in same-sex relationships
seeking an award of custody or retention of custody of their natural
children. 3 1 In August 1995, Judge Joseph Q. Tarbuck of the circuit court of
Escambia County ruled in a custody modification case then before him.
319
Because the mother was a lesbian, the court removed an eleven-year-old girl
from the custody of the mother who had raised her from birth and steered her
successfully through Attention Deficit Disorder.3 20 Custody was awarded
instead to the child's natural father, who had shot his first wife to death,
spent eight years in prison for the murder, spouted racist views, and had
fallen behind on his child support.32' The court reasoned that "the child
should be given the opportunity and the option to live in a non-lesbian world
or atmosphere to decide if that's what she wants-that's the life she wants to
pursue when she reaches adulthood. 322 Judge Tarbuck continued: "I don't
think that this child ought to be lead into [a lesbian] relationship before she
has a full opportunity to know that she can live another lifestyle just by
virtue of the fact of her living accommodations." 323 An appeal was taken by
the mother to the First District Court of Appeal.
324
In August 1996, a unanimous three-judge panel of the First District
Court of Appeal declined to overturn Judge Tarbuck's award of custody to
317. See Matthews v. Weinberg, 624 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1995).
318. In September 1991, an appeal followed a trial court's modification of a 1985
award of custody of a minor daughter to the child's lesbian mother. The modification had
allowed the mother to relocate to San Francisco. The child's father appealed the modification,
arguing that San Francisco is "notorious for the number of lesbians and homosexuals living
there," and because the daughter was allegedly living under conditions which would hinder
her becoming a normal healthy woman. However, the appellate court's terse per curiam
opinion in no way suggests that the father's outrageous claims in any way contributed to its
having reversed the trial court's order allowing removal of the child from Florida. Mize v.
Mize, 589 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
319. Ward v. Ward, No. 92-2424-CAOI-H (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 1995) (on file
with author's estate).
320. John McKinnon, A Lesbian Mom's Loss of Custody Now a Key Case, Judge
Awarded Girl, 11, to Dad-Who's a Killer, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 1, 1996, at 6A. Lesbian
Mother, Murderer Father, and a Child, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 9, 1996, at IA.
321. See Lesbian Mother, Murderer Father, and a Child, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 9, 1996,
at IA.
322. Transcript of Custody Award Decision Hearing, at 1, lines 12-17, Ward v. Ward,
No. 92-2424-CAO1-H (on file with author's estate).
323. Id. at 84, lines 2-7.
324. See Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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the father in the Ward case.325 "[The focus of this case is not on the
mother's sexual orientation, but on the best interests of the child," the
326
unsigned opinion read. It found that the trial judge's decision was
supported by "competent and substantial evidence" that the child was bein
harmed by conduct to which she was being exposed in her mother's home.3Z7
The panel cautioned that it was "not suggesting that the sexual orientation of
the custodial parent by itself justifies a custody change.' 3 s An appeal was
filed within a matter of weeks.329
In January 1997, the mother in the Ward case died.330 Her daughter
would remain with the child's father, who had killed his first wife.
331
Counsel for the deceased lesbian mother asked the First District Court of
Appeal to withdraw or vacate its opinion and dismiss the appeal.332
In 1993, Judge Jere Tolton of the circuit court for Okaloosa County
reached a decision similar to that in Ward in a dispute involving an initial
child custody award.333 He cited the mother's lesbianism in awarding
325. Id. at 255. See also Jackie Halifax, Lesbian Mom Loses Custody Appeal, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 31, 1996, at 5B.
326. Ward, 742 So. 2d at 252.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 254.
329. Gay Mother Appeals Ruling on Custody, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Sept.
18, 1996, at 17A.
330. Lesbian in Custody Case is Dead She Lost Daughter to Killer Father, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Jan. 23, 1997, at 24B.
331. Id. However, within a week of the lesbian mother's death, a formal complaint had
been filed against Judge Tarbuck for violation of those provisions of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which prohibit disparagement on the basis of sexual orientation and gender in the
performance of their judicial duties. Letter from Thomas C. MacDonald, Jr., General Counsel,
Judicial Qualifications Commission, to Allan H. Ted (Mar. 5, 1997) (on file with author's
estate). The complaint noted that an "earlier filing might have negatively impacted the
mother... if an appellate court had remanded the case back to Judge Tarbuck." Id. By early
March, "[a]fter full investigation and consideration of the complaint, the [JQC] concluded that
the matter [did] not warrant further proceedings." Id. It dismissed the complaints and closed
its file on the matter. Id.
332. Letter from Charlene M. Carres, Esq., to the First District Court of Appeal (Jan.
28, 1997) (on file with author's estate).
333. See Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In re The
Marriage of Maradie, No. 93-442-FD (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. 1993) (on file with author's estate).
Also in July 1993, Judge A. C. Soud of the Circuit Court for Duval County barred a gay man
from any say in the upbringing of his children. Jacksonville Judge Rules Against Gay Father,
THE WEEKLY NEws, Aug. 4, 1993, at 14. The judge called the father's homosexual lifestyle
"detrimental to his children" and "so indicative of moral unfitness that it disqualifies his
ability to live up to and perform the societal duty of parenting children." McAbee v. McAbee
(on file with author's estate).
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custody of their four-year-old daughter to the child's natural father.334 The
court wrote,
Mrs. Maradie, with her homosexual lover, spend nights and sleep
together in the same bed, kiss, hold hands and speak in terms of
endearment in front of the child. The possibility of negative impact
on the child, especially as she grows older and reaches her late pre-
teen and early teen years, is considerable. The Court does not have
to have expert evidence to reach this conclusion, but can take
judicial notice that a homosexual environment is not a traditional
home environment, and can adversely affect a child.335
The mother in that case also appealed to the First District Court of Appeal.33
In July 1996, the First District Court of Appeal granted a new hearing in
the Maradie case, holding that the Okaloosa County Circuit Court could not
assume without evidence that "a homosexual environment [would] adversely
affect a child. 3 37 "We do not mean to suggest that trial courts may not
consider the parent's sexual conduct," the ruling said. "In considering the
parent's moral fitness, however, the trial court should focus on whether the
parent's behavior has a direct impact on the welfare of the child."
338
In January 1996, Judge Jack R. Heflin of the circuit court for Okaloosa
County removed two children from the custody of their mother because she
was a lesbian or bisexual and the father could "provide a more traditional
family environment for the children. 3 39 The custody award was made to the
father notwithstanding testimony in which the child's maternal grandmother
stated that she had witnessed acts of violence by the father against both the
lesbian mother and the older of the couple's children, and further testimony
that the father had been Baker Acted based on an expressed desire to commit
suicide.340 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court'sdecision. 341
Other cases during the decade challenged the inability of same-sex
couples to marry. In June 1993, a lesbian couple, Shawna Underwood and
Denia Davis, challenged Florida's statutory requirement that marriage
334. Court Faces 2 Lesbian Custody Cases, MIAMI HERAD, Mar. 12, 1996, at 5B.
335. Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 540-41 (footnote omitted).
336. Id. at 540.
337. Id. at 542. See also Bill Bergstrom, Lesbian Mom Gains New Custody Hearing,
MIAMi HERALD, July 18, 1996, at 5B.
338. Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 542.
339. Packard v. Packard, No. 94-1817-FD (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. 1977).
340. Id.
341. Packard v. Packard, 727 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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license applicants be of the opposite sex. 342 Filed in the circuit court for
Orange County, the suit 3 was voluntarily dismissed after extensive
discussions with lesbian and gay rights legal experts who suggested that the
same-sex marriage case, then pending in Hawaii, would be a better first test
of this issue.344 However, at the end of March 1997, a three-judge panel of
the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed a decision by Brevard County
Circuit Judge Edward M. Jackson recognizing as enforceable a nuptial-type
agreement between two women.345 Neither party had urged that the
agreement was void as against public policy.? The court pointed out that
"[e]ven though the state has prohibited same-sex maraes and same-sex
adoptions, it has not prohibited this type of agreement." The sponsor of
Florida's version of the Defense of Marriage Act34 questioned the appellate
court's authority to uphold a "nuptial agreement" between parties whom the
.349law prohibits from marrying.
One case in the employment area strongly protected the privacy rights
relating to the personal life of employees.350 In March 1992, an Orlando jury
ruled in favor of a deputy, fired from the Orange County Sheriff's
Department for being gay.3  It found that the deputy was coerced into
resigning following an investigation by the sheriff into the deputy's sexual
orientation and private life. 2 With the jury having resolved the issue of
whether the deputy resigned or was fired, the next step was for the court to
determine whether the firing violated the deputy's rights to privacy and
equal protection.353 Circuit Court Judge William Gridley ruled that Orange
County Sheriff Walt Gallagher had violated the rights of Deputy Thomas
342. See Bob Levenson, Lesbian Couple Sue to Gain Right to Wed, ORLANDO
SENTIEL, July 9, 1993, at Al.
343. Underwood v. State, No. CI-93-4656 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. 1993) (on file with
author's estate).
344. Letter from Peter Warren Kenney, counsel for the plaintiffs (Feb. 7, 1995) (on file
with author's estate).
345. Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759,759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
346. See id,
347. Id. at 761.
348. FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
349. Ruling May Sidestep Ban on Gay Marriages, MIAMI HERALD, June 12, 1997, at
5B.
350. See Woodard v. Gallagher, No. 89-5776, 1992 WL 252279 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. June
9, 1992).
351. Id. at*I.
352. Id.; see also Deputy's Lawsuit Sets Precedent, Tm WEEKLY NEWS, Mar. 18, 1992,
at 3 (on file with author's estate).
353. Woodard, No. 89-5776 at *1; see also Bob Levenson, Jurors Say Deputy Was
Forced to Quit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1992, at Al.
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Woodard when he forced Woodard to resign for being gay.35 4 The judge
ruled that "the [state] constitutional right to privacy protects the individual
from the prejudice or punitive use" of information about the plaintiff's
sexual orientation and private sexual conduct.355
Litigation involving the Florida Hate Crimes Act also occupied the
courts during the nineties. In April 1992, Circuit Court Judge J. Leonard
Fleet of Broward County ruled the Florida Hate Crimes Act
unconstitutionally broad, and he dismissed misdemeanor battery charges
against a man accused of shouting derogatory names at a Jewish lawyer.35
The Florida Attorney General voiced full confidence in the law's
constitutionality and prepared for an appeal. 358 In late-November 1992, the
Third District Court of Appeal declared Florida's Hate Crimes Act
unconstitutionally vague.359 Just a few days later, the Florida Hate Crimes
Law was declared unconstitutionally vague by Pinellas County Circuit Judge
Robert Beach. 3 ° In January 1994, the Supreme Court of Florida put to rest
the question of the constitutionality of the Florida Hate Crimes Act.36 In a
five-to-two decision, the court held that the statute applies only to bias
motivated crimes and, when so read, is constitutional. 362
Finally, significant changes in ethical rules governing the conduct of
attorneys and judges emerged in the decade. On July 1, 1993, the Supreme
Court of Florida adopted a revised rule of ethics, for the first time
prohibiting attorneys from engaging in certain discriminatory acts.363
Significantly, lawyers could not
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly,
354. Woodard, No. 89-5776 at *3.
355. See id. See also Circuit Court Finds Sheriff Violated Officer's Right To Privacy;
Orders Reinstatement and Back Pay, THE WEEKLY NEws, June 17, 1992, at 10 (on file with
author's estate).
356. Ch. 91-83, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws 625, 626 (amending FLA. STAT. § 775.085
(1991)).
357. Hate-Crimes Law Voided, Tm WEEKLY NEws, Apr. 29, 1992, at 3 (on file with
author's estate).
358. Id.
359. See Richards v. State, 608 So. 2d 917, 921 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd,
638 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1994). See also Appeals Court Throws out Hate Crimes Law; State Will
Appeal, TIE WEEKLY NEws, Dec. 2, 1992, at 8.
360. No Hate-Crimes Law in Pinellas, GAZETrE (Hillsborough County), May 1993, at
13 (on file with author's estate).
361. See State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994).
362. Id. at 1077.
363. Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d
720, 722 (Fla. 1993).
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or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or
discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or
other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on
account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin,
disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic
status, employment, or physical characteristic.
364
The new rules, which "stop short of regulating the employment practices of
lawyers" and will be "subject to an evolutionary development of details,"
took effect January 1, 1994.365
On September 29, 1994, the Supreme Court of Florida issues revised
Canons of Judicial Conduct adding a new canon to extend the substance of
the lawyer nondiscrimination rule to the Florida judiciary.36 The new rule
also specifically includes "sexual orientation" as a ground on which
prejudice is prohibited.367 It applies to judges in the performance of their... . 368 •,
judicial duties. It provides further that judges "shall require lawyers in
proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting... prejudice. '369
B. Initiatives and Legislation
At the beginning of 1990, the Palm Beach County Commission made
that jurisdiction the first in Florida to adoJPt a sexual orientation
nondiscrimination ordinance in a dozen years. This modest ordinance,
approved by a four-to-one vote of the Board of County Commissioners,
applied only to housing and public accommodations. 371 Shortly thereafter,
however, by a unanimous vote of the Board of County Commissioners, Palm
Beach County became the first jurisdiction in Florida to protect homosexual
county employees from discrimination by amending the county's
Affirmative Action Plan to provide for redress for lesbian and gay county
employees.372 Later in the year, local activists began openly discussing
extending similar protections for employees in the private sector.
364. Id. (amending rule 4-8.4(d)) (emphasis added).
365. Robert Craig, Florida's New Antidisparagement Ethics Rules, FLA. B.J., Nov.
1993, at 30, 34 (1993) (on file with author's estate).
366. In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1994).
367. Id. at 1039; CANONS OFJUDICIAL CONDUCr, Canon 3B(5) (1999).
368. See CANONS OFJUDICIAL CONDUC, CANON 3B.
369. CANONS OFJUDICiAL CONDUC, CANON 3B(6).
370. PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 90-1 (1990) (on file with author's estate).
371. See Larry Aydlette, Clergy's Testimony, Quiet Lobbying Helped Sway County
Commissioners, PALM BEACHPOST, Jan. 21, 1990, at 16A.
372. See Meg James, Job Policy to Protect Gay Rights Affirmative Action Plan Targets
County Hiring, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 4, 1990, at lB. See also John F. Kiriacon, West Palm
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Also in 1990, activists at Florida International University ("FLJ") began
the process of proposing the addition of sexual orientation to the university's
nondiscrimination policies.3 74 FIU President Modesto A. "Mitch" Maidique
supported the change, but felt the decision should be made on a state
university system-wide level rather than by an individual campus.375 The
State University System replied that it had, through the Collective
Bargaining Advisory Committee, agreed "to recognize in collective
bargaining contracts and elsewhere in policy, those protections against
discrimination contained in Federal or state statutes and regulations, or in
well-developed judicial case law.0 76 Because sexual orientation lacks such
status, the State University System declined to pursue the change.3"
Activists at FlU, Florida Atlantic University ("FAU"), and other schools
within the State University System continued to pursue this expansion of
nondiscrimination policies.
During the 1990 session of the Florida Legislature, a proposed
amendment to add coverage for crimes evidencing prejudice on the basis of
sexual orientation to the Florida Hate Crimes Act passed through necessary
committees in both houses, but the bills died in both chambers in the end of
session crush.378 House Bill 2449 and Senate Bill 3000 originally proposed
enhanced penalties for crimes that "manifest prejudice, bigotry, or bias
against any definable and identifiable segment of the population," which was
meant to include crimes based on the victims' sexual orientation, among
other categories. 379 This version passed its first House committee. 3 80 The
bill was amended, however, so that "sexual orientation" was added to the
then existing list in the Hate Crimes Act instead of using the more general
language.
381
Beach City Commissioners Vote To Ban Anti-Gay Discrimination In City Employment
Practices, THE WEEKLY NEws, May 22, 1991, at 3.
373. See Gillian Haggerty, Activist, 71, Puts Mature Face on Gay-Rights Movement,
PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 21, 1990, at lB.
374. Letter from Modesto Maidique, President, Florida International University, to
James J. Parry, Associate Vice Chancellor of Labor Relations, Office of Human Resources,
State University System (June 8, 1990) (on file with author's estate).
375. Id.
376. Letter from James J. Parry, to Modesto Maidique, President, Florida International
University (July 9, 1990) (on file with author's estate).
377. Id.
378. See H.R. 2449, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1990); S. 3000, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1990).
379. H.R. 2449, 22d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1990); S. 3000, 22d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1990).
380. Id.
381. Id.
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The 1990 elections significantly impacted lesbian and gay rights in
382Florida. In the September primary, after a particularly nasty campaign that
in many respects echoed the 1977 Anita Bryant "Save Our Children" crusade
in Dade County, 38 3 the referendum on the Broward "Human Rights
Amendment" went down to defeat by a vote of 58.6-to-41.4%. Analysts
cited the opposition of Archbishop Edward McCarthy of the Miami Catholic
Archdiocese and others who cloaked their opposition in religious terms as a
major factor in the defeat.384 During the same election, however, and due at
least in part of the work to the lesbian and gay community in greater Tampa,
two Hillsborough County Commissioners who had voted against the
Hillsborough County sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance lost
their bids for reelection.385 That seemingly set the stage for a reversal of the
commissioners' prior rejection of the local ordinance.396
In the aftermath of the loss in the Broward County "Human Rights
Amendment" referendum, local activists began the process of moving
forward again. They approached the County Human Rights Relations
Division (now the Human Rights Division) and obtained agreement that the
Division would accept complaints of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.387 Even though the Division had no jurisdiction to redress such
complaints, the new process would help to document the nature and extent of
the problem.
388
Joined by representatives of such other groups as Florida N.O.W., a
Broward lesbian/gay democratic club, and the Dade Political Action
Committee working on lesbian/gay issues, Broward and Dade activists began
a series of meetings with Miami Archbishop McCarthy and his top staff in
an effort to find some common ground on which to build a better
relationship between the Archdiocese and the lesbian/gay community.
38 9
In December 1990, Mayor Vicki Coceano of the City of Miramar in
Broward County canceled the city's permission to allow a production of the
382. See id,
383. Carl Hiaasen, Gay-Rights Law Is Defeated by a Margin Greater Than 2-to-I,
MIAMI HERALD, June 8, 1977, at 1A.
384. Steve Bousquet, Broward Says No to Gay-Rights Protection, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 5, 1990, at IA.
385. Fight for Rights Continues in Hillsborough, GAZETTE (Hillsborough County),
Apr. 1991, at 1.
386. Wayne Garcia, Proposal on Gay Rights Lives Again, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Mar. 7,
1991, at 1.
387. Broward Human Rights Board Agrees to Keep Track of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination Complaints, THEWEEKLY NEWS, Oct. 24, 1990, at 9.
388. Id.
389. John Kiriacon, Activists, Miami Archbishop Discuss Hate-Crimes Reform, THE
WEEKLY NEWS, Nov. 7, 1990, at 10.
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390play "Norman, Is That You?" at a municipal theater. She had received a
single complaint from a city resident that the play had a homosexual
theme.391 Local activists quickly used the cancellation as a spring board to
keep sexual orientation nondiscrimination discussions alive in Broward. 392
Within weeks, the Miramar City Council voted unanimously to apologize for
the city's poor handling of the cancellation of the play, and activists began
efforts to get the city to enact a sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinance.39
A series of local ordinances in 1991 dealt with discrimination based on
sexual orientation.394 City commissioners in the City of West Palm Beach in
Palm Beach County made that the first city in Florida to ban discrimination
based on sexual orientation in its municipal employment policies.395 In
August 1991, the cities of Temple Terrace and Plant City in Hillsborough
County drafted their own human rights ordinance excluding coverage for
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Shortly thereafter, the city
councils of both cities petitioned the Board of County Commissioners of
Hillsborough County to amend the County's sexual orientation
nondiscrimination ordinance to exempt their municipalities from the
coverage of the county's Human Rights Ordinance. The County Attorney
issued a formal opinion that any such exemption would violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.396
In late-August 1991, the School Board of Palm Beach County refused to
add sexual orientation to its list of categories protected from employment
discrimination.397  Instead, it voted to change the wording of the
nondiscrimination clause to prohibit all discrimination currently covered by
federal or state laws (with sexual orientation being a protected class at
neither level). 398 In late-August, the Chief of Police for the City of MiamiBeach in Dade County issued a new discrimination policy for the city's law
390. Keith Eddings, City Cancels Play With Homosexual Themes, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 5, 1990, at 1BR.
391. Id.
392. See Letters from Our Readers, THE WEEKLY NEws, Dec. 19, 1990, at 6.
393. John Kiriacon, Activists Win Apology, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Dec. 26, 1990, at 3.
See also Letters From Our Readers, TIM WEEKLY NEws, May 1, 1991, at 6.
394. See, e.g., Kiriacon, supra note 393, at 3.
395. See id.
396. Memorandum from Emeline C. Acton, Hillsborough County Attorney, to Phyllis
Busansky, Chair, Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners (Sept. 11, 1991) (on
file with author's estate).
397. Palm Beach County Schools Nix Anti-Bias Protections, TIE WEEKLY NEws, Aug.
28, 1991, at 11 (on file with author's estate).
398. Id.
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enforcement employees. The revised policy included a prohibition against
discrimination or harassment on the basis of sexual orientation.
399
In September 1991, the City of Key West in Monroe County adopted
sexual orientation nondiscrimination protections. Its ordinance extended to
employment, credit transactions, bonding and public accommodations.
4 °0
The measure received the support of a unanimous City Commission.401 By
late-1991, the cities of West Palm Beach, Boynton Beach, and Riviera
Beach, all in Palm Beach County, had each adopted a resolution prohibiting
the respective municipalities from doing official business with or
appropriating funds for country clubs or other organizations with
discriminatory membership policies.4°2
The 1991 session of the legislature provided a pleasant surprise. The
addition of coverage for crimes evidencing prejudice on the basis of sexual
orientation to the Florida Hate Crimes Act received an endorsement from
Archbishop McCarthy,403 who also recommended support for the proposal
by the full Florida Catholic Conference.4°4 The Senate bill4°5 was sponsored
by Senator Eleanor Weinstock 4°6 and the House bill by Representative James
Burke.4w With Archbishop McCarthy's support added to the lobbying
efforts of the Florida Task Force, the Anti-Defamation League, the ACLU of
Florida, and others, the amendment passed the Florida Senate by a vote of
thirty-three-to-three and passed the House by a vote of seventy-nine-to-
twenty-nine. 4° Despite a strong push by Christian fundamentalists to get the
Governor to veto the billI4 it passed and was signed into law.
410
By late-1991 and early into 1992, Governor Lawton Chiles had
proposed reform of the statewide civil rights laws to combine the then
399. Miami Beach Police Chief Orders Cops to End Anti-Gay Discrimination,
Harassment, TMWEEKLY NEWS, Sept. 4, 1991, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
400. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE § 91-30 (1991) (on file with author's estate).
401. Human Rights Law Approved by City, KEY WEST CnzEN, Sept. 5, 1991, at 1A.
402. Three Palm Beach County Cities Ban Official Business at Social Clubs That
Discriminate Against Gays, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Dec. 18, 1991, at 3 (on file with author's
estate).
403. Maijorie L. Donohue, Archdiocese Backs Penalties for Crimes Against Gays,
FLORIDA CATHOuC, Apr. 19, 1991, at 14.
404. Panel OKs Hate-Crimes Measure, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Apr. 3, 1991, at 3.
405. S. 1482, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1991).
406. Democrat, West Palm Beach.
407. Democrat, Miami.
408. Victory on Hate Crimes!, THE WEEKLY NEWS, May 8, 1991, at 3 (on file with
author's estate).
409. Activists Ask Supporters to Call Chiles, THE WEEKLY NEWS, May 8, 1991, at 3 (on
file with author's estate).
410. Ch. 91-83, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws 625, 626 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.085
(1991)).
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existing Florida Human Rights Act and the Florida Fair Housing Act into a
new Florida Civil Rights Act. Despite pressure from multiple directions,
41
the Governor successfully resisted any attempt to use his 1992 civil rights
reforms as a vehicle to add sexual orientation into the list of kinds of
412discrimination prohibited in Florida. An attempt to add sexual orientation
protections to the Governor's bill4W 1 3 failed by a vote of six-to-three in the
court system, Probate and Consumer Law Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee and then again by voice vote on reconsidera-
tion. 4  The sponsor of the Governor's bill in the Florida House of
Representatives 4 15 reported that Chiles had threatened to veto the measure if
it arrived on his desk with sexual orientation protections included . 6
In February 1992, the City of West Palm Beach again broke new
ground, this time allowing employees who are domestic partners the same
bereavement leave as married people and blood relatives. The provision
defined "domestic partner" in a manner to include lesbian and gay
partners.
417
In late-May 1992, a subcommittee of the Miami Beach Community
Relations Board voted to prepare an antidiscrimination ordinance that
included sexual orientation, taking the first step towards that city's sexual
orientation nondiscrimination protections.41 8  Also in 1992, activists in
Alachua County had sought sexual orientation nondiscrimination
419protections. In June of that year, the Gainesville City Commission,
Alachua County's largest municipality, refused to enact sexual orientation
nondiscrimination protections and passed, by a vote of three-to-two, 420 a
411. Chiles' Expanded Rights Bill Ignores Gay Bias, Tue WEEKLY NEWS, Nov. 13,
1991, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
412. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 was ultimately codified at FLA. STAT. §§
760.01-.11 (1993).
413. Sponsored by Representative Jim Burke, Democrat, Miami.
414. House Sponsor of Governor's Rights Bill Charges Chiles Threatened to Veto it if
Lesbian/Gay Amendment OK'd, THE WEEKLY NEws, Feb. 5, 1992, at 3 (on file with author's
estate).
415. Representative Willie Logan, Democrat, Miami.
416. House Sponsor of Governors Rights Bill Charges Chiles Threatened to Veto It if
Lesbian/Gay Amendment OK'd, supra note 414, at 3.
417. West Palm Beach Does It Again! Bereavement Leave for 'Partners' OK'd, THE
WEEKLY News, Feb. 12, 1992, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
418. Miami Beach Panel Begins Rights-Law Consideration, THm WEEKLY NEws, June
3, 1992, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
419. See Kay Stokes, Discrimination Controversy, GAINUEVnLE SUN, Sept. 23, 1991, at
IA. See also Tom Leithauser, Hearing Packs Auditorium, GAMNESVILLE SUN, Oct. 11, 1991, at
lB.
420. Tom Leithauser, City Withholds Support for Gay Rights Law, GAwNESVILLE SUN,
June 2, 1992, at IA.
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reactionary resolution which linked homosexuality to necrophilia, bestiality
and pedophilia.421  It further recommended that the Alachua County
Commission not include coverage for sexual orientation discrimination in its
human rights ordinance.422 Shocked lesbian and gay activists staged a sit-in,
which resulted in fifteen of them being arrested.423 Just a week later, the
Alachua County Commission, by a vote of four-to-nothing, removed sexual
orientation from a proposed amendment to its antidiscrimination
ordinance.
424
In Miami Beach, the full Community Relations Board, by a vote of six-
to-four, adopted the recommendation of its subcommittee and recommended
to the city commission adoption of an ordinance guaranteeing that "equality
of rights shall not be denied or abridged on account of sexual orientation.
Next came the first public vote on lesbian and gay rights since the 1990
vote in Broward County.42 "Take Back Broward" had led a movement to
repeal Tampa's sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance, and on
November 4, 1992, the voters of Tampa did repeal the ordinance by a vote of
58.5-to-41.5%. 427 The vote was held notwithstanding a challenge by the
county's Supervisor of Elections questioning the validity of the signatures on
the petitions which forced the referendum.42 During the same election,
Temple Terrace voters adopted by a vote of sixty-three-to-thirty-seven
percent a municipal human rights ordinance specifically excluding anyone
"who may claim" discrimination because of sexual orientation. 429
In Miami Beach, with little opposition and just two weeks after the
repeal of the Tampa ordinance, the City Commission voted unanimously to
preliminarily pass a sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance which
421. Gainesville Activists Arrested After Commission Votes to Condemn Sexual
Minorities, THE WEEKLY NEWS, June 10, 1992, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
422. A Community Divided, A Community That Fails, TiE WEEKLY NEWS, Feb. 8,
1995, at 10 (on file with author's estate).
423. Gainesville Activists Arrested after Commission Votes to Condemn Sexual
Minorities, supra note 421, at 10.
424. David Greeberg, Gays Are Deleted from Proposal, GAINESV=L SUN, June 10,
1992, at 1A.
425. Florida Stateline, THE WEEKLY NEWs, June 17, 1992, at 35 (on file with author's
estate).
426. See supra text accompanying notes 382-93.
427. Gay Rights Law is Overturned, MIAM HERALD, Nov. 5, 1992, at 23A (on file with
author's estate).
428. Corey Steven Hull, Tampa Voters Repeal Gay-Rights Ordinance, THE WEEKLY
NEws, Nov. 11, 1992, at 3.
429. Todd Simmons, A Farewell to Rights, GAZE=r (Hillsborough County), Dec.
1992, at 5.
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extended to employment, housing, and public accommodations. 43  The final
adoption of the ordinance occurred on December 2, 1992,431 with a similarly
unanimous vote.432
In January 1993, an effort was mounted to pass a sexual orientation
nondiscrimination ordinance in the City of Hialeah in Dade County. The
proposal was offered by the mayor, who could not vote on proposals before
the City Council. The proposal failed when no member of the City Council
would bring it up for a vote.433 In the same month, the Broward County
Legislative Delegation heard arguments from sexual orientation
nondiscrimination supporters who favored rerunning a countrywide
referendum to gain such rights and those who favored alternative
approaches.434 After split votes on preliminary questions, the delegation
unanimously approved the referendum approach, underscoring the solidarity
of the delegation in favor of nondiscrimination rights for lesbians and gay
men.435 During the 1993 session, however, the Florida Legislature converted
the Broward County Human Rights Act from public local law for the benefit
of Broward County to a simple county ordinance, allowing the Board of
County Commissioners of Broward County to make any further changes
without the need for further action by the legislature or approval by the
Broward electorate.436
430. Bonnie Weston, Gay Rights Passes Beach Test, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 19, 1992, at
1A (on file with author's estate).
431. MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE 92-2829 (1992) (on file with author's estate).
432. Judy Camillone, It's OK to be Gay in Miami Beach!, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Dec. 9,
1992, at 3.
433. Betty Cortina & David Hancock, Hialeah Council Balks at Passing Gay Rights
Law, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 1993, at lB.
434. Judy Camillone, Activists Divided Over Tactics, TIM WEEKLY NEWS, Jan. 27,
1993, at 3.
435. Id.
436. H.R. 1421, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1993) (sponsored by Representatives
Debbie Wasserman Schultz (Democrat, Davie) and Steven Brian Feren (Democrat,
Plantation)). In 1993, the legislature clarified that a mother's breast feeding of her baby
would not fall within conduct prohibited by Florida's sodomy statute, including the
proscription against unnatural and lascivious acts. Ch. 93-4, §§ 1, 6, 1993 Fla. Laws 101, 103
(codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 383.015, 847.001 (1995)). The 1993 session of the legislature saw
the first introduction of two significant gay rights measures. Representative Mel McAndrews
introduced legislation to add coverage for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to
the Florida Civil Rights Act (House Bill 737). A companion bill (Senate Bill 1530) was
introduced by Senator Ron Silver. Neither bill received a hearing. The other measure in 1993
would have repealed Florida's statutory prohibition against adoption by homosexuals (House
Bill 1461). Sponsored by Representative Suzanne Jacobs, it did get a hearing in the House
Committee on Aging and Human Services, but by prior agreement between the sponsor and
the Committee Chair, the bill was withdrawn before the committee could discuss or vote on it.
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At the end of March 1993, with the public hearing room packed with
people and an overflow crowd estimated at 300 gathered in a parking garage
across from the courthouse to watch the hearing on television sets, the Board
of County Commissioners in Alachua County adopted a sexual orientation
nondiscrimination ordinance s7 by a vote of three-to-two. The crowd
reportedly included a dozen Ku Klux Klan members.438 The ordinance
covered housing, employment and public accommodations. The Concerned
Citizens of Alachua County, the political arm of the American Family
Association, immediately began planning a repeal effort.439 The proposed
sexual orientation nondiscrimination amendment for Boynton Beach was the
next to come up for a vote. It lost by a three-to-two vote, with the American
Family Association figuring prominently in the opposition and the out of
uniform gand dragon of the local Ku Klux Klan testifying against the
proposal.
By 1994, however, Concerned Citizens of Alachua County had
collected enough signatures to place two antigay initiatives on the November
1994 ballot. One proposed to amend the County Charter to prohibit the
inclusion of "sexual orientation," "sexual preference," or any similar
classification in any county ordinance; the other proposed to repeal the
inclusion of "sexual orientation" in the county's antidiscrimination
ordinance. 441
In June 1994, on the heels of the Supreme Court of Florida's advisory
opinion striking down the proposed statewide antigay constitutional
amendment,442 Alachua County activists filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of both of the local antigay initiatives.443 In August 1994,
Circuit Court Judge James Tomlinson refused to dismiss the challenge to the
It was, however, apparently the first hearing on a pro-lesbian/gay rights proposal (other than
the Broward local bill and the insurance provision in the Omnibus AIDS Act) in the Florida
Legislature.
437. ALACHUA CouNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 92-41 (1992) (on file with author's estate).
438. John Glass, Gay Rights Advocates Win Bout in Alachua, MIAmi HERALD, Apr. 1,
1993, at 5B (on file with author's estate).
439. Gay Rights OK'd In Alachua; Right Begins Repeal Effort, THE WEEKLY NEws,
Apr. 7, 1993, at 12 (on file with author's estate).
440. Perversion Not a Civil Right: Boynton Defeats Human Rights Measure, THE
WEEKLY NEws, Aug. 25, 1993, at 8 (on file with author's estate).
441. What's What and Who's Who in Alachua County, THE WEEKLY NEws, Feb. 8,
1995, at 11 (on file with author's estate).
442. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, 632 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1994).
443. Lassiter v. County of Alachua, sub nom. Morris v. Hill, No. 94-2084-CA (Fla. 8th
Cir. Ct. 1994) Alachua County (on file with author's estate).
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two initiatives. 444 On October 12, less than a month before the scheduled
election the circuit court ruled that the repeal initiative could go onto the
ballot.445 And on October 25, the court ruled that the proposed amendment
to the county charter could also go onto the ballot.446
The Alachua County ordinance was repealed by the voters by a margin
of fifty-seven-to-forty-three percent in the Republican landslide general
election of November 8, 1994.447 Thus, in each of the first four times in
which the electorate had the opportunity to vote on sexual orientation
nondiscrimination ordinances in Florida-Dade County in 1977, Broward
County in 1990, Tampa in 1992 and Alachua County in 1994-the result has
been the same, and by almost the same margin each time. The second of the
Alachua County initiatives, prohibiting the enactment of sexual orientation
nondiscrimination ordinances, passed as well, 448 and by a margin of fifty-
nine-to-forty-one percent.44 9 Only after the passage of the two initiatives in
Alachua County and the 1994 elections did the Gainesville City Commission
agree, by a vote of four-to-one, to rescind its 1992 resolutions recommending
that Alachua County not extend its nondiscrimination protections on the
basis of sexual orientation.4
Throughout the second half of 1993, the American Family Political
Committee of Florida, the state component of the American Family
Association, had gathered petition signatures to place on the ballot a
proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution.45 1 The amendment would
444. Judge Allows Challenge to 2 Anti-Gay Initiatives, GAiNESviLLE SUN, Aug. 18,
1994, at 2B (on file with author's estate).
445. Edith Paal, Rights Measure Will Be on Ballot, GAiNESVILLE SUN, Oct. 13, 1994, at
IA.
446. Id.
447. Repeal of Law on Gay Rights Just a First Step, MiAMI HERALD, Nov. 10, 1994, at
22A.
448. ALACHUA COUNTY, FLA. CHARTER amend. 1, as passed by the voters in November
1994 (on file with author's estate).
449. Gay Rights Loses, GAINEsv.LE SUN, Nov. 9, 1994, at IA (on file with author's
estate).
450. City Rescinds Anti-Gay Resolution, GAwmsVnILE SUN, Dec. 13, 1994, at IA.
451. The full text of the proposed amendment was as follows:
1) Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Florida is hereby
amended by:
Inserting "(a)" before the first word thereof and, adding a new subsection
"(b)" at the end thereof to read:
(b) The state, political subdivisions of the state, municipalities or any other
governmental entity shall not enact or adopt any law regarding discrimination
against persons which creates, establishes, or recognizes any right, privilege
or protection for any person based upon any characteristic, trait, status or
condition other than race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap,
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have prohibited the enactment or adoption by the state and its political
subdivisions of any law which provided for nondiscrimination protections on
any basis other than race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap,
ethnic background, marital status, or familial status. Furthermore, it would
have repealed any such previously enacted laws. Pursuant to the provisions
of Article IV, Section 10, of the Florida Constitution and section 16.061(1)
of the Florida Statutes, on November 4, 1993, the Attorney General of
Florida placed the matter before the Supreme Court of Florida for an
advisory opinion concerning the validity of the petition.
One brief in opposition to the petition was filed on behalf of the Florida
Public Interest Law Section, the Florida AIDS Legal Defense & Education
Fund, the Florida Association of Women Lawyers, Florida Legal Services,
Inc., Floridians Respect Everyone's Equality, Floridians United Against
Discrimination, Miami Area Legal Services Union, the National Lesbian &
Gay Lawyers Association, the Florida Chapter of the National Organization
for Women, People for the American Way, the Southern Poverty Law
Center, and the United Teachers of Dade's Gay & Lesbian Caucus; a second
brief in opposition was filed by the ACLU of Florida. The American Family
Political Committee of Florida filed the only brief in support of the petition.
Oral argument before the Supreme Court of Florida was made by the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and former ABA President
Chesterfield Smith.452  On March 3, 1994, the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled on the constitutional amendment proposed by the local branch of the
American Family Association to repeal and bar sexual orientation
ethnic background, marital status or familial status. As used herein the term
"sex" shall mean the biological state of being either a male person or a female
person; "marital status" shall mean the state of being lawfully married to a
person of the opposite sex, separated, divorced, widowed or single; and
"familial status" shall mean the state of being a person domiciled with a
minor, as defined by law, who is the parent or person with legal custody of
such minor or who is a person with written permission from such parent or
person with legal custody of such minor.
2) All laws previously enacted which are inconsistent with this provision are
hereby repealed to the extent of such inconsistency.
3) This amendment shall take effect on the date it is approved by the
electorate.
Id.
452. As the American Family Association attempted to place this antigay amendment
to the Florida Constitution before the voters, Tampa area activists drafted an alternate
amendment designed to expand the "Right of privacy" provision. Known as "The Privacy
Project," the effort's language did not specifically mention "sexual orientation" or
"homosexuality" but instead expressed a right to be let alone. Kevin Klahr, HRTF Plans
Amendment to Florida Constitution, GAz=rE (Hillsborough County), Aug. 1993, at 5. The
effort was apparently abandoned shortly thereafter.
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nondiscrimination laws and local ordinances in Florida.4 3 It held that the
proposed amendment "touches upon more than one subject and therefore
violates the single-subject provision of the constitution. But for the Chief
Justice, who recused herself from the case, the decision was unanimous, and
the proposed amendment was stricken from the ballot.4 55
In May 1994, the Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation ruled that within the meaning of their condominium association
rules and the attendant circumstances, two same-sex roommates did indeed
constitute a "family" and would not be ordered to vacate the condominium
unit for violation of a single family use rule. 6 In September 1994, West
Palm Beach became the seventh local government in Florida to enact sexual
orientation nondiscrimination protections.4 5 7 Adopted by a four-to-one vote,
the ordinance extends to housing, employment and public
accommodations.
Late in 1994, several of the local sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinances came under attack. A new effort was begun to petition the
Tampa ordinance to referendum,45 9 and petitions were also circulated to
force the West Palm Beach ordinance onto the ballot. 
4W
The Florida component of the American Family Association, which had
taken the Tampa and Alachua County ordinances to the voters, renewed its
vow to pursue repeal of similar ordinances in Palm Beach County and West
Palm Beach.46' Before the beginning of December, the AFA had again
collected enough signatures to force the West Palm Beach ordinance to a
referendum.462 Even before the vote in West Palm Beach, however, the Palm
Beach County Commissioners made public a plan to expand that county's
453. In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to
Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
454. Id. at 1019.
455. Gary Kirkland, State's High Court Yanks Anti-Gay-Rights Initiative, GAINESVILLE
SUN, Mar. 4, 1994, at IA.
456 Maitland House Management, Inc. v. Martin, No. 93-0242, Division of Florida
Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, Department of Business and Professional
Regulation (May 27, 1994) (on file with author's estate).
457. See WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE 2777-94 (1994) (on file with author's
estate).
458. David Kidwell, City Passes Gay-Rights Law, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 14, 1994, at
5B.
459. Tampa's Debate About Gay Rights Enters Round Two, MIAMI HERALD, May 2,
1994, at 5B.
460. Anti-Gay Election Petitions Turned In, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 14, 1994, at lB.
461. Id.
462. West Palm Sets Jan. 10 Election on Gay-Rights Law, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 22,
1994, at lB.
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sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance to private employment.
463
Beyond the obvious expansion of rights, another effect of such a plan could
have mooted the results of the repeal effort then being waged against the
West Palm Beach ordinance.464 On January 10, 1995, the West Palm Beach
electorate voted fifty-six-to-forty-four percent not to repeal the city's sexual
orientation nondiscrimination ordinance and thus became the first
jurisdiction in Florida to withstand, by popular vote, a repeal effort. 46
5
In late-March 1995, the Broward County Charter Review Commission,
by a nine-to-one vote, agreed to place on its public hearing agenda the
proposed addition of "sexual orientation" to the Broward County Charter as
a basis on which the County Commission is required to protect human
rights.46 A week later, the Broward County Commission agreed to hold a
public hearing on the proposal to add coverage for "sexual orientation"
discrimination to the Broward County Human Rights Act. 467 Additionally,
Hillsborough County Commissioners voted four-to-three to hold a public
hearing on whether to repeal the county's four-year-old ordinance banning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.4  That same week,
activists in Broward County withdrew their request to the Broward County
Charter Review Commission for the addition of the basis of "sexual
orientation" to the human rights guarantee in the Broward County Charter,
opting instead to pursue only a change in the county's human rights
ordinance.469
On June 13, 1995, following a lengthy public hearing, the Broward
County Board of County Commissioners voted six-to-one to add "sexual
orientation" as a category protected by the Broward County Human Rights
Ordinance.4 70  The ordinance, with the 1995 amendments, covers
463. Jay Croft, County Ordinance Would Ban Job Bias Against Gays, PALM BEACH
POST, Dec. 30, 1994, at lB.
464. Id.
465. Voters Uphold Rights of Gays, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11, 1995, at 5B (on file with
author's estate).
466. Larry Keller, Gay Rights Measure on Agenda, County Charter Panel Sets Public
Hearings, SuN-SEnTIEL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 28, 1995, at 1B (on file with author's
estate).
467. Larry Keller, County Leaders Schedule Gay Discrimination Hearing, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 5, 1995, at 3B.
468. Anti-Discrimination Hearing To Be Held, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr.
7, 1995, at 22A.
469. Bob LaMendola, Activists Switch Strategy, Gay-Rights Groups Ask County for
Law, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Apr. 27, 1995, at 3B.
470. Joseph Tanfani, A 'Historic' Victory for Broward's Gays, Foes Vow to Launch
Drive For Repeal, MIAMI HERA, June 14, 1995, at IA.
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employment and housing, and public accommodations.471 A series of
amendments was also added to exempt relijious institutions from the sexual
orientation nondiscrimination requirement.472 Opponents vowed to begin
collecting signatures immediately to place a measure on the next year's•• 473
ballot to rescind the new provision.
On July 18, 1995, by a three-to-four vote, the Palm Beach County
Board of County Commissioners rejected an effort to add "sexual
orientation" as a protected class under a proposed Palm Beach County Equal
Employment Ordinance. 474  The commission then passed the ordinance
without the sexual orientation protections by a five-to-two vote.475
In late-1995, the Florida Department of Corrections began the formal
process of repealing the longstanding listing of "[h]omosexuality" as an
offense or deficiency for which an employee could be disciplined. 76 This
and other amendments were proposed to delete provisions deemed
"obsolete. 477  The Economic Impact Statement for the proposed
amendments noted that the sections had not been used.478 The rule changes
took effect January 30, 1996.479
The 1996 session of the Colorado Legislature took note of the then
pending possibility that same-sex marriages might be in some manner
permitted in Hawaii.48 ° In at least twenty states, efforts were underway to
481deny full faith and credit to same-sex marriages from Hawaii or elsewhere.
In Florida, Representative Buddy Johnson 4" introduced House Bill 2369 to
do exactly that.483 The bill was withdrawn from further consideration just
471. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 95-26 (1995) (codified at BROWARD
COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16V2-3 (1999)).
472. Larry Keller & Tao Woolfe, County Commission OK's Gay Rights Law,
Opponents Plan Drive For Vote to Rescind Rule, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), June 14,
1995, at IA.
473. Id.
474. Palm Beach Rejects Plan to Extend Employment Protection, THE WEEKLY NEWS,
at 11 (on file with author's estate).
475. Id.
476. Cf FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r 33-4.002 (1991) (renumbered as r. 33-208.002 in
1998)).
477. Economic Impact Statement Memorandum from Charles Hazelip to Perri M. King
(Nov. 28, 1995) (on file with author's estate).
478. Id.
479. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r 33-208.002 (2000).
480. Legislature Passes Ban On Same-Sex Marriages, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 15, 1996,
at I0A (on file with author's estate).
481. Id.
482. Republican, Plant City.
483. H.R. 2369, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1996).
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one week later,4" apparently because its sponsor exceeded his bill allotment
and possibly because of pressure from the leadership of both houses.485
In May 1996, by a six-to-three vote, the United States Supreme Court
struck down Colorado's "Amendment 2," which barred state and local units
of government within Colorado from providing discrimination protection to
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.486 The Court said that the voter-approved
amendment to the Colorado Constitution classified homosexuals not to
further a proper legislative end but "to make them unequal to everyone
else.... A state cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.
'
"V
This was the first time the United States Supreme Court had extended the
principle of equal protection of the laws to lesbians and gay men, and the
decision would have a direct effect on litigation pending in Florida. 48
By September 1996, in anticipation of a court decision allowing same-
sex marriages in Hawaii, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into
law, the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 89 providing that the federal
government will not recognize homosexual marriages, and allowing states to
refuse to recognize such unions licensed in other states.494
In December 1996, a Hawaii court ruled on a long pending case:0 ! that
the state had failed to show a compelling state interest in denying lesbian
and gay couples the right to marry and ordered the state to begin issuing
licenses to same-sex couples. 492 The following day, the same judge put the
ruling on hold while the state appealed, acknowledging that Hawaii would
have a dilemma if same-sex couples were allowed to marry and the state's
supreme court then overturned the lower court's ruling.493 The Supreme
484. Motions Relating to Committee References, I H.R.L 242 (Mar. 12, 1996) (on file
with author's estate).
485. Johnson Withdraws Anti-Marriage Bill, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Mar. 20, 1996, at 12
(on file with author's estate).
486. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
487. Id. at 635. See also Jan Crawford Greenburg, Gay Rights' Cause Wins Key
Victory: Court Throws Out Colorado Amendment, SUN-SENTNEL (Fort Lauderdale), May 21,
1996, at IA.
488. Ruling Favors Gay Marriages in Hawaii, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al.
489. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. §§1, 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
490. Hawaii Judge Puts Gay-Marriage Ruling on Hold, Delay Is Effective Till State
High Court Decides on Appeal, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5, 1996, at 3A (on file with author's
estate).
491. Baehr v. Miike, No. Civ. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996).
492. Id. at *21-22. See also Ruling Favors Gay Marriages in Hawaii, supra note 488,
at IA.
493. Hawaii Judge Puts Gay-Marriage Ruling on Hold, supra note 490, at 3A.
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Court of Hawaii ordered the state to show cause why the marriage license
sought should not be issued and remanded the case to the trial court.49"
The 1997 session of the legislature saw the anticipated introduction into
both chambers of a state version of the Defense of Marriage Act. House Bill
147 was filed by Representative Johnnie Byrd495 with twenty-five co-
sponsors out of the 120 member House; Senate Bill 272 was filed by Senator
John Grant496 with an absolute majorit of the Senate, twenty-one out of the
forty-member Senate, as cosponsors.: The new Speaker of the Florida
House, Republican Dan Webster, supported the legislation, saying that it
would bolster the "legitimacy of a family" and allow "for what the
traditional family was designed to do."
4 99
In early March, the House bill was unanimously approved by the
Committee on Government Operations.0 By mid-March, the legislation
had been approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee by a vote of eight-to-
two.501 In late-March, the Republican controlled House defeated by a vote of
eighty-eight-to-twenty-five an amendment sponsored by Representative Lois
Frankel.5 seeking to apply moral standards to all persons seeking to marry
in Florida,0 3 and a day later, the full House passed the nonrecognition bill
by a vote of ninety-nine-to-twenty.0 4 The Senate bill was reportedly
amended to extend Florida's right to refuse to recognize not only same-sex
marriages but also domestic partnerships which were lawful where they were
formed.50 5 In late-April, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of thirty-three-
494. Id.
495. Republican, Plant City. See Representative Johnnie Byrd, Jr.-Online Sunshine
(visited Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.leg.state.fl.us/house/members/h.62.html>.
496. Republican, Tampa. See Senator John A. Grant, Jr.-Online Sunshine (visited
Apr. 9, 2000) <http://www.leg.state.fl.us/senatemembers/sl3>.
497. Mark Silva, Majority of State Senators Vow Not to Recognize Gay Marriages,
MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 3, 1997, at 5B (on file with author's estate).
498. Republican, Orlando. Speaker Webster is regularly identified by the media as the
leader of the Christian Coalition in the Florida Legislature.
499. John Kennedy, Webster Wants Gay Marriages Outlawed, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale), Jan. 30, 1997, at 22B.
500. Bill Tightens Ban on Same Sex Marriages, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 6, 1997, at 6B.
501. Same-Sex Marriage Ban Approved by Committee, SUN-SENTIEL (Fort
Lauderdale), Mar. 13, 1997, at 7B.
502. Democrat, West Palm Beach.
503. Tyler Bridges, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Passes House Hurdle, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 26, 1997, at 5B.
504. Tyler Bridges, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Passes House by a 99-20 Vote, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 27, 1997, at 6B.
505. Doug Janousek, Senate Adds to Marriage Ban Measure, THE WEEKLY NEws, Apr.
16, 1997, at 13.
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to-five.50  The City of Key West passed a formal resolution in early May
asking Governor Chiles to veto the legislation.5 " At the end of May, the
Governor allowed the bill to become law without his signature.08
In mid-June, in "an unexpected vote preceded by an unusual display of
prayer, hymn-singing and speaking in tongues by hundreds of Christian
activists,"09 the Metro Commission rejected the proposed gay rights
ordinance by a vote of seven-to-five on the bill's first reading. First reading
is normally "a perfunctory vote that simply moves a [proposed] ordinance
along to the next step: a public hearing at a later date in which the issue is
fully discussed and a final vote taken."o Within less than a month, an effort
was made to resurrect the Dade County sexual orientation nondiscrimination
proposal. One method would have been for one of the seven commissioners
who voted against it during June's first reading to move to reconsider;
however, no such motion was made at a July public hearing where it was
briefly on the agenda.51 Another method for returning the issue to
consideration is to walt a required six-month period, after which even a
commissioner who voted for it earlier could schedule it for first reading.
512
Proponents vowed to use that method. 13
In June 1997, local activists formally appeared before the Gainesville
City Commission to propose the addition of coverage for sexual orientation
to the city's existing human rights ordinance.514 In July 1997, activists went
to the Monroe County Commission and proposed the adoption of domestic
partner benefits, including those for same-sex couples. One county
commissioner observed that passage is inevitable.515 Also in July 1997, what
was believed to be the first "palimony" type suit was filed516 by one gay managainst his former lover, who had adopted the plaintiff some thirteen years
506. Mark Silva, Senators Say No to Same-Sex Marriages, After 33-5 Vote Bill Goes to
Chiles, MArnHERALtD, Apr. 30, 1997, at IA.
507. City Commission Reaches Out to Chiles, THE WEEKLY NEWS, May 14, 1997, at 9.
508. Tyler Bridges, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Broadened Chiles Decides Not to Block
Bill, MLAMI HERAtD, May 30, 1997, at 1A.
509. Karen Branch, Metro Kills Gay-Rights Proposal, MIAMI HERALD, June 18, 1997,
at Al (on file with author's estate).
510. Id.
511. Morning of Talk About Gay Rights, Commission Refuses to Consider, MIAMI
HERALD, July 9, 1997, at 2B (on file with author's estate).
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. HRCNCF PRoposEs Crry BAN ON ANTI-GAY DISCRIMINATION, HUMAN RIGHTs
COuNcIL OF NORTH CENTRAL FLORIDA, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 1997, at 1 (on file with author's
estate).
515. Marika Lynch, Benefits For Unwed Partners, County Commission Receptive To
Proposal, MLIAI HERALD, July 19, 1997, at lB.
516. Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 590 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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earlier.517 Early reports made no mention of whether the adoption had taken
place in Florida in violation of the statuto 1prohibition against such, and if
so, what effect that might have on the case.
C. The Hillsborough County/Tampa Experience
In early 1991, the Hillsborough County Charter Review Board declined
to take up the issue of discrimination against lesbians and gay men.519 One
of the county commissioners, who had voted against adoption of the
ordinance when it came before the Board of County Commissioners in the
prior year as an amendment to the County's Human Rights Ordinance, now
sought a referendum instead.520 The Charter Review Board sent the issue
back to the Board of County Commissioners, feeling that the matter would
be better handled by elected officials.521
Later that year, however, the Tampa City Commissioners gave
preliminary approval to a sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance
with an exemption for religious organizations, by a vote of four-to-three. 5
After a six-hour joint public hearing attended by more than 2500 people on
both the Hillsborough County and Tampa municipal ordinance proposals,
and with the changes brought about by the 1990 elections, Hillsborough
became the second Florida county to adopt sexual orientation
nondiscrimination protections, 5 reversing by a four-to-three vote the 1989
action of the prior Board of County Commissioners. The ordinance s24
offered such protection in the areas of public accommodations, real estate
transactions, and county contracting and procurement procedures.
525
In Tampa, the City Council gave final approval, by a vote of four-to-
three to its municipal ordinance. The Tampa ordinance extended sexual
orientation nondiscrimination protections to employment, public
517. C. Ron Allen, Adopted Gay Man Sues Former Lover for Home, Couple Legally
Linked By Adoption, Splitting up, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), July 23, 1997, at 6B.
518. Id.
519. THE GAZETrE (Hillsborough County), Feb. 1991, at 3 (on file with author's
estate).
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Tampa City Commission Gives Preliminary Approval to Ordinance Banning Anti-
Gay Discrimination, THE WEEKLY NEws, May 15, 1991, at 10 (on file with author's estate).
523. Hillsborough, Tampa Ban Bias, THE WEEKLY NEWS, June 5, 1991, at 3 (on file
with author's estate).
524. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLA., ORDINANCE 88-9 (1991) (on file with author's
estate).
525. Hillsborough, Tampa Ban Bias, supra note 523, at 3.
526. Id.
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accommodations, and real estate transactions. 527 The local component of the
American Family Association immediately announced plans to seek a
referendum to repeal the Tampa ordinance. In August 1991, after a sixty-
day drive to collect signatures, the head of "Take Back Tampa," the local
element of the American Family Association, submitted petitions to remove
coverage for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation from the
529Tampa Human Rights Ordinance. The group claimed to have gathered
15,000 signatures.Y Throughout the summer and fall of 1991, the American
Family Association ("AFA") collected signatures to petition the Tampa
sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance to a referendum.5" In late-
November, Circuit Court Judge Guy Spicola ruled that the Hillsborough
County Elections Supervisor's disqualification of hundreds of signatures was
improper, and the AFA then claimed enough signatures to force the issue to
the ballot.512 In March 1992, the Hillsborough County Commission, by a
vote of three-to-four, denied a request to place on the ballot a proposal to
allow voters to adopt or repeal county ordinances.533 The proposal had
originated with the 'Take Back Tampa" campaign. 34
In 1992, Circuit Court Judge Roland Gonzalez ordered 35 that the
question of whether or not to repeal the city's human rights ordinance,
including its sexual orientation nondiscrimination protections, must appear
on the ballot.536 The city vowed to appeal that as well as Judge Spicola's
earlier decision restoring the validity of those 'Take Back Tampa"
signatures which had been invalidated by the Supervisor of Elections.
5 37
In September 1993, however, the Supreme Court of Florida
unanimously invalidated some 462 of the signatures on the petitions that had
forced the successful vote on repeal of the Tampa nondiscrimination
ordinance. Thus, notwithstanding the public's vote to repeal, the
527. TAMPA, FLA., ORDINANcE91-88 (1991).
528. AFA to Seek Repeal of Tampa Action via Referendum, THE WEEKLY NEws, June
5, 1991, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
529. GAz EE (HilIsborough County), Sept. 1991, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Tampa Judge's Decision Gives New Life to Push for Anti-Gay Rights
Referendum, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Dec. 4, 1991, at 3 (on file with author's estate).
533. Hillsborough Vote Deals Setback to Anti-Gay Activists, THE WEEKLY NEwS, Mar.
18, 1992, at 12 (on file with author's estate).
534. Id.
535. Rand Hall, Majority Needed for Minority Rights, GAZErE (Hillsborough County),
July 1992, at 3.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Rand Hall, Take Back Tampa-WE DID!, GAZErE (Hillsborough County), Nov.
1993, at 5.
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ordinance was reinstated.539  The legal challenge to Tampa's sexual
orientation nondiscrimination ordinance ended on April 18, 1994, when the
United States Supreme Court refused without comment to hear "Take Back
Tampa's" case.54 "Take Back Tampa" vowed to recirculate the petitions.54'
In December of 1992, an effort to repeal the Hillsborough County
ordinance failed when the Board of County Commissioners deadlocked,
542three-to-three. And one more vote in January 1993 saw the Hillsborough
ordinance upheld by a commission vote of four-to-three.
5 43
The Florida component of the American Family Association, which had
taken the Tampa ordinance to the voters, renewed its vow to pursue repeal of
the reinstated ordinance in Tampa. 44 Before the month of November was
out, the AFA had again collected enough signatures to force the reinstated
Tampa sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance onto the ballot.
545
In early 1995, the same forces which had formed the "Take Back
Tampa" group had reacted to the invalidation of a sufficient number of
signatures to stop its petitioning the local nondiscrimination ordinance to
referendum by gathering new signatures. 546 Now calling itself "Yes! Repeal
Tampa's Homosexual Ordinance Committee," it gathered the necessary valid
signatures to place repeal of the city's sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinance on the March 1995 ballot, along with the city's mayoral and city
council elections.5 47 The city approved minor changes from the language of
the petitions to the language which appeared on the ballot.
548
In March 1995, Hillsborough County Court Judge Manuel Menendez
removed from the election ballot the second attempt to repeal Tampa's
sexual orientation nondiscrimination ordinance.549 The judge held that the
Tampa City Council lacked the authority to change the wording of the
referendum, as it had done, to simplify the ballot language. 55 City attorneys
539. Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993).
540. Clewis v. Krivanek, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994).
541. Nancy Valmus, U.S. Supreme Court Refused to Hear Caton, GAZETTE
(Hillsborough County), May 1994, at 14.
542. Tom Scherberger, Hillsborough Gay Rights Amendment Sustains Challenge, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at 8B.
543. Hillsborough OKs Gay Rights Law, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 8, 1993, at B5.
544. Id.
545. Rand Hall, Tampa's Human Rights Ordinance Heads to Voters... Again!,
GAZETTE (Hillsborough County), Nov. 1994, at 7.
546. Tom Fielder, Gay-Rights Law Repeal Attempt In Legal Limbo, MIAmi HERALD,
Mar. 6, 1995, at 5B (on file with author's estate).
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Iorio v. Citizens for a Fair Tampa, 661 So. 2d 32, 32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
550. Ballot Changed, MiAMi HERALD, Mar. 4, 1995, at 5B.
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appealed, triggering an automatic stay of the circuit court's removal of the
issue from the ballot.55' However, the appellate court affirmed the circuit
court's decision.5 52 Thus, voters were not allowed to decide the referendum
on repealin the city's four-year-old sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinance.
In mid-May 1995, after a four-hour public hearing on the matter, the
Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners voted four-to-three to
repeal the county's four-year-old ordinance banning discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.M Some 700 people attended the hearing, moved
from the county commission chamber to the Hillsborough County
Fairgrounds. 5 Shortly thereafter, "Take Back Tampa" filed suit556 for a
court order to declare the Tampa sexual orientation nondiscrimination
ordinance invalid, claiming that the city "thwarted the will of the -eople" by
enforcing an ordinance that was rejected by a public referendum.
D. Developments Within the Florida Bar
In late-1990, the then-relatively-new Public Interest Law Section
("PILS") of The Florida Bar, adopted one of its first legislative positions:
Endorsing an amendment to the Florida Hate Crimes Act to include crimes
evidencing prejudice on the basis of the victim's sexual orientation.55 8
Following through on the work begun by the ABA, the section endorsed
legislation at the federal, state, and local levels to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation in employment, housing, and public
accommodations.559 This time the requests did not seek the support of the
entire Florida Bar to endorse the legislative positions; rather, they sought
only to allow the new section to lobby on these issues. The entire Bar's
551. Tampa Gay Rights Ordinance in Doubt, SuN-SENTNEL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 5,
1995, at 26A.
552. Tampa Voters Choose Mayor, Not Rights Bill, SUN-SENTNEL (Fort Lauderdale),
Mar. 8, 1995, at 22A (on file with author's estate).
553. Id.
554. County Kills Gay Rights Law, MIAMI HERALD, May 18, 1995, at 5B.
555. Shame, Shame, Shame: Hillsborough Bows to Right, Repeals Law Against
Discrimination, Tm WEEKLY NEWS, May 24, 1995, at 10 (on file with author's estate).
556. Take Back Tampa Back Again, GAZE~M (Hillsborough County), Aug. 1995, at 5.
557. Id.
558. Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Public Interest Law
Section of the Florida Bar Approved by the Board of Governors in March 1991, at 3
(November 16, 1990) (on file with author's estate).
559. Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council of the Public Interest Law
Section of The Florida Bar approved by the Board of Governors in March 1991, at 2 (Jan. 24,
1991) (on file with author's estate).
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Board of Governors gave the section permission to lobby for these two goals
on March 21, 1991.
56
The section took yet another legislative position designed to further the
rights of lesbians and gay men in Florida. PILS endorsed repeal of Florida's
statutory prohibition against adoption by homosexuals.61 Unlike its
treatment of the other two sexual orientation positions taken by the section,
however, the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar in this case refused to
562allow PILS to lobby. It found the position to be one which had the
potential of "deep philosophical or emotional division among a substantial
segment of the Bar..." and thus, outside the parameters of cases which
defined allowable lobbying within mandatory membership bar associations,
as in Florida' s. 63
PILS ultimately filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Florida
seeking to clarify when the Board of Governors could and could not prohibit
a section of The Florida Bar from lobbying on a legislative position the
section has taken: 64 The court, in an unpublished per curium opinion,
declined to hear the petition. 65 The leadership of PILS then formed a
voluntary membership organization, the Florida Academy of Public Interest
Lawyers, which endorsed the proposal for repeal of the adoption prohibition
as its first legislative position.5
66
In September 1993, the Public Interest Law Section sought to take a
legislative position on another issue affecting the rights of lesbians and gay
men.567 This time, PILS endorsed reformation of chapters 798 and 800 of
Florida Statutes, which proscribe criminal behavior under the headings
"Adultery; Cohabitation" and "Lewdness; Indecent Exposure," respectively,
to make noncommercial acts between consenting adults in private beyond
560. Public Interest Law Section of The Florida Bar to Lobby to Eliminate Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, a news release by the Public Interest Law Section of The Florida
Bar, Apr. 9, 1991 (on file with author's estate).
561. Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Public Interest Law
Section of The Florida Bar, at 3-4 (Sept. 6, 1991) (on file with author's estate).
562. Id.
563. Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, at 8 (Sept.
13, 1992) (on file with author's estate).
564. The Florida Bar re: Authority of a Voluntary Section to Engage in Legislative
Action, 599 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1992).
565. Id.
566. Letter from Stephen F. Hanlon, Esq., to Alan Terl (April 8, 1996) (on file with
author's estate).
567. Minutes of the Meeting of Executive Council, Public Interest Law Section of The
Florida Bar, at 7 (Sept. 9, 1993) (on file with author's estate).
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the scope of the criminal law.568 On February 17, 1994, the Board of
Governors of The Florida Bar authorized PILS to lobby for those changes.
569
The year 1994 marked the start of a new biennium for The Florida Bar.
All previous legislative positions were sunsetted, and those sections and
committees which sought to renew Bar authorization to lobby on behalf of
specific proposals had to begin that process anew.570 The Public Interest
Law Section sought renewed authority to lobby for sexual orientation
nondiscrimination ordinances generally, for the specific addition of coverage
for sexual orientation nondiscrimination to the Florida Civil Rights Act, and
for decriminalization of victimless crimes, all of which positions had
previously been approved for section lobbying by the Board of Governors. 571
A new Bar biennium also meant a change of players, however,
including those on the Board of Governors' Legislation Committee. This
time, the Legislation Committee rejected all three of the sexual orientation
proposals as too controversial and divisive. At the full Board of Governors,
the lack of a quorum prevented a vote on whether to uphold or overturn the
Legislation Committee.572
In February 1995, notwithstanding the prior finding by the Legislation
Committee that the issue is "divisive," the Board of Governors of The
Florida Bar authorized the Public Interest Law Section of the Bar to lobby in
support of sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws and ordinances
generally, and specifically for the addition of sexual orientation
discrimination to the coverage of the Florida Civil Rights Act.573 A former
PILS chair told the Board that sexual orientation discrimination "is the civil
rights issue of the 1990s and we can't be a public interest law section if we
don't deal with it.' 574 The section did not pursue Board approval of its
proposal to lobby for reform of victimless crimes legislation at that time.
[At this point, Allan Terl's manuscript ends.]
568. Id.
569. PILS Gets OK to Lobby Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination, FLORIDA BAR
NEws, Mar. 1, 1995, at 24.
570. Gary Blankenship, Board Debates Controversial Section Legislative Positions,
FLORDA BAR NEws, Oct. 15, 1994, at 18.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. PILS Gets OK to Lobby Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination, supra note
569, at 24.
574. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 1995, sixteen-year-old Keith Brennan and eighteen-year-
old Joshua Nelson used a baseball bat and a box cutter knife to kill eighteen-
year-old Tommy Owens.' Owens remained conscious during the attack and
pleaded for his life, but neither Brennan, nor Nelson showed any mercy
toward him. Law enforcement officers apprehended Brennan and Nelson a
short time after the murder. The jury found Keith Brennan guilty as
1. Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365, S365 (July 8, 1999).
2. Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1999).
3. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S365.
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charged for the murder of Owens and recommended the death penalty.4 The
trial judge followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Brennan to
death.*5 However, on July 8, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida vacated
Brennan's death sentence and reduced his sentence to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.6 The court held that executing Keith
Brennan would be cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of
the Florida Constitution because Brennan was only sixteen years old at the
time of the murder.7
The Supreme Court of Florida made its decision, that executing sixteen-
year-old offenders is cruel or unusual punishment, based on the number of
juvenile executions that have been carried out in Florida over the last
twenty-five years.8 The court concluded that executing sixteen-year-old
offenders is unusual and therefore a violation of article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution because no sixteen-year-old offenders have been
executed in Florida since 1972.9 The court did not examine jury
determinations or legislative enactments in making its decision as the United
States Supreme Court did in deciding the constitutionality of executing
fifteen and sixteen-year-old offenders in Thompson v. Oklahomal' and
Stanford v. Kentucky."
The purpose of this comment is to review the history of the juvenile
death penalty and to analyze the arguments surrounding Brennan v. State.12
Part II of this comment will discuss the history of the death penalty for
juveniles in the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Florida. Part M will analyze Brennan, including the appellate brief
arguments and the opinions of the justices of the Supreme Court of Florida.
Finally, Part IV will conclude this comment.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A. United States Supreme Court
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court held that executing an
offender who is under sixteen years old at the time of their offense
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
4. Id. at S366.
5. Id. at S367.
6. Id. at S368.
7. Id.
8. See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367.
9. Id.
10. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
11. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367-68.
12. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (July 8, 1999).
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Amendment of the United States Constitution.13 In 1989, the Supreme Court
held that executing sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.1
4
Essentially, the United States Supreme Court has drawn a line at the age of
sixteen.' 5 The states may not cross this line, but are free to extend the line to
a higher age, making it illegal by statute to execute offenders sixteen and
older.
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma
On January 23, 1983, fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson
participated in the murder of Charles Keene, his former brother-in-law. 
s
Keene's body was found in a river two weeks later, chained to a concrete
block.17 It was determined that the victim had been shot twice and that his
throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut.'8 Thompson was certified to stand
trial as an adult in accordance with Oklahoma law.19 A jury found
Thompson guilty of first-degree murder and recommended the death
penalty.20 The trial judge sentenced Thompson to death.2' On appeal, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Thompson's conviction and
sentence.?
13. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Note that the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment while
article 1, section 17 of the Florida Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual punishment.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, with FA. CONST. art. I, § 17. Also note that references to
a defendant's age in this comment refers to the defendant's age at the time of their offense.
15. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
16. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 860 (1988).
17. Id. at 861.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 861-62. Under title 10, section 1112(b) of the Oklahoma Statutes, juveniles
could be certified to stand trial as adults if the State could prove "prosecutive merit" of the
case and, after considering six factors, the court determined that there were no reasonable
prospects for rehabilitation of the child within the juvenile system. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §
1112(b) (1981). Numerous witnesses testified about Thompson's prior abusive behavior,
which included arrests for assault and battery, attempted burglary, assault and battery with a
knife, and assault and battery with a deadly weapon. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 861-62. A
clinical psychologist testified that the juvenile justice system could not help Thompson. Id.
20. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 862.
21. Id.
22. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
2000]
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On certiorari, Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court held,
in a plurality opinion,23 that imposing the death penalty on sixteen-year-old
offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 He held that "evolving
standards of decency" demonstrate that society opposes capital punishment
for offenders under sixteen,25 that imposing the death penalty on offenders
under sixteen is disproportional, and that imposing the death penalty on
offenders under sixteen does not serve the social purposes of capital
punishment.27  Hence, executing offenders under sixteen years of age
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.28
First, to determine what "evolving standards of decency" were in the
United States, Justice Stevens examined legislative enactments and jury
determinations. He concluded that state laws limiting the rights of fifteen-
23. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompson was the swing vote, which helped
define the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848-59. Although she concurred with Justice
Stevens' opinion, she was reluctant to adopt it without better evidence. Id. at 848-49. She
agreed with Justice Stevens, that statistics showing the rarity of executions imposed on
offenders under 16 years old support the inference of a national consensus opposing the death
penalty for 15-year-olds, but she said that the statistics are not dispositive. Id. at 853. Justice
O'Connor also agreed with Justice Stevens when he said adolescents are generally less
blameworthy than adults. Id. However, she said that fact does not necessarily mean all 15-
year-olds are incapable of the culpability that would justify imposing capital punishment on
them. Id. Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded that offenders under 16 should not be
executed under a capital punishment statute that fails to specify a minimum age at which one
may become eligible for the death penalty. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58.
Justice Scalia dissented, saying it is impossible for the plurality to hold, based on
legislative enactments, that evolving standards of decency demonstrate society's opposition to
imposing the death penalty on offenders younger than 16. Id. at 868. This is because 40% of
the states and the federal government allow for imposing the death penalty on any juvenile
tried as an adult. Id. On the subject of jury determinations as an indicator of "evolv-ing
standards of decency," Justice Scalia said that the plurality erroneously examined statistics on
capital executions, which are substantially lower than capital sentences. Id. at 869. Justice
Scalia concluded by saying, although statistics do indicate that imposing the death penalty on
offenders under 16 is rare, the Court is not discussing the rarity of capital punishment for
offenders under 16, but whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits it entirely. Id.
24. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
25. Id. at 824-25, 833.
26. Id. at 835.
27. Id. at 837-38.
28. Seeid.at838.
29. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-33. Courts are guided by "'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"' in determining what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
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year-olds indicate that society regards fifteen-year-olds as less responsible
than adults.30 Using statistics, Justice Stevens determined that a majority of
the states as well as other countries oppose the death penalty for offenders
under sixteen years old, indicating that society was becoming less tolerant of
imposing capital punishment on juveniles.31  Finally, Justice Stevens said
that the rarity of executions of offenders under sixteen years old in the
United States indicates that juries oppose imposing capital punishment on
such offenders.
32
Next, Justice Stevens discussed the proportionality of the death penalty
and the death penalty's contribution to social purposes when imposed on
offenders under sixteen.33 He concluded that juveniles are less culpable than
adults are because they are less mature and less responsible than adults.
34
(1958)). Courts examine legislative enactments and jury determinations to determine what
evolving standards of decency are. Id. at 822-23. If evolving standards of decency indicate
that society opposes capital punishment for a certain age group, then executing an offender
who belongs to that age group constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 821-23 &
nn.4-7.
30. Id. at 823-25. At that time, no states allowed 15-year-olds to vote or sit on a jury;
in all but one state a 15-year-old could not drive without parental consent; in all but four states
a 15-year-old could not marry without parental consent; no state allowed 15-year-olds to
purchase pornographic material; all states had enacted legislation designating the maximum
age for juvenile court at 16 years old; and no states allowed 15-year-olds to purchase alcohol
or cigarettes. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824.
31. Id. at 826-31. At that time, 14 states did not allow capital punishment at all; 18
other states had expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty statutes at age 16
at the time of the offense; and in the remaining 19 states, the death penalty was allowed, but
no minimum age limit had been set. Id. The death penalty had been completely abolished in
West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all Scandinavian countries, and was
available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in most western countries, including
Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Id.
32. Id. at 831. It is estimated that only 18-20 people under the age of 16 at the time
of their offense have been executed in the 20th Century, the last such execution taking place in
1948. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832. "The road we have traveled during the past four
decades-in which thousands of juries have tried murder cases-leads to the unambiguous
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally
abhorrent to the conscience of the community." Id.
33. Id. at 833-38.
34. Id. at 834-35. Justice Stevens wrote that because of less experience, less
education, and less intelligence, teenagers are less able to evaluate the consequences of their
conduct and are more apt to be motivated by emotion or peer pressure. Id. He cited to
Eddings v. Oklahoma, saying that crimes by juveniles deserve less punishment because
adolescents have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long range terms than
adults. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16
(1982)). He went on to cite the REPORT OF THE TWENTETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORcE, 1978
REPORT ON SENTENCING PotucY TowARD YOUNG OFFENDERS (1978) [hereinafter 1978
2000]
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Therefore, imposing the death penalty on juveniles is disproportional and
hence a violation of the Eighth Amendment.35 Justice Stevens determined
that imposing the death penalty on offenders younger than sixteen years old
also does not contribute to the social purposes of the death penalty,
specifically, retribution and deterrence.36
2. Stanford v. Kentucky
Stanford v. Kentucky37 involved two consolidated cases.38 In the first
case, seventeen-year-old Kevin Stanford and an accomplice robbed a gas
station where twenty-year-old Barbel Poore was working as an attendant.39
During and after commission of the robbery, Stanford and his accomplice
repeatedly raped and sodomized Poore before Stanford shot her in the face
and in the back of the head.40 At trial, a corrections officer testified that
Stanford said he killed Poore because she lived next door to him and would
41recognize him. Stanford was transferred and tried as an adult and was
convicted of murder, first-degree sodomy, first-degree robbery and receiving
42
stolen property. He was sentenced to death by the trial judge and his
sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.43
REPORT] saying that youth crime is not exclusively the offender's fault and that offenses by
youths represent a failure of family, school, and the social system. Id. at 834 (citing 1978
REPORT).
35. See id. at 833-35.
36. Id. at 836-38. Retribution is "'inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of
men' ... [gliven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for
growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children." Id. at 836-37 (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Justice Stevens said that making younger persons
ineligible for the death penalty will not diminish the deterrent value of capital punishment for
the vast majority of potential offenders because people under 16 are involved in only about
two percent of the arrests made for willful homicide. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837.
37. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
38. Id. at 364 (consolidating Stamford v. Kentucky, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987) with
Wilkins v. Missouri, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987)).
39. Id. at 365.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365-66. Under section 208.170 of the Kentucky Statutes, a
juvenile could be tried as an adult if the offender is either charged with a Class A felony or a
capital crime, or was over 16 and charged with a felony. KY. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 208.170
(Michie 1982). In this case, the juvenile court certified Stanford to be tried as an adult after
stressing the seriousness of his offense and the unsuccessful attempts of the juvenile system to
rehabilitate him for numerous instances of past delinquency. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365.
43. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
860 [Vol. 24:855
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In the second case, sixteen-year-old Heath Wilkins robbed a
convenience store owned and operated by Nancy and David Allen.44 His
plan was to rob the store and kill whoever was working there because "a
dead person can't talk."'45 During the robbery, Wilkins stabbed Nancy Allen,
a twenty-six-year-old mother of two, while his accomplice held her." Allen
spoke up to assist the two when they had trouble opening the cash register.47
This led Wilkins to stab her three more times in the chest, two of the wounds
puncturing the victim's heart.48 When Allen began to beg for her life,
Wilkins stabbed her in the throat four times, severing her carotid artery.49
Wilkins was certified to stand trial as an adult and was sentenced to death.5°
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed on review, rejecting Wilkins'
51Eighth Amendment argument.
On certiorari, Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court held, in
52
a plurality opinion, that imposing capital punishment on sixteen or
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. ld. at 366.
48. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 367. Under section 211.021(1) of the Missouri Statutes, for Wilkins to be
tried as an adult, the juvenile court was required to terminate juvenile jurisdiction and certify
him under section 211.071. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 211.021(1), 211.071 (1986). That section
allowed individuals between 14 and 17 who committed felonies to be tried as adults. See id.
The juvenile court in this case certified Wilkins relying on the viciousness and violence of the
crime, the defendant's maturity, and the juvenile system's inability to rehabilitate Wilkins
after previous delinquency. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 367.
51. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368.
52. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, concluded, "no national consensus
forbids the imposition of capital punishment" on 16 or 17-year-old offenders. Id. at 381. She
cited Thompson saying that the most relevant statistic in this case is that every American
jurisdiction that has set a minimum age for capital punishment has set it at 16 years old or
above. Id. at 381 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 849 (1988)).
In Justice Brennan's dissent, he examined legislative enactments and jury
determinations to determine whether "evolving standards of decency" oppose the juvenile
death penalty. Id. at 382-93. He concluded that imposing the death penalty on juveniles is
"unusual" and therefore unconstitutional because statistics show that juveniles account for
only about two percent of total executions in the United States. Id. at 386-87. Justice
Brennan said that imposing the death penalty on 16 or 17-year-old offenders is
disproportionate because, in his view, juveniles so generally lack the degree of responsibility
for their crimes, that the Eighth Amendment forbids that they receive it. Stanford, 492 U.S. at
394-96. He claimed, although individualized consideration exists in capital sentencing, it
does not guarantee that immature individuals undeserving of the death penalty will not be
sentenced to death. Id. at 397. Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that since juveniles are
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seventeen-year-old offenders does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.53 In arriving at that conclusion, Justice Scalia, like Justice
Stevens in Thompson, examined legislative enactments and jury
determinations to determine what "evolving standards of decency" were in
the United States. 4 He concluded that legislative enactments and jury
determinations indicate that society does not oppose imposing the death
penalty on sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders.55  Justice Scalia
determined that laws limiting the rights of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds
are not proof that it is "categorically unacceptable" to prosecutors and juries
to execute minors.56 Those laws operate in gross and apply to all
individuals.57 However, death penalty statutes provide for individualized
consideration of each individual person sentenced to death.5 8  An
individual's maturity is appropriately used as a mitigating factor rather than
a complete bar to the death penalty. 9
Justice Scalia stressed the Court's responsibility to look to the concepts
of decency of modem American society as a whole rather than the Court's
own concepts of decency in determining what evolving standards of decency
were in America. He determined that the degree of national consensus,
which is sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual, had
not been established in this case.6 1 Essentially, Justice Scalia held that the
less culpable than adults, they cannot be executed to satisfy the social purpose of retribution.
Id. at 403-04.
53. Id. at 380.
54. Id. at 368-74.
55. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
56. Id. at 374.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 375.
59. Id.
60. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369. Justice Scalia emphasized in footnote one that
American standards of decency are dispositive, rejecting the plurality's examination of
sentencing practices in other countries to determine evolving standards of decency in
Thompson. Id. at 369 n.1. Justice Scalia wrote that the sentencing practices of other nations
cannot be used to establish the Eighth Amendment prerequisite that the punishment in
question is accepted among Americans. Id.
61. Id. at 370-72. Fifteen out of 37 states declined to impose the death penalty on 16-
year-old offenders and 12 out of 37 declined to impose it on 17-year-old offenders. Id. at 370.
Justice Scalia compared and contrasted these numbers to cases where the Supreme Court
invalidated the death penalty. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371-72. In Coker v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court struck down capital punishment for the crime of rape holding that Georgia was
the only jurisdiction that authorized such a punishment. Id. at 371 (citing Coker v. Georgia,
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petitioners did not meet their heavy burden of establishing a national
consensus against capital punishment for people sixteen or seventeen years
old at the time of their offense.62
Justice Scalia concluded that the petitioners' argument, that juries'
reluctance to impose the death penalty on sixteen and seventeen-year-old
offenders is poof of contemporary society's opposition to such punishment,
was not supported by evidence because the statistics used by the petitioners
carried little significance. 63 He determined that since there are far fewer
capital crimes committed by juveniles, that there are also far fewer
executions of juveniles.64 Justice Scalia concluded by saying that the small
number of juvenile executions does not mean that society views those
executions as categorically unacceptable, but instead, society views
imposing the death penalty on individuals under eighteen as something that
should be done only in rare instances.6
Justice Scalia called it "absurd to think that one must be mature enough
to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be
mature enough to understand that murdering another human being is
433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977)). In Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court struck down capital
punishment for a crime in which an accomplice took a life, emphasizing that only eight
jurisdictions authorized similar punishment. Id. at 371 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 792 (1982)). The Court in Stanford noted the Court in Ford v. Wainwright struck down
capital punishment of the insane saying that '"no State in the Union' ... permitted such
punishment."' Id. at 371 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986)). However,
Justice Scalia likens Stanford to Tison v. Arizona, where the Supreme Court upheld
imposition of capital punishment for major participation in a felony with reckless indifference
to human life, noting that only 11 jurisdictions out of those allowing capital punishment
rejected its use under such circumstances. Id. at 371-72 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 154 (1987)).
62. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-73.
63. Id. at 373-74 (citing VICTOR L. STREIm, IMPOSITION OF DEATH SENTENCES FOR
JUVENILE OFFENSES, JAN. 1, 1982-APR. 1, 1989, PAPER FOR CLEVELAND MARSHALL COLLEGE
OF LAW (1989)). The current version of Victor L. Streib's report is entitled THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JAN.
1973-JUNE 1999 and is available on the World Wide Web at <www.law.onu.edu/faculty/
streib/juvdeath.htm>. Actual executions for crimes committed by those under age 18 made up
only two percent of the total number of executions that occurred between 1642 and 1986.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373-74 (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, IMPOSrrON OF DEATH SENTENCES FOR
JUvENILE OFFENSES, JAN. 1, 1982-APR. 1, 1989, PAPER FOR CLEVELAND MARSHALL COLLEGE
OF LAW (1989)). Between 1982 and 1986, out of a total of 2,106 death sentences, only 15
were imposed on people 16 or under at the time of their offense, and only 30 on people who
were 17 at the time of their offense. Id.
64. Stanford, 492 U.S. 373-74.
65. Id.
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profoundly wrong, and to conform one's conduct to that most minimal of all
civilized standards." 66 He held that statutes proscribing minors from
drinking, smoking, etc., make determinations in gross about an individual's
maturity.67 Essentially, those statutes are necessary to our society because it
would be impossible to examine every person individually to determine
whether they are mature enough to drink or drive or smoke cigarettes.(8
However, when imposing the death penalty, states are required to
individually consider the maturity of the defendant.6 9 Therefore, Justice
Scalia held that the existence of statutes limiting the rights of juveniles does
not support the argument that all juveniles are too immature to realize that
murdering another person is wrong.70
B. Supreme Court of Florida
Individual states are bound by the decisions in Thompson and Stanford
and, therefore, may not execute offenders under sixteen years old. However,
they may extend the line drawn by the United States Supreme Court by
legislative enactment. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Florida decided that it
is constitutional under article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution to
execute seventeen-year-old offenders in Florida.7' Then, in 1994, the
Supreme Court of Florida decided that executing fifteen-year-old offenders
72is unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution.
1. LeCroy v. State
On January 11, 1981, the bodies of John and Gail Hardeman were
found in a remote area of Palm Beach County where they had been camping
and hunting a week earlier.73 John died from a single shotgun wound to the
head and Gail died from three small caliber gunshot wounds to the chest,
neck, and head.74 When Gall's body was found her trousers had been
unzipped and her brassiere had been partially removed. 75 John's wallet, a
66. Id. at 374.
67. Id. at 374-75.
68. See id. at 374.
69. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374-75.
70. Id. at 374.
71. See LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1988).
72. See Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994).
73. See LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 752.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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.30-06 hunting rifle, and Gail's .38 revolver were all missing from the
scene.76 Seventeen-year-old Cleo LeCroy ("LeCroy") and his brother Jon
("Jon"), who had been camping in the area with their parents, assisted in the
search for the victims.77 During the search, the brothers claimed to be great
trackers, and said that if the police let them search alone that they would find
78the bodies. Jon found Gail's body, the first body discovered, in the
presence of police officers.7 9 The brothers were questioned by the police
immediately after discovery of the both bodies.' ° LeCroy waived his
Miranda rights and gave two statements to the police, in which he admitted
killing the couple.81 At trial, significant evidence was introduced
demonstrating that LeCroy murdered John and Gail. 2  The jury
recommended life for John's murder and death for Gail's murder.83 The trial
judge agreed with the jury's recommendations on both murder counts.84 On
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 752.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 752-53. In his first statement, LeCroy said that he killed John by accident
when he fired his gun at a hog and his bullet ricocheted striking John in the head. Id. at 752.
Regarding Gail, LeCroy's first statement changed three times: first, he said that he killed Gail
when she burst on the scene and he did not know who she was; next, he said that she fired at
him first; and finally, that he killed her to eliminate a witness. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 752. He
denied touching the bodies or taking anything from them. Id. LeCroy said that he told his
brother Jon what had happened, but that Jon had nothing to do with the killings. Id. at 752-
53. After giving his first statement, LeCroy asked almost immediately to give another
statement. Id. at 753. He waived his Miranda rights again. Id. In his next statement, LeCroy
told police that he shot Gail after she came on the scene yelling, and that he unzipped Gail's
trousers to check for a pulse. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 753. He also stated that he did take the
guns belonging to John and Gail. Id.
82. Id. At trial, LeCroy's girlfriend testified that LeCroy told her about the killings
and taking the money and guns from the victims and that he sold the rifle to an acquaintance,
which was later recovered by the police. Id. She also testified that LeCroy told her that he
burned a pair of his pants because they had blood on them and that he planned to mutilate the
barrel of his .22 to prevent identification. Id. Weapons experts testified that the barrel of
LeCroy's .22 had been mutilated. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 753. A jail mate testified that
LeCroy admitted the killings. Id. Contrary to LeCroy's statements, the medical examiner
testified that the shots fired at Gail were fired at point blank range, and in two of them, the gun
was probably in contact with her body. Id.
83. Id. at 755.
84. Id.
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appeal, LeCroy argued that the death penalty imposed on a seventeen-year-
85
old is cruel and unusual punishment.
Writing for the majority86 in LeCroy, Justice Shaw held that there is no
constitutional bar to imposing the death penalty on seventeen-year-old
offenders in Florida.87 He began by indicating that the sentencing judge
gave great weight to the appellant's youth as a mitigating factor, yet the
judge found that the appellant was mentally and emotionally mature and
understood the difference between right and wrong and the nature and
consequences of his actions. 88  Next, Justice Shaw noted that legislative
action in Florida over the last thirty-five years had consistently evolved
toward treating juveniles who commit serious offenses as adults, and since
1951, the legislature had repeatedly handled juveniles charged with capital
crimes "in every respect as adults." 89 Then, the court noted that the jury
85. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756.
86. Justice Barkett concurred in the majority's finding of guilt, but dissented as to the
sentence because he believed that imposing the death penalty on a 17-year-old offender
violates both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 17
of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 758. He concluded that legal disabilities imposed on
minors indicate that youthful offenders have not fully developed the ability to judge or
consider the consequences of their behavior. Id. He said "[w]hen a government withholds the
right of a citizen to enjoy certain benefits and privileges because of immaturity and lack of
judgment, then for the same reason it also should withhold the imposition of the ultimate and
final penalty, which can be imposed only where there is heightened culpability." Id. at 759.
Justice Barkett agreed with Justice O'Connor's reasoning in her concurrence in Thompson
when she said that the death penalty should not be imposed on an individual under 16 years
old pursuant to the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum
age. Id. at 760 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857-58 (1988)). Finally, Justice
Barkett concluded, saying Florida's legislature must address the statutory minimum age issue
before it continues to allow execution of juveniles. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 760.
87. Id. at 758.
88. Id. at 756.
89. Id. at 756-57. Florida law recognizes distinctions between juveniles and adults,
however "section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1979-1987), mandates that a child of any age
charged with a capital crime 'shall be tried and handled in every respect as if he were an
adult."' Id. at 756 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1979-1987)) (emphasis in original).
The court in LeCroy said that the words "in every respect" can only be read as a declaration of
legislative intent that offenders under 18 may be subject to the same penalty as adults,
including the death penalty. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756-57. Legislative history in Florida has
consistently shown strong support for treating juveniles as adults when they are involved in
serious crimes. Id. Prior to 1950, the Florida Constitution vested jurisdiction over all
criminal charges against minors in criminal courts. Id. at 756. There were no juvenile courts
and all juveniles were tried as adults. Id. In 1950, the Florida Constitution was amended,
essentially creating the juvenile court system. Id. This was codified as chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39 (1951)). Under this
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recommended the death penalty for Gail's murder, but not for John's
murder, concluding that the jury was able to distinguish between the more
aggravated murder of Gail.9 "This reflects a community judgment that in
this particular case, under these circumstances and for this defendant, the
death penalty is appropriate." 91 Justice Shaw determined that the cases cited
by LeCroy indicating the rarity at which the death penalty is imposed on
minors in Florida does not prove that there is a per se rule against imposing
the death penalty on juveniles?9 Instead, Judge Shaw determined that the
cases citred demonstrated that minors convicted of first-degree murder tend
to "exhibit immaturity or other mitigating characteristics which persuade
juries and sentencing judges that the death penalty is inappropriate in their
specific cases." 93 Essentially, the court concluded: 1) LeCroy's maturity
was considered as a mitigating factor and he was found to be a mature
individual; 2) Florida law has evolved toward treating violent juvenile
offenders as adults; and 3) the rarity of juvenile executions does not create a
statute violations of law committed by a child, then defined as individuals under 17 years of
age, were removed from criminal courts and placed in either juvenile courts or in county
courts in those counties without juvenile courts. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39 (1951)). Section
39.02(6) of the Florida Statutes gave the juvenile court discretion to transfer felony charges
against juveniles 14 or older to criminal courts, except when juveniles age 16 commit a crime
which would be a capital offense if committed by an adult, in which case the juvenile "shall be
[sic] transferred." Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1951)). In 1955, the legislature amended
section 39.02(6), deleting "sixteen years or older" and providing that any child, irrespective of
age, indicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment by a grand jury shall be
tried in a criminal court. Id. at 756-57 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1955)). That section
was further amended in 1967 providing that the juvenile court shall be without jurisdiction
and the child shall be handled in every respect as if he were an adult whenever an indictment
is returned by a grand jury charging a child of any age with a violation of Florida law
punishable by death or life imprisonment. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1969)). In 1973,
chapter 39 was substantially rewritten returning exclusive original jurisdiction of charges
against juvepiles to the circuit court. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 757 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39
(1973)). The court could then try any juvenile fourteen years old or older as an adult on any
criminal offense. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39 (1973)). A child was redefined as anyone under
18 years of age. Id. In 1978, chapter 39 was rewritten providing that any child tried as an
adult would be subject to prosecution, trial, and sentencing as an adult. Id. (citing FLA. STAT.
§ 39 (Supp. 1978)). Finally in 1981, the legislature further amended chapter 39 providing that
if a juvenile was convicted of any crime punishable by life in prison or death, that the child
"shall be sentenced as an adult." Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981)).
90. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 757.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 757.
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per se rule banning juvenile capital punishment.94  Based on these
conclusions the court held that there is no constitutional ban against
imposing the death penalty on seventeen-year-old offenders in Florida.95
2. Allen v. State
On December 10, 1990, fifteen-year-old Jerome Allen and two
accomplices stole a car, robbed a gas station, and, during the robbery, shot
one of the gas station's employees, Stephen DuMont.96 DuMont died from
the shotgun wound. However, before dying, he was able to describe his
assailants and the car that they drove.9 Deputies apprehended Allen and
searched his house where they found a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition.
98
However, experts could not say whether DuMont had been killed with the
gun that was recovered. 99  The jury found Allen guilty of first-degree
murder, among other violent crimes.10 During the penalty phase, one of
Allen's accomplices testified that although Allen did not shoot DuMont, he
was the one who urged the other accomplice to do so to prevent being
identified.'0 1 The jury recommended the death penalty on a seven-to-five
vote.102 During the sentencing hearing, a forensic psychologist testified that
Allen had a traumatic, chaotic childhood, that his father violently attacked
him on occasion, and that Allen suffered from behavioral and learning
disorders. 103 The psychologist also noted that Allen suffered head trauma
that may have resulted in organic brain injury or neurological problems, and
that he had a low Intelligence Quotient.1°4 Allen's mother testified that
Allen sometimes went into a daze and often suffered from fainting spells.1
0 5
The trial court sentenced Allen to death.'06
94. See id. at 756-57.
95. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756-57.
96. See Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494,495 (Fla. 1994).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496.
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The court held, per curiam,0 7 that because the death penalty is hardly
ever imposed on fifteen-year-old offenders, it is either cruel or unusual
punishment if imposed on offenders who are under the age of sixteen at the
time of the crime.1t0 Therefore, the court concluded that the death penalty is
prohibited for fifteen-year-olds by article I, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution.1 9 "We cannot countenance a rule that would result in some
young juveniles being executed while the vast majority of others are not,
even where the crimes are similar."110
Im. BRENNAN v. STATE
A. Facts and Procedural History
Sixteen-year-old Keith Brennan and eighteen-year-old Joshua Nelson
wanted to leave the city of Cape Coral, so they devised a plan to steal
Tommy Owens' car."' On March 10, 1995 they lured Owens to a remote
spot, and began to beat Owens with a baseball bat.112 Owens pleaded with
Nelson and Brennan for his life and told them to take his car, but after a
discussion Nelson and Brennan decided to kill Owens to avoid being caught
by the police.1 After tying Owens up, Brennan cut Owens' throat with a
box cutter knife. 14 Owens remained conscious during the stabbing and
begged Nelson to hit him again with the bat so that he would be knocked
107. In his special concurrence, Justice Overton said that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Thompson demands that the Supreme Court of Florida hold that executing
a 15-year-old is unconstitutional. Id. at 498. He stated that under the Florida Constitution,
the proper constitutional dividing line is under the age of 16. Id.
In his special concurrence, Justice Grimes agreed with Justice Overton, that Thompson
demands that the court rule that it is unconstitutional to execute one under 16 years of age. Id.
However, he said he was unwilling to accept the notion that the Florida Constitution prohibits
imposing the death penalty upon a person below the age of 16 under all circumstances. Id.
108. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497.
109. Id. (citing Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991)). At that time, more
than a half century had passed since Florida last executed an offender younger than 16. Id.
Since then only two death penalties have been imposed on such individuals, and both were
overturned. See Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1980); Vasil v. State, 374 So. 2d 465
(Fla. 1979).
110. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497.
111. Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365, S365 (July 8, 1999).
112. Id.
113. Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1999).
114. Id.
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unconscious before the stabbing continued.115  Nelson complied with
Owens' request; he and Brennan continued to strike Owens with the bat.'
1 6
After the beating and stabbing, Nelson and Brennan dragged Owens' body
under nearby bushes. 1 7 They then picked up Tina Porth and Misty Porth in
Owens' car, and drove to New Jersey after stopping in Daytona Beach. 1 8
Law enforcement officers later apprehended Nelson and Brennan in New
Jersey.
1 19
Brennan was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, first-
degree felony murder, and robbery with a deadly weapon. 20 The Porth
sisters testified that, during the trip, Nelson and Brennan informed them that
they had killed Owens.12  Brennan gave a taped confession in which he
admitted his involvement in the murder but denied that there was any prior
plan to kill Owens. 122 The confession was played to the jury during trial and
Brennan was found guilty on all three counts.1
23
At the time of the crime, Brennan was a sophomore in high school. 24
He had no significant history of prior criminal activity and his juvenile
records showed only prior crimes against property.1l 5 During the penalty
phase, Brennan presented evidence that his mother committed suicide when
he was two years old, that she suffered from severe depression, and that he
had been institutionalized.126 He also presented evidence that he was
sexually molested by his older brother when he was eight and was allegedly
"picked on" by others. 127 In 1993, he received inpatient care for alcohol and
drug addiction. 128
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight-to-four after
hearing all the evidence.129 Among the aggravators, the trial judge found
that "the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and "the
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S365.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S365-66.
123. Id. at S366.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S366.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of legal or moral justification." 130 The trial judge also
considered six statutory mitigators and twenty-five nonstatutory
mitigators. Age as a statutory mitigator was given great weight, while the
statutory mitigator of lack of significant criminal history was given moderate
weight. Although the trial judge gave significant weight to Brennan's
young age and his lack of significant prior criminal history, the court
concluded that he "wielded a baseball bat and [a] box cutter to murder
another young man.' 33 The trial court followed the jury's recommendation
and sentenced Brennan to death for the first-degree premeditated murder
charge.
134
B. Appellate BriefArguments
1. Appellant's Initial Brief
Brennan's primary argument with respect to the constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty was that imposing the death penalty on sixteen-year-
old Brennan constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of
article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 35  This was
"Issue r' of Brennan's argument.136 Brennan adopted the rationale set forth
in Allen,' 37 which said that executing a sixteen-year-old is a violation of
article I, section 17 of Florida's Constitution because executing such a
person is "unusual" due to the rarity of executions of sixteen-year-olds in
Florida. Brennan indicated that in the last twenty-five years only three
other sixteen-year-olds were sentenced to death in Florida, and none of them
were executed.139 He concluded that imposing the ultimate penalty on only
130. Id.
131. Id. at S373 n.2.
132. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S366.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Appellant's Initial Brief at 24, Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (1999)
(No. 90-279).
136. Id.
137. Id. at25. SeeAllen, 636 So. 2d at 494.
138. Appellant's Initial Brief at 25-29. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
139. Appellant's Initial Brief at 27-28. In each case, the offender was re-sentenced to
life in prison. See Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1996); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1994); Morgan v. State, 537 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1989); Morgan v. State, 453 So. 2d 394
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one sixteen-year-old in twenty-five years is "cruel, unusual, and
disproportional" and is prohibited by the Florida Constitution and the United
States Constitution.40
2. Appellee's Answer Brief
In its answer brief, the State argued that Brennan failed to meet his
heavy burden of demonstrating that imposing the death penalty on sixteen-
year-old offenders is cruel and/or unusual under article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution or under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.14 The State began its argument by stressing that
in Stanford, the United States Supreme Court has already rejected Brennan's
argument-that it is cruel and unusual to execute a sixteen-year-old.' 42 The
State especially stressed the fact that Brennan was only eight days short of
being seventeen when he killed Owens.143  Next, the State addressed
Brennan's use of Allen in its argument, which said that it is unconstitutional
to execute a sixteen-year-old in Florida because no sixteen-year-old
offenders who have been sentenced to death in the last twenty-five years
have been executed.144 In response, the State argued that no one under
twenty has been executed in Florida in the last twenty-five years either.
45
"Surely this does not mean that the death penalty cannot be imposed on
anyone nineteen or younger."'146 The State then argued that Brennan's
argument finds no support in legislative enactments because legislative
enactments in Florida have "consistently evolved toward treating juveniles
charged with serious offenses as if they were adult criminal defendants."' 47
Then, the State said that Brennan's argument, that the death penalty has not
been carried out on a sixteen-year-old offender in the last twenty-five years,
is not as important as how many times it has been imposed, which has been
(Fla. 1984); Morgan v. State, 392 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981); Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616
(Fla. 1979).
140. Appellant's Initial Brief at 28.
141. Appellee's Answer Brief at 9, Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (1999)
(No. 90-279).
142. Id. at 5 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id.
146. Appellee's Answer Brief at 6.
147. Id. at 7 (quoting LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 757 (Fla. 1988)). See supra
note 89.
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seven times in the last twenty-five years.1a The State stressed that none of
the other sixteen-year-olds had their sentence reduced based solely on their
age.
49
3. Appellant's Reply Brief
Brennan began his reply brief by indicating that the issue of imposing
the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old offender has not been addressed or
resolved in Florida (although it was decided in the United States Supreme
Court); the court in Farina avoided that issue.150 Brennan then argued that
Allen supports the inference that rarity of executions of a particular age
group demonstrates that it is cruel or unusual punishment to execute
members of that age group and that such execution is prohibited by the
Florida Constitution. 5 He said that although the State cited Stanford for the
proposition that the federal constitution does not prohibit execution of a
sixteen-year-old, that case has never been cited by a Florida appellate
court.
152
C. Analysis of Brennan v. State
1. Justice Shaw Announced the Judgment of the Court
The majority of the court held that imposing the death penalty on
Brennan, for a crime committed when he was sixteen years of age, would
constitute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article I, section 17 of
the Florida Constitution.15 3 In arriving at that conclusion the Supreme Court
of Florida was guided by the holding in Allen, which said that imposing the
death penalty on a fifteen-year-old would be cruel or unusual punishment
under the Florida Constitution because it is almost never imposed on fifteen-
year-olds in Florida.' 54 Essentially, the court in Brennan determined that
148. Appellee's Answer Brief at 8. Henry Brown (one time), James Morgan (four
times), James Farina (one time so far), and Brennan. Id.
149. Id. at 8-9.
150. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (1999)
(No. 90-279).
151. Id. (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994)).
152. Id. at 1-2.
153. Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365, S368 (July 8, 1999).
154. See id. at S367 (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1994)). Allen
held that over a half century had passed since a 15-year-old was executed in Florida, and that
whatever the reasons for the rarity of such executions that the court could not "countenance a
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sixteen-year-olds are executed so rarely (a sixteen-year-old has not been
executed in Florida since 1940) that the court is compelled to adopt the same
conclusion arrived at in Allen.155 The court rejected the State's argument
that executing a juvenile was no different than executing a woman since both
are so uncommon, saying that the law itself recognizes that children are not
as responsible for their acts as are adults.
56
The majority then attacked the State's argument, that it is constitutional
to execute a sixteen-year-old offender in Florida because the United States
Supreme Court has already decided that it is constitutional to execute such
an offender in Stanford.157 The court said that, to the contrary, the Stanford
opinion supports the determination that imposing the death penalty on
sixteen-year-old offenders in Florida is unconstitutional. 58  The court
arrived at that conclusion saying that the plurality in Stanford concluded that
the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes depends on the
individualized consideration given to the defendant's circumstances, and that
Florida statutes are devoid of any such individualized consideration. 5 9 The
majority in Brennan argued that, in Stanford, the plurality determined that
juvenile transfer statutes ensure consideration of a defendant's individual
maturity and moral responsibility. 6° Based on that cite from Stanford, the
Supreme Court of Florida held in Brennan that it is unconstitutional to
execute a juvenile under Florida law because section 985.225(1)(a) of the
Florida Statutes neither sets a minimum age for the death penalty nor sets
forth criteria to ensure individualized consideration of the defendant's
maturity and moral responsibility.'
6
'
rule that would result in some young juveniles being executed while the vast majority of
others are not, even where the crimes are similar." Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497.
155. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367. The court in Brennan said that the last
reported case where the death penalty was imposed and carried out on a 16-year-old defendant
was in Clay v. State, 196 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1940), which was over 55 years ago. Id. The court
also noted that in the last 25 years, only three other 16-year-old defendants were sentenced to
death and none of those sentences were carried out. Id. See also, supra note 139.
156. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367 (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497
(Fla. 1994)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989)). The Kentucky and
Missouri statutes considered in Stanford specifically provided for individualized consideration
before transferring juveniles to be tried as adults. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375 n.6.
161. See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367-68. Section 985.225(l)(a) of the
Florida Statutes provides that a child of any age may be indicted for a capital crime and shall
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The Legislature's failure to impose a minimum age, the
legislative mandate that a child of any age indicted for a capital
crime shall be subject to the death penalty, and the failure to set up
a system through our juvenile transfer statutes that "ensure[s]
individualized consideration of the maturity and moral
responsibility" render our statutory scheme suspect under the
federal constitution and the reasoning of Stanford as it applies to
sixteen-year-old offenders.
1 62
Finally, the court noted that a proportionality analysis requires the court
to compare the totality of the circumstances of the case at hand with other
capital cases (similar defendants, facts, and sentences). 163  The court
concluded that the inherent problem of upholding the death penalty in
Brennan is highlighted by the fact that the death penalty has not been upheld
for any other defendant who was sixteen at the time of the crime, i.e., there
are no similar cases to compare it to.164 Therefore, the court declined to
conduct a proportionality analysis.
65
Essentially, since the death penalty is almost never imposed on
defendants who are Brennan's age, and when imposed in the last twenty-five
years the sentence has been subsequently vacated, the court decided that it
could not impose the death penalty on Brennan consistently with Florida's
case law and constitution.'6 The death sentence was therefore vacated and
reduced to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole.
167
2. Justice Anstead Specially Concurred
Justice Anstead concurred in the majority's opinion and noted the
soundness of the court's reasoning based on its holding in
Allen. 168 However, Justice Anstead wrote a separate opinion because he
believes in an alternative basis for holding that it is unconstitutional to
be handled in every respect as an adult including sentencing. FLA. STAT. § 985.225(l)(a)
(1999).
162. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S368 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
375 (1989)).
163. See id. (citing Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494,497 (Fla. 1994)).
167. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S368.
168. Id. (Anstead, J., concurring).
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execute a juvenile sixteen years of age in the state of Florida. 169 He based
his argument on "society's traditional values" and examined the rights
society has historically prescribed to children. 17° He concluded that "based
upon the enormous value we place on our children, and our historically
consistent treatment of children differently from adults for virtually all legal
purposes, but especially for purposes of assessing responsibility and meting
out punishment for criminal acts, that the constitutional line should be drawn
at age seventeen. ' 71  Justice Anstead determined that our laws have
consistently shown that a person only becomes sufficiently mature to accept
the responsibilities and privileges of adulthood at age eighteen. 172 That line,
he said is consistent with our traditional attitude towards children and
represents our "determination not to give up on our children."'
73
Justice Anstead continued, stressing that we must stand by the line we
have already drawn, which is at seventeen, even when it becomes difficult to
do so as in a case where a horrible crime has been committed by a
juvenile. 74 He said that "in standing firm we demonstrate the strength of
our commitment to our children" and then quoted Justice Barkett in LeCroy,
when he said, "[w]hen a government withholds the right of a citizen to enjoy
certain benefits and privileges because of immaturity and lack of judgment,
then for the same reason it also should withhold the imposition of the
ultimate and final penalty, which can be imposed only where there is
heightened culpability.' 75 Justice Anstead concluded saying that to allow
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id. "'Florida law protects seventeen-year-olds and those who are younger,
treating them as minors and children."' Brennan, Fla. L. Weekly at S374 n.14 (quoting
LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 759 (Fla. 1988) (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 1.01(14), 39.01(7)
(1987)). For example, an unmarried 17-year-old cannot vote, serve on a jury, etc. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 1.01(13), 39.01(12) (1999).
172. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S369.
It is no coincidence, for example, that we use the age of eighteen as the cutoff
for child dependency and for the legal requirement of parents to take care of
their children, as well as a dividing line for a countless number of other legal
distinctions based upon a firmly established public policy of placing
limitations upon and extending special protections to the young and
immature.
Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 759 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
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capital punishment of juveniles below eighteen years old would be hypocrisy
and would destroy society's values.
176
3. Chief Justice Harding Concurred in Part and Dissented in Part
Chief Justice Harding concurred with Brennan's conviction but
dissented as to his sentence.177 He said that although he concurred in the
Allen decision and its reasoning, he now believes it to be flawed.178 Chief
Justice Harding now believes that this issue should be resolved based on
Florida's legislative history on the subject as suggested in Stanford.179 He
concluded that an analysis of the unusual element should include more than
just asking how often the death penalty is imposed.180
Chief Justice Harding pointed out several problems with the reasoning
in Allen, which was adopted by the majority in this case. 18' First he noted
that the Allen standard does not allow for a change in public opinion on the
issue because once the standard is put in place it can never be changed if
182
citizens change their minds. Essentially, once a punishment is held to be
"unusual," it will not be imposed anymore and will remain "unusual"
forever.183 The second flaw results if the state decides to alter its method of
execution.184 Under Allen, the first time a new method of punishment is used
it will be considered unusual and thus subject to constitutional scrutiny since
it has never been used before.185
Chief Justice Harding then cited to the concurring opinions in Allen,
written by Justice Grimes and Justice Overton, which provided that the issue186
of executing sixteen-year-olds is controlled by Thompson. Chief Justice
Harding agreed with Justice Grimes' and Justice Overton's opinion and said
that because there is no federal constitutional bar against executing a
sixteen-year-old offender, the better way to resolve this issue in Florida is to
determine whether the legislature has spoken on the subject.1 7 Chief Justice
176. See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S369.
177. Id. (Harding, C.L, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S369-71.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at S369-70.
185. Id.
186. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S370.
187. Id.
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Harding then examined the legislative history of the juvenile death penalty in
Florida by focusing on the information set forth in LeCroy. 18 He concluded
that Florida's legislative history reveals a distinct cutoff line between
offenders that are sixteen and older and those younger than sixteen. 8 9
Chief Justice Harding then compared the rationale in LeCroy to the
rationale in Allen concluding that the two opinions are in conflict. 19° In
Allen the court concluded that juveniles are treated differently than adults. 191
Under Florida law, a juvenile is defined as any unmarried person who has
not yet reached the age of eighteen. 92 Chief Justice Harding determined that
under the logic of Allen, all juveniles, including seventeen-year-olds, fall
into the purview of the Allen test.193 The majority in Brennan and in Allen
said that no fifteen or sixteen-year-old offenders have been executed in over
twenty-five years and therefore, it is unconstitutional to execute such
offenders.194 However, no seventeen-year-olds have been executed in over
twenty-five years either.' 95 Thus it seems that the holding in Allen would
prevent a seventeen-year-old offender from being executed, despite LeCroy's
holding to the contrary.
196
Chief Justice Harding determined that since the courts in LeCroy and
Stanford based their decisions on legislative enactments, that the reasoning
in those cases is more persuasive than Allen.197  He determined that
according to current figures, the contemporary consensus is very similar to
that of 1989 when Stanford was decided. 98 Since 1989, two more states
have actually altered their laws to allow for capital punishment of sixteen-
year-olds bringing that number to a total of twenty-four states out of forty
188. Id. See also supra note 89.
189. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S370.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 985.03(7) (1999).
193. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S370.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at S371. LeCroy and Stanford examined legislative enactments to determine
what society viewed as acceptable punishment, while Allen examined the number of
executions of 16-year-olds. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-77 (1989); LeCroy v.
State, 533 So. 2d 750, 756-57 (Fla. 1988); Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1994).
Chief Justice Harding is essentially saying that legislative enactments in Florida over the last
50 years are a better indicia of what society considers to be acceptable punishment rather than
tallying the number of 16-year-olds executed over the last 25 years. Brennan, 24 Fla. L.
Weekly at S371.
198. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S371.
[Vol. 24:855
128
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss3/1
Garofalo
that allow capital punishment. 199 Those figures reaffirm the holdings in
Stanford and also LeCroy, that there is no consensus against executing
sixteen-year-old offenders."
Chief Justice Harding finally argued that in attempting to distinguish
Stanford from this case, the majority relied on only one single aspect of
Justice Scalia's reasoning 2o(that juvenile transfer statutes ensure
individualized consideration). While it is undisputed that transfer statutes
ensure individualized consideration of defendants, Chief Justice Harding
believes that the United States Supreme Court was concerned with the
general concept of individualized consideration of maturity and moral
responsibility, using juvenile transfer statutes only as an example of
individualized consideration, not as a constitutional requirement.Y Chief
Justice Harding concluded that in Florida, the legislature has designated age
as a statutory mitigating circumstance, which, in his view, satisfies Justice
Scalia's concerns regarding individualized testing.203
4. Justice Wells Concurred in Part and Dissented in Part
Justice Wells concurred in the affirmance of guilt, but joined Chief
Justice Harding's dissent as to Brennan's sentence. Specifically, Justice
Wells argued that the majority's reliance on Allen as precedent in Brennan is
clearly wrong and an abuse of the doctrine of stare decisis.205 He argued that
Allen is precedent for cases involving people under sixteen while LeCroy is
precedent for Brennan.206 Justice Wells agreed with the majority's concernfor society's values for children, but said that the court has a responsibility
199. Id. at S374 n.23. Chief Justice Harding said that since 1989, three more states
have allowed for capital punishment but set a minimum age at 18, two states have moved from
having a minimum age of seventeen to having no minimum age, and Washington has decided
that no juveniles may be put to death. Id. Forty states allow capital punishment. Id. Out of
those, 19, including Florida, have no express minimum age limit. Id. The highest courts in
Alabama, Arizona, South Carolina, and Virginia have upheld cases where 16-year-old
defendants were sentenced to death. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S374 n.23. Vermont no
longer permits capital punishment for the crime of murder. See id.
200. Id. at S371.
201. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,374-77 (1989)).
202. Id. Individualized consideration in capital sentencing is a constitutional
requirement. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.
203. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S371.
204. Id. at S372 (Wells, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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to exercise the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 7 He argued, since the
United States Supreme Court has already determined that the death penalty
is constitutional, whether or not to have the death penalty is a legislative
decision, which must be made by the individual state legislatures, not by
members of the court.208 Justice Wells determined that since the people are
imposing the punishment, it should be the 2people, through their elected
representatives, who decide the punishment. He concluded that in this
case, the majority, by one vote, has not sufficiently shown due respect to
"the 'authority' of the legislature and assumes too much authority. 210
IV. CONCLUSION
By vacating Keith Brennan's death sentence and holding it to be cruel
or unusual punishment under the Florida Constitution to execute sixteen-
year-old offenders using the rarity of executions standard, the Supreme
Court of Florida has accomplished the following. First, it has banned the
execution of sixteen-year-old offenders forever in Florida, unless the court
decides to review this issue again on certiorari and uses a standard other than
the rarity of executions standard.2z 1 Second, the rarity of executions
standard, if applied consistently, makes it impossible for Florida to ever
212initiate a new method of execution. This is because, if Florida attempts to
use lethal injection, for example, as its method of execution instead of the
electric chair, such method of punishment, which has not yet been used in
213Florida, will be rare and unusual. Based on that standard, courts could, in
theory, find that a new, more humane method of execution is
unconstitutional solely because it has never been used before.
It is unclear why the Supreme Court of Florida did not examine jury
determinations and legislative enactments in this case to resolve this issue. It
is also unclear why the court would use the rarity of executions standard
when it has had a hand in producing the statistics upon which it relies.
214
207. Id. at S371.
208. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S371.
209. Id.
210. Id. at S372.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
213. Id.
214. See Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1996); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1994); Morgan v. State, 537 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1989); Morgan v. State, 453 So. 2d 394
(Fla. 1984); Morgan v. State, 392 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981). The Supreme Court of Florida
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Juries in Florida have recommended the death penalty six times over the last
twenty-five years for sixteen-year-old offenders, including Brennan, but the
Supreme Court of Florida has vacated the sentence each time on
technicalities having nothing to do with the defendant's age thereby
preventing the executions from being carried out.215 Finally, it is unclear
why, under the standard adopted by the court, it is not unconstitutional to
execute all offenders under the age of twenty.216
It is apparent that there is more than one standard that may be applied to
determine whether punishment is cruel or unusual. However, to maintain the
doctrine of stare decisis it is the court's duty to develop the most sensible
and most fair standard and apply it consistently.217
Andrew F. Garofalo
vacated Morgan's death sentence four times, Farina's death sentence once, and Brennan's
once after the juries had recommended the death penalty.
215. IL
216. See supra text accompanying notes 148 & 198.
217. See supra text accompanying note 208.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 1995, Governor Lawton Chiles signed Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 168 into law, creating chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida!
Sections two through seven of chapter 95-182 are identified as the "Officer
Evelyn Gort and All Fallen Officers Career Criminal Act of 1995" ("Gort
Act").2 The Gort Act's namesake, Metro-Dade police officer Evelyn Gort
was shot and killed by an armed robber in Coconut Grove, Florida in 1993.
Her assailant, twenty-two year old Wilbur Leroy Mitchell, was a career
criminal with several prior felony convictions.4 State senators, prompted by
Gort's death and responding to the elevated number of crimes committed in
1. S. 168, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995), reprinted in 29 FINAL LEGISLATWE BILL
INFORMATION, at 44 [hereinafter S. 168].
2. Ch. 95-182, § 1, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1665.
3. Florida Legislature, Career Criminal Bill Merits Support, SUN-SETINTL (Fort
Lauderdale), Feb. 19, 1995, at 6G.
4. Id.
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Florida by career criminals,5 introduced the Gort Act as Senate Bill 168.6
The bill was initiated during the 1995 Regular Legislative Session as part of
a comprehensive four-bill crime package.
The Gort Act contains six sections. Section one of chapter 95-182
identifies sections two through seven as the "Officer Evelyn Gort and All
Fallen Officers Career Criminal Act of 1995. ''8 Section two is the heart of
the Gort Act. Section two amends section 775.084 of the Florida Statutes,
which provides enhanced penalties for habitual felony offenders and habitual
violent felony offenders.9 It creates a violent career criminal classification
and establishes enhanced sentencing guidelines for qualifying offenders.'0
The act mandates minimum prison terms for violent career criminals and
requires them to serve at least eighty-five percent of their court-imposed
sentences." It expressly prohibits discretionary early release for violent
career criminals and limits the amount of gain time awards they are eligible
to receive.
12
Section two also establishes the qualifications for sentencing as a
"violent career criminal." 13 First, a defendant must have three prior felony
convictions in Florida as an adult. 4  Qualified offenses enumerated in
section two include any forcible felony and felonies involving violence or
threats of violence such as aggravated stalking and aggravated child abuse.'
5
Convictions that have been set aside by any postconviction proceeding or
pardon are not considered.' 6 Second, a defendant's present felony offense
must be one of the felonies enumerated in section two. 1 Third, a defendant
5. See ch. 95-182, § 4, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1671 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
775.0841 (1995)); STAFF OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., FINAL BILL
ANALYSIS & ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. CS/CS/HB 461 & 1885, & COMPANION
BILL CS/SB 168 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter ANALYSIS CS/CS/HB 461 & 1885, &
CS/SB 1681.
6. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-182.
7. Michael Griffin, Senate Gets Tough on Crime, Package Meant to Force Longer
Prison Sentences, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 9, 1995, at 1A.
8. Ch. 95-182, § 1, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1665.
9. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1665-70 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1995)).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1670 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084(4)j)2. (1995)).
12. Id.
13. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
775.084(l)(c) (1995)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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must have been incarcerated in a state or federal prison.18 Fourth, the
defendant must have committed the present felony offense "within 5 years
after the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony or within 5 years
after the defendant's release... from a prison sentence.., imposed as a
result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later."
19
Finally, the defendant must have committed the current felony offense after
October 1, 1995, the effective date of chapter 95-182.
20
Section three of the Gort Act amends section 775.08401 of the Florida
Statutes by requiring state attorneys to adopt uniform criteria for deciding
when to pursue the habitual felony offender, habitual violent felony
offender, and violent career criminal sanctions. Section four amends
section 775.0841, which states legislative findings and intent regarding
career criminals.2 Section five amends section 775.0842 of the Florida
Statutes, which identifies "[p]ersons subject to career criminal prosecution
efforts."2 Section six amends section 775.0843 of the Florida Statutes,
which requires criminal justice agencies to "employ enhanced law
enforcement management efforts and resources for the investigation,
apprehension, and prosecution of career criminals."24 Section seven creates
section 790.235 of the Florida Statutes, making it illegal for violent career
criminals to own or possess firearms.25 Section seven imposes a minimum
sentence of fifteen years imprisonment for individuals convicted of violating
the section.
26
Following certification to the House of Representatives, committee
members in the House amended Senate Bill 168 by adding three sections
27addressing domestic violence. The amendments became sections eight
through ten of chapter 95-182. Section eight amends section 741.31 of the
Florida Statutes, allowing an award of damages for "[a]ny person who
suffers an injury and/or loss as a result of a violation of an injunction for
protection against domestic violence. ' ' Section nine creates section 768.35,
18. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
775.084(1)(c)2. (1995)).
19. Id. § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084(1)(c)3. (1995)).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 3, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1670-71 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.08401 (1995)).
22. Id. § 4, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1671 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.0841 (1995)).
23. Ch. 95-182, § 5, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1671 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.0842
(1995)).
24. Id. § 6, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1671-73 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.0843 (1995)).
25. Id. § 7, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1673 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 790.235 (1995)).
26. Id.
27. ANALYSIS CS/CS/HB 461 & 1885, & CS/SB 168, supra note 5.
28. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-74 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
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granting victims of continuing domestic violence a cause of action against
the perpetrator for compensatory and punitive damages.29  Section ten
amends section 784.046 of the Florida Statutes, which establishes the
procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of injunctions for
protection against repeat violence. 30 It enlarges the duties of the clerk of the
court, updates the guidelines for transmission of related information among
law enforcement agencies, restricts the authority to serve or execute
injunctions for protection against domestic violence to specified law
enforcement officers, and enables courts to utilize criminal contempt
proceedings to enforce injunctions for protection against repeat violence.3'
The House amendments are the source of the current constitutional challenge
raised against chapter 95-182.32
The Second and Third District Courts of Appeal of Florida are split
over the constitutionality of chapter 95-182.33 The question raised before the
courts was whether chapter 95-182 violates Article III, section six of the
Florida Constitution, commonly known as the single subject matter rule.34 In
Thompson v. State,35 the Second District Court of Appeal held that chapter
95-182 violates the single subject matter rule, reasoning that the career
criminal and domestic violence provisions of the act constitute two
subjects.36 The court relied on the Supreme Court of Florida's decisions in
Bunnell v. State,37 State v. Johnson, and Burch v. State39 in reaching its
29. Id. § 9, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.35 (1995)).
30. Id. § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674-75 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
31. Id.
32. See Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
33. Id.; Spann v. State, 719 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
34. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316; Spann, 718 So. 2d at 1031.
35. 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
36. Id. at 317. Recently, a nearly identical issue was presented before the First
District Court of Appeal in Trapp v. State. 736 So. 2d. 736 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Trapp involved a single subject challenge to chapter 95-184 of the Laws of Florida. Id. at
737. Similar to chapter 95-182, sections two through 35 of chapter 95-184 address career
criminal sentencing. Id. at 737-38. Sections 36 through 38 of chapter 95-184 are identical to
sections eight through 10 of chapter 95-182. Compare ch. 95-184, §§ 36-38, 1995 Fla. Laws
1676, 1722-24 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046 (1995)), with ch. 95-182,
88 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-75 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046
(1995)). As in Thompson, the First District Court of Appeal determined that the act
"combine[d] criminal penalties with civil remedies." Trapp, 736 So. 2d at 737. However, the
court declined to follow Thompson. See id. at 738-39. Instead, it upheld chapter 95-184
under the controlling authority of Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990), reasoning that
"[a]ll portions of the legislation... deal[t] with remedies for acts which constitute
crimes." Id. at 738. However, the court speculated that the creation of the act may have
involved logrolling and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida. Id. at 739.
37. 453 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984).
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decision.40 The Third District disagreed and in Spann v. State41 upheld
chapter 95-182, rejecting a single subject matter challenge.42 Both courts
acknowledged the conflict.43  The Supreme Court of Florida granted
review.
This comment examines the Second District Court of Appeal's decision
in Thompson.45 Part 11 of this comment illustrates the issue presented in
Thompson, providing background on Article III, section six of the Florida
Constitution. Part III presents the facts of the case, its procedural history,
and the court's holding. Part IV scrutinizes the court's decision.
This comment disagrees with the court's holding for four reasons. First,
the Gort Act relates to the domestic violence provisions in chapter 95-182 by
listing aggravated stalking as a qualified offense for sentencing as a violent
career criminal and habitual violent felony offender. Second, the Thompson
court erroneously characterized the Gort Act as a criminal subject and the
domestic violence provisions as an unrelated civil subject. Third, the chapter
laws invalidated in Bunnell and Johnson are distinguishable from chapter 95-
182. The court also incorrectly distinguished Burch and ignored precedent
supporting a conclusion of constitutionality. Fourth, the legislative history of
the act does not indicate the presence of "logrolling," the legislative practice
sought to be eliminated by the single subject matter rule.
I1. THE SINGLE SUBJECT MATrER RULE
Article 1, section six of the Florida Constitution states, "[e]very law
shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and
38. 616 So. 2d I (Fla. 1993).
39. 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990).
40. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
41. 719 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
42. Id. at 1031, per curiam (relying on Higgs v. State, 695 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997)).
43. See id.; Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
44. See State v. Thompson, 717 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1998). The Florida Constitution
requires the supreme court to hear appeals from decisions of courts of appeal "declaring invalid a
state statute or a provision of the state constitution." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1). It grants the
supreme court discretionary authority to hear decisions of courts of appeal "that expressly and
directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the
same question of law," or decisions "that [are] certified by [a district court of appeal] to be in
direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3),
(4).
45. 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1998).
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the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."46 Many state constitutions
have similar provisions limiting statutes to a single subect and requiring the
title of a legislative enactment to disclose its subject. The single subject
rule is designed to prevent "the evils of all-inclusive, incongruous, and
disconnected legislation." 48  In State v. Canova,49 the Supreme Court of
Florida identified three specific objectives of the single subject matter rule.5
First, the rule prevents "log rolling legislation." 51 Logrolling is a practice
whereby the legislature combines in one bill several unrelated matters that
individually could not garner legislative support.52  The legislature then
procures the bill's passage by combining the "minorities in favor of each of
the measures into a majority that will adopt them all."53 Second, the rule
prevents fraud and surprise through the careless and unintentional adoption
of provisions in a bill not broached by its title.54 Third, the single subject
matter rule affords the public notice of an act's contents and an opportunity
to be heard thereon.5
Article III, section six only applies to chapter laws. 6 Chapter laws are
acts of the legislature not yet officially published as part of the Florida
Statutes.57 Chapter laws are added to the existing body of state law under
the state's continuous statutory revision program. Acts of the legislature,
signed into law are initially printed as session laws, which are bound and
published as the Laws of Florida.5 9 Following each odd-year legislative
46. FLA. CONST. art III, § 6. The single subject rule contained in article HI, section 16
of the 1885 Florida Constitution is nearly identical to that of the current 1968 Florida
Constitution. Compare FLA. CONST. of 1885, art III, § 16, with FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 6. The
former provision read, "Each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one subject and
matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."
FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 16.
47. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art IV, § 45; MO. CONST. art III, § 23; Oaio CONST. art II,
§ 15(D); OR. CONST. art IV, § 20.
48. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 212 (1955).
49. 94 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1957).
50. Id. at 184.
51. Id.
52. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 212 (1955).
53. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990).
54. See State v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 1957).
55. See id.
56. See State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1993).
57. See generally Sandra M. Anderson, Revising: The Process of Statutory Revision
in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1427 (1978) (discussing the importance of statutory revision
in the legislative process).
58. Id. at 1430.
59. Id.
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session, session laws are biennially adopted as part of the Florida Statutes.6°
Once enacted as part of the statute law of the state, "a chapter law is no longer
subject to challenge on the grounds that it violates the single subject
requirement of article Ill, section 6, of the Florida Constitution."61 Therefore,
an individual has standing to raise a single subject matter challenge to a
chapter law if the violation occurred after the law's effective date and before
the date of its reenactment as part of the Florida Statutes.62
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state charged Carol Leigh Thompson with "robbery with a firearm,
a first-degree felony punishable by life, aggravated battery of a victim over
the age of sixty-five, a first-degree felony, and felon in possession of a
firearm, a second-degree felony." 63 All charges are qualified offenses for
sentencing under the Gort Act. The state notified Thompson that it would
prosecute her as a "'habitual felony/habitual violent felony offender/violent
career criminal."' 65  Thompson moved to "preclude her sentencing as a
violent career criminal and to declare unconstitutional chapter 95-182, Laws
of Florida."' ' The trial court denied Thompson's motion.67 Thompson
"entered pleas of no contest to each offense, reserving her right to appeal• ,,68
that denial. The trial court concluded that Thompson was a violent career
criminal and sentenced her pursuant to the Gort Act.
69
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed Thompson's
sentence and declared chapter 95-182 repugnant to Article ll, section six of, • • 70
Florida's Constitution. In its opinion, the court identified two distinct
60. See FLA. STAT. § 11.2421 (1999). Supplements to the Florida Statutes are
published following each regular even year legislative session. 49 FLA. JuR. 2d Statutes § 2
(1984). The supplements contain "the full text of each section amended during that session,
together with the catchlines of sections repealed." Id.
61. Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 2.
62. Id. at3.
63. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 1998).
64. Ch. 95-168, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084
(1995)).
65. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316.
66. Id. Thompson had standing to bring a single subject matter rule challenge to
chapter 95-182. Thompson's offense occurred after October 1, 1995, the act's effective date,
and prior to its reenactment as part of the Florida Statutes on May 24, 1997. See ch. 97-97, §
1, 1997 Fla. Laws 622, 622 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.2421 (1997)).
67. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316.
68. Id.
69. Id. The court sentenced Thompson "to life imprisonment on counts one and two
and to forty years with a thirty-year-minimum mandatory on count three." Id.
70. Id.
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subjects in chapter 95-182--one criminal and one civil.7' According to the
court, the first subject, embodied in sections two through seven, "create[s]
and define[s] the violent career criminal sentencing category and provide[s]
sentencing procedures and penalties. 72 The second subject, contained in
sections eight through ten, addresses "civil aspects of domestic violence. 73
To support its reasoning, the court presented a simplified history of Senate
Bill 168, noting that the Gort Act began as a single bill in the Senate while
sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 originated as three separate bills
in the House of Representatives. 74  These three House bills died in
committee.75  Language from these three bills was engrafted onto two
76separate House bills, one being Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 168.
According to the court, "[i]t is in circumstances such as these that problems
with the single subject rule are most likely to occur. ' 77
The court analogizes the combination of provisions contained in chapter
95-182 to chapter laws struck down by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Johnson and Bunnell.78 In both cases, the court invalidated chapter laws for
violating Article Im, section six of the Florida Constitution. 79 The Thompson
opinion implies that the chapter laws invalidated in Johnson and Bunnell
were struck down because they impermissibly combined criminal and civilI. 80provisions. Concluding that chapter 95-182 impermissibly combines civil
and criminal subjects, the court invalidated it based on the Johnson and
Bunnell holdings. The court resolved that the provisions of chapter 95-182
had "no 'natural or logical connection. ' '8 2 According to the court:
Nothing in sections 2 through 7 addresses any facet of domestic
violence and, more particularly, any civil aspect of that subject.
71. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
72. Id. at 316.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 317.
76. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317. The language from these House bills was also
engrafted onto Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 172, which became chapter 95-184. See
1995 Fla. Laws cl. 95-184. Chapter 95-182 and chapter 95-184 contain identical domestic
violence provisions. Compare ch. 95-182, §§ 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-75 (codified
at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046(9) (1995)), with ch. 95-184, §§ 36-38, 1995 Fla.
Laws 1676, 1722-24 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046 (1995)). See Trapp
v. State, 736 So. 2d 736,737-38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
77. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
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Nothing in sections 8 through 10 addresses the subject of career
criminals or the sentences to be imposed upon them. It is fair to
say that these two subjects "are designed to accomplish separate
and dissociated objects of legislative effort."8 3
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Construction of the Single Subject Matter Rule
The single subject matter rule is the source of numerous constitutional
challenges to chapter laws. The difficulty facing the courts when presented
with single subject challenges is determining what exactly constitutes a
single subject. This task is complicated by the reality that bills passed by the
legislature contain numerous provisions, the result of complex transactions
and tradeoffs that result in compromised legislation.84 In response, the
courts have developed a framework within which single subject challenges
to chapter laws are examined.
As noted, Article Ell, section six of the Florida Constitution requires
that "[e]very law.., embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."85 Courts
afford the legislature great deference when enacting laws,86 and will resolve
every reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality.8 7 The courts will not
declare an act unconstitutional unless it is invalid beyond a reasonable
doubt.88 Nevertheless, the courts continually reiterate that the provisions of
an act must have a "natural or logical connection" in order to pass
constitutional muster.8 9 In Canova, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
the provisions of an act must be "fairly and naturally germane" to its
subject.90 An act's provisions must be "necessary incidents to or tend to
make effective or promote the objects and purposes of legislation included in
the subject."91  Courts state that the provisions of an act must not
83. Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 163 So. 270, 283 (Fla. 1935)).
84. Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutues in the
Shade, 82 COLUM. L. Rv. 1752, 1763 (1982) (reviewing GUIDo CALABRsL A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATLFI'ES (1982)).
85. FLA. CONST. art III, § 6.
86. See, e.g., Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1990).
87. See, e.g., State v. Kinner, 398 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1981).
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1172 (Fla. 1991).
90. State v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 1957).
91. Id.
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"accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort., 92 This
test is based on "common sense."
93
Acts of the legislature are said to have subjects and objects. 94 In
Spencer v. Hunt,95 the Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the two
concepts as follows:
The "subject" of an act is the matter to which it relates; the
"object" is its general purpose. Although the two terms are held to
be equivalent by some authorities, the better view is that the word
"subject" is a broader term than the word "object," as one subject
• • 96
may contain many objects.
In Board of Public Instruction v. Doran,97 the Supreme Court of Florida
established that "[t]he term 'subject of an act' . . . means the matter which
forms the groundwork of the act and it may be as broad as the Legislature
chooses as long as the matters included in the act have a natural or logical,,98
connection. This is a crucial distinction as Article I, section six requires
laws to be singular in subject, not object. The single subject rule does not
prohibit a statute from containing many provisions, nor does it require the
embodiment of every thought of the legislature in a different statute.99 An
examination of chapter 95-182 within this context reveals that all of its
provisions naturally and logically relate to the single subject of repeated
criminality. 1°°
B. The Sections of Chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida
The Second District Court of Appeal's holding is partially based on its
deduction that nothing in the Gort Act, which is comprised of sections two
through seven of chapter 95-182, "addresses any facet of domestic
violence."10' However, the court's deduction is inaccurate. In actuality, the
92. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
93. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987).
94. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 217 (1955).
95. 147 So. 282 (Fla. 1933).
96. Id. at 284 (citing Exparte Heman, 77 S.W. 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903)).
97. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
98. Id. at 699.
99. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 218 (1955).
100. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 3, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643
(Fla. 1999) (No. 92-83 1).
101. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 1998).
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Gort Act does address a facet of domestic violence-aggravated stalking. 02
The act addresses aggravated stalking on two occasions. First, section two
of chapter 95-182 lists "[a]ggravated stalking, as described in s. 784.048(3)
and (4)" of the Florida Statutes as a qualified offense for sentencing as a
violent career criminal. 103 Second, section two amends section 775.084 of
the Florida Statutes by adding aggravated stalkin as a qualified offense for
sentencing as a habitual violent felony 
offender.g
Section 784.048(4) of the Florida Statutes defines the crime of
aggravated stalking as follows:
Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat
violence pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection
against domestic violence pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other
court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person or
that person's property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense
of aggravated stalking .... 105
The definition of aggravated stalking includes conduct occurring after
violation of an injunction for protection against domestic violence.lub The
title of section eight of chapter 95-182, which created section 741.31 of the
Florida Statutes, is a "[v]iolation of an injunction for protection against
domestic violence.9' 7  It enables domestic violence victims to secure
damages for injuries resulting from breach of an injunction. 108  The
definition of aggravated stalking in section 784.048(4) of the Florida
Statutes also includes conduct occurring after a violation of an injunction for
102. Brief of Appellee at 1, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (No. 96-02517). The argument that aggravated stalking connects the various sections of
chapter 95-182 was the foundation for the state's case in the Second District Court of Appeal
of Florida. Id. The state presented this same argument before the Third District Court of
Appeal in Higgs v. State, which upheld the constitutionality of chapter 95-182. Id. at 2; Higgs
v. State, 695 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997). In its Initial Brief on the Merits in
the Supreme Court of Florida, the State incorporated this argument as part of its analysis of
the sections of chapter 95-182. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 16, State v.
Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999) (No. 92-831).
103. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1667 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.084
(1995)).
104. Id.
105. FA. STAT. § 784.048 (1999) (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
108. Id.
2000]
142
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
protection against repeat violence. 1' 9 Section ten of chapter 95-182 governs
the issuance and enforcement of injunctions for protection against repeat
violence. 110 Thus, sections eight and ten of chapter 95-182 relate to the
crime of aggravated stalking. Collectively, sections eight through ten of
chapter 95-182 relate to the crime of aggravated stalking because the
definition of domestic violence, which is contained in section 741.28(1) of
the Florida Statutes, specifically lists aggravated stalking as a qualifying
offense."'
When chapter 95-182 amended section 775.084 of the Florida Statutes,
it listed aggravated stalking as a qualified offense for sentencing as a violent
career criminal and added aggravated stalking as a qualifying offense for
sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender.!12 Thus, the legislature's
inclusion of aggravated stalking as a qualifying offense for both violent
career criminals and habitual violent felony offenders connects the Gort Act
to sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182.113
The Thompson court identified two distinct subjects in chapter 95-
182-one criminal and one civil. 114 According to the court, sections one
through seven "create and define the violent career criminal sentencing
category and provide sentencing procedures and penalties."" 5  The court
held that sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 address "civil aspects
of domestic violence." 6 Based on its characterization of these provisions as
"civil" and "criminal," the court concluded that they have no natural or
logical connection." 7 However, the court's description of sections eight
through ten is inaccurate. They are criminal statutes.
Sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 address various aspects of
domestic violence.1 8  Section 741.28(1) of the Florida Statutes defines
domestic violence as "any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated
battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking,
kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical
109. FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (1999).
110. Ch. 95-182, § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046
(1995)).
111. FLA. STAT. § 741.28(1) (1999).
112. Ch. 95-182, § 2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1666-67 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 785.084
(1995)).
113. Brief for Appellee at 1, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1998) (No. 96-
02517).
114. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
115. Id. at 316.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 317.
118. Ch. 95-182, §§ 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673-74 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 741.31, 768.35, 784.046 (1995)).
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injury or death of one family or household member by another who is or was
residing in the same dwelling unit." 119 The Florida Statutes identify each
offense enumerated in section 741.28 as either a felony or misdemeanor.'2
Felonies and misdemeanors are crimes. Likewise, domestic violence, which
may encompass any one or a combination of these offenses, is also a crime.
In addition, the legislature expressly stated "that domestic violence [should]
be treated as a criminal act rather than a private matter."'121 Despite the
court's characterization, sections eight through ten clearly have a criminal
orientation.
Sections eight through ten of chapter 95-182 provide restitution for
victims of repeat criminal behavior.12 Restitution is a remedy designed to
compensate a victim for damage or loss caused by a defendant's criminal
offense.'13 Restitution is statutory and may come from the state in the form
of governmental assistance to innocent victims of crime, or directly from the
responsible perpetrator.124
In Spivey v. State z5 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
purposes of restitution are "to compensate the victim, [and] ... serve the
rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the criminal justice
system."' 6 The court stated that "restitution is a criminal sanction."12 7
Damages awarded to individuals injured as a result of a breach of an
injunction against repeat violence, and compensatory and punitive damages
awarded for injuries resulting from continuing domestic violence, clearly
may be characterized as restitution since they require "the convicted
defendant [toj'pay' for [his] crime by making financial compensation to the
victim ....
All the sections of chapter 95-182 relate to the single subject of repeat
criminal behavior. It is clear that the Gort Act is an attempt to abate
recidivism since habitual felony offenders and violent career criminals are
by definition repeat criminals. Conceivably, the threat of longer
incarceration will dissuade many from a return to crime. The domestic
violence provisions of chapter 95-182 also are an attempt by the legislature
119. FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (1999).
120. Id. §§ 784.01, .011, .02, .021, .03, .045, .048.
121. Id. § 741.2901(2).
122. Petitioner's Initial Brief on the Merits at 13, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643
(Fla. 1999) (No. 92-831).
123. 15 FLA. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 2754 (1993).
124. Id. § 2740.
125. 531 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1988).
126. Id. at 967.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. GERALD D. ROBIN, INTRODUCION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: PRINCIPLEs,
PROCEDURE, PRACrICE 604 (2d ed. 1984).
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to dissuade repeated criminality. A repeater is a person who "commit[s]
crime and [is] sentenced, and then commit[s] another and [is] sentenced
again. 129 Under Florida law, any family or household member who is the
victim of domestic violence has standing to file a petition for an injunction. .. .. 130
for protection against domestic violence against the perpetrator. Domestic
violence is a crime. 131 When the perpetrator breaches that injunction, he
commits a misdemeanor of the first degree. 132 Misdemeanors are crimes.
133
Thus, one who breaches a protective injunction is a repeater since he
committed the crime warranting the injunction, and then committed a second
crime by breaching the injunction. Section eight of chapter 95-182 is an
attempt to abate such breaches, and in turn control repeat criminality through
the deterrent effect of restitution. 34 Likewise, section nine attempts to
prevent repeated incidents of domestic violence by providing damages to
victims "who [have] suffered repeated physical or psychological injuries
over an extended period of time....,,135 Section ten endeavors to control
repeated criminality by enabling the courts to utilize criminal contempt
proceedings to force compliance with injunctions for protection against
repeat violence.1
36
C. The Applicability of Bunnell v. State and State v. Johnson
Once one identifies an act's subject, the court must find a natural and
logical relationship between the act's components. The Thompson court
relied on Bunnell and Johnson to invalidate chapter 95-182.137 However, the
chapter laws voided by the Supreme Court of Florida in Bunnell and Johnson
are distinguishable from chapter 95-182.
Bunnell presented a challenge to chapter 82-150. '8 Section one of
chapter 82-150 created the crime of obstruction of justice by knowingly
giving false identification to a law enforcement officer.139 Sections two and
three of the act changed and reduced the membership of the Florida Council
129. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990).
130. FLA. STAT. § 741.30(1)(a) (1999).
131. Id. § 741.2901(2).
132. Id. § 741.31(4)(a).
133. Id. § 775.08(4).
134. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
135. Id. § 9, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.35 (1995))
(emphasis added).
136. Id. § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
137. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1998).
138. Bunnell v. State, 453 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 1994).
139. Id.
[Vol. 24:883
145
: Nova Law Review 24, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2000
Kopas
on Criminal Justice. 14 The Bunnell court invalidated chapter 82-150
reasoning that "the subject of section 1 has no cogent relationship with the
subject of sections 2 and 3 and that the object of section 1 is separate and
disassociated from the object of sections 2 and 3.'141
Chapter 95-182 differs significantly from chapter 82-150. Chapter 95-
182 has a single subject-repeated criminality.1  Sections two through
seven are designed to control criminal behavior through the embellishment
of criminal penalties. 143  Sections eight through ten attempt to abate
recidivism through the retributive and restitutional qualities of civil damage
remedies. 144 In contrast, the provisions of chapter 82-150 were attenuated.
Section one of chapter 82-150 was a prototypical criminal provision
designed to subordinate criminal behavior and expedite criminal
investigations. However, sections two and three of chapter 82-150 could be
described best as managerial or governmental. These sections are quite
clearly designed to accomplish completely different objects of legislative
effort. Adjusting the membership of a bureaucratic agency could impact
criminal behavior in only a superficial way.
Likewise, the chapter law invalidated by the Supreme Court of Florida
in Johnson is distinguishable from chapter 95-182. Johnson involved a
challenge to chapter 89-280.146 The first three sections of the act amended
sections 775.084, 775.0842, and 775.0843 of the Florida Statutes pertaining
to "habitual felony offenders," "career criminal prosecutions," and "policies
for career criminal cases.''V However, "[s]ections four through eleven of
the act pertain[ed] to the Chapter 493 provisions governing private
investigation and patrol services, specifically, repossession of motor vehicles
and motorboats."' The court held that the provisions of chapter 89-280 had
no cogent relationship, rejecting the state's argument that the two provisions
140. Id.
141. Id. The rationale of Bunnell is somewhat flawed. The court identified two
distinct subjects in chapter 82-150, then concluded that that the two subjects have no cogent
relationship. Id. However, since Florida's constitution mandates every law to be singular in
subject, a law with two subjects would be per se unconstitutional. Thus, once the court
reasoned that the act had two subjects, it was superfluous to determine their relationship.
142. Bunnell, 453 So. 2d at 809.
143. See ch. 95-182, §§ 2-7, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1665-73 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
775.084, .08401, .0841, .0842, .0843, 790.235 (1995)).
144. See id. §§ 8-10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1673-74 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 741.31,
768.35, 784.046 (1995)).
145. See Johnson v. State, 616 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1993).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id.
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relate to the broad subject of crime control.149 According to the court, the
,150
act "addresses two very separate and distinct subjects."
Unlike the provisions in chapter 89-280, the provisions in chapter 95-
182 have a natural and logical relationship. The inclusion of aggravated
stalking as a qualified offense for sentencing as a violent career criminal and
habitual felony offender links the Gort Act to sections two through ten of
chapter 95-182."l The definition of aggravated stalking includes conduct
occurring after violations of injunctions for protection against domestic
violence and repeat violence. 52 Section eight of chapter 95-182 allows
domestic violence victims to secure damages for injuries resulting from a
violation of a domestic violence injunction. 5 3  Section ten amends the
procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of injunctions for
protection against repeat violence. 54 Collectively, the domestic violence
provisions of chapter 95-182 relate to the Gort Act because all are efforts to
control repeat criminal behavior.' 55  All sections of chapter 95-182 are
necessary incidents to and promote the aim of controlling repeat criminal
behavior. 56 In sharp contrast, the provisions of chapter 89-280 have no
relationship other than a scant association with crime control.1 7 As the
Johnson court noted, "[n]o reasonable explanation exists as to why the
legislature chose to join these two subjects within the same legislative
act."
158
D. Burch v. State and the Wide Latitude Afforded the Legislature by the
Courts in the Enactment of Laws
In Burch v. State, 59 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld chapter 87-
243 of the Laws of Florida against a single subject attack. Chapter 87-243
was a comprehensive piece of crime control legislation. In all, the act
contained seventy-six sections, amending, creating, and repealing over
149. Id.
150. Johnson, 616 So. 2d at 4.
151. Brief of Appellee at 1, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (No. 96-02517).
152. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(4) (1999).
153. Ch. 95-182, § 8, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1673 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.31
(1995)).
154. Id. § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws at 1674 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
155. See 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-182.
156. Id.
157. 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-280.
158. Johnson v. State, 616 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1993).
159. 558 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1990).
160. Id. at 3.
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seventy Florida statutes.161 The act addressed an array of topics including
standards and schedules of controlled substances, abatement of nuisances,
aircraft registration practices, improvement districts and enterprise zones,
safe neighborhoods drug testing, and drug abuse education in primary and
secondary schools.162 The court held that each area "bear[s] a logical
relationship to the single subject of controlling crime .... , 63 6
The Thompson court distinguished the chapter law upheld in Burch.1
The court noted that chapter 87-243 had an extensive preamble in which the
legislature detailed the purpose of the act and explained the relationship
between its parts.165 According to the preamble, the legislature drafted
chapter 87-243 as an "urgent and creative remedial action" to combat a
crime rate crisis. 166 The legislature stated that it enacted a comprehensive
law in order to avoid fragmented, duplicative legislation. 167 The courts apply
the single subject matter rule less stringently to comprehensive legislation
provided an act combats a stated crisis and the legislature explains the
relationship between its parts. 168  Comparing Burch, the Thompson court
seems to fault chapter 95-182 for not having an explanatory opening
statement. 169 However, chapter 95-182 is not comprehensive legislation like
that in Burch. Comprehensive means "including much, comprising many
things, having a wide scope, [and] inclusive."1 0- Chapter 95-182 does not
address an expansive subject like crime control. It is relatively narrow
legislation designed to abate recidivist criminal behavior through increased
criminal penalties and civil remedies. No explanatory preamble is necessary
to explain the natural and logical relationship between multifarious
provisions.
"Prior comprehensive enactments by the legislature demonstrate that
widely divergent rights and requirements can be included without challenge
161. 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-243.
162. Id.
163. Burch, 558 So. 2d at 3.
164. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
165. See id.
166. 1987 Fla. Laws ch. 87-243.
167. Id.
168. Cf. State v. Leavins, 599 So. 2d 1326, 1334 (Fla. 1992). In State v. Leavins, the
codrt invalidated chapter 89-187 of the Laws of Florida on the ground that it violated the
single subject rule. Id. at 1335. The court identified 22 subjects in the act ranging from gas
lease regulation, hunting stamp fees, oyster licenses, and license plate taxes. Id. at 1333-34.
The court rejected the state's argument that the provisions of the act related to the general
topic of environmental resources. Id. at 1334. "[Sluch a finding would not, and should not,
satisfy the test" under the single subject rule. Id. at 1335.
169. See Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 317.
170. 8 WoRDs AN) PHRAsEs 444 (1951).
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in statutes covering a single subject."'171 On numerous occasions the courts
have rejected single subject challenges to chapter laws containing diverse
provisions. In Smith v. Department of Insurance,172 the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld the 1986 Tort Reform and Insurance Act against a single
subject challenge. 7 3 The court identified five discrete parts to the act.174 The
legislation included copious long term insurance and tort reforms, and
temporary insurance reforms. 175 It also created an insurance law and tort
reform task force, and 'modifie[d] [the] financial responsibility requirements
applicable to physicians. ' 176 The court rejected the appellee's contention
that the act impermissibly combined civil litigation and tort reform.7 The
court held that civil litigation and tort reform have a natural and logical
relationship to the legislature's express objective of making low cost liability
insurance available.17
In State v. Lee, 179 the Supreme Court of Florida held that a
comprehensive chapter law did not violate the single subject rule because it
reformed tort laws, automobile insurance laws, and assessed additional fines
for various traffic offenses.18 The court stated that the single subject rule
"is not designed to deter or impede legislation by requiring laws to be
unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation.' In Chenoweth v.
Kemp,1 82 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld chapter 76-260 against a
single subject challenge. Chapter 76-260 "covers a broad range of
statutory provisions dealing with medical malpractice and insurance ....,.184
The court summarily upheld the law, stating that tort litigation and insurance
reform have a natural and logical connection.
185
171. State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276, 282-83 (Fla. 1978).
172. 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
173. Id. at 1083.
174. Id. at 1085-87.
175. Id. at 1085.
176. Id. at 1086.
177. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1087.
178. Id.
179. 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978).
180. Id. at 282.
181. Id.
182. 396 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1981).
183. Id. at 1124.
184. Id.
185. Id. Chief Justice Sundberg criticized the Chenoweth majority. Id. at 1126-27.
Sundberg characterized chapter 76-260 as a "haphazardly formulated and disjointed" piece of
legislation "ranging over almost the entire insurance field." Chenoweth, 396 So. 2d at 1124.
According to Sundberg, if chapter 76-260 "passes constitutional muster, one is hard put to
envision a chapter which would not." Id. at 1127. Nevertheless, the courts consistently cite
Chenoweth with approval. See Burch v. State, 558 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1990); Smith v.
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The provisions contained in chapter 95-182 are nowhere near as
extensive as those in Burch, Smith, Lee, and Chenoweth. The court in each
case reiterated and reaffirmed the proposition established by Board of Public
Instruction v. Doran186 that an act "may be as broad as the Legislature
chooses provided the matters included in the law have a natural and logical
connection." 187 Each decision is highly illustrative of the great deference
afforded the legislature by the judiciary.
E. The Legislative History of Chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida
When faced with a single subject matter challenge to a legislative act,
Florida courts often will examine its legislative history. In this context,
legislative history means the "history of the evolution" of the statute. As a
general rule, courts may properly look to legislative history where statutes
are challenged "because the object to be accomplished is prohibited or a
prohibited route is selected to reach a permissive destination."190
The Gort Act was introduced in the Senate on March 7, 1995 as Senate
Bill 168.191 The Senate certified the bill to the House on March 8, 1995,
where it entered containing only the Gort Act provisions. 192 As stated
previously, House members amended the bill by adding three sections
addressing domestic violence. 93 These amendments became sections eight
through ten of chapter 95-182. The language in sections eight through ten
originated in three separate House bills: House Bill 1251, House Bill 1789,
and House Bill 2513. But all three bills died in committee. 94  The
Thompson court opined that the legislative history of Senate Bill 168
Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1085 (Fla. 1987); State v. Leavins, 599 So. 2d 1326,
1334 (Fla. 1st Dist, Ct. App. 1992).
186. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
187. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276, 282 (Fla. 1978).
188. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1998).
189. 73 AM. JuR. 2D Statutes § 150 (1974).
190. Id.
191. S. 168, supra note 1.
192. Brief for Appellee at 9, Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1998) (No. 96-
02517).
193. S. 168, supra note 1.
194. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON JUDICIARY FINAL BILL ANALYSIS & ECON.
IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. PCS/HB 1251 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter ANALYSIS
PCS/HB 1251]; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON JuDIcIARY FINAL BILL ANALYSIS &
ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. PCS/HB 1789 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter
ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1789]; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS REVISED BY THE COMM. ON AGING
& HUMAN SERVIcEs FINAL BILL ANALYSIS & ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT ON BILL No. HB 2513
(Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter ANALYsIs HB 2513].
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indicates the presence of logrolling.195  Thompson asserted that the
legislature "took advantage of the popular public furor [surrounding Gort's
death] to slip... pet bills into" Senate Bill 168.196 However, the legislative
history presented by the Thompson court to support its conclusion is
oversimplified. The complete legislative history of chapter 95-182 discounts
the inference of the presence of logrolling.
The Final Bill Analysis of House Bill 1251 indicates that it contained
six sections.197  The bill amended sections 741.29 and 741.2902 of the
Florida Statutes by inserting legislative intent regarding services for victims
of domestic violence and requiring courts to consider making perpetrators
attend batterers intervention programs 98 Section three of House Bill 1251
amended section 741.30 of the Florida Statutes, enlarging the duties of the
clerk of the court with respect to protective injunctions, and authorizing
certain law enforcement officers to serve those injunctions.' 9 Section four
of House Bill 1251 amended section 741.30 of the Florida Statutes by
enlarging the offense of violation of an injunction for protection against
domestic violence to include contacting the victim by telephone, and going
to the victim's home, school, or place of employment. 2 W Section five of the
bill amended section 784.046 of the Florida Statutes.201 Similar to section
three, section five enlarged the duties of the clerk of the court and law
enforcement officers with respect to protective injunctions. Section six of
House Bill 1251 provided the effective date.202
Of House Bill 1251's six sections, the House only borrowed languae
from section five.20 3 Section five became section ten of chapter 95-182. E
Thus, the legislature did not engraft the substance of House Bill 1251 onto
Senate Bill 186 as the Thompson court suggests.205 Instead, the legislatureincorporated only a fraction of the House Bill 1251's language.
195. See Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Initial
Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at 18, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999) (No.
92-831).
196. Answer Brief for Respondent on the Merits at 31, State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d
643 (Fla. 1999) (No. 92-831).
197. ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, supra note 194.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, supra note 194.
203. Compare ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, with ch. 95-182, § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665,
1774 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
204. Compare ANALYSIS PCS/HB 1251, with ch. 95-182, § 10, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665,
1774 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 784.046 (1995)).
205. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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The House also incorporated domestic violence language from House
Bill 1789.206 The Final Bill Analysis of House Bill 1789 illustrates its
connection to Senate Bill 186. It notes that "the current definition of
domestic violence does not include stalking and aggravated stalking."
M
House Bill 1789 "broaden[ed] the definition of domestic violence" by
adding, inter alia, aggravated stalking to the definition of domestic
violence.0 The bill added aggravated stalking because the offense is
"prevalent in domestic violence cases." 2 9 The Final Bill Analysis also
reveals that House Bill 1789 "enhance[d] the already existing domestic
violence law" by adding "aggravated stalking to the list of crimes which
qualify an offender for sentencing as an habitual [violent felony]
offender." 210 Thus, it appears that the legislature recognized a relationship
between aggravated stalking, habitual offenders, and domestic violence prior
to amending the Gort Act. This suggests that the legislature did not "logroll"
domestic violence provisions from House Bill 1789 onto the Gort Act.
Instead, it simply added provisions it always considered germane to the
habitual offender statute.
The House also borrowed language from House Bill 2513.211 The
substance of House Bill 2513 became section nine of chapter 95-182.
212
House Bill 2513 provided, inter alia, civil remedies for victims of violators
of injunctions for protection against domestic violence. 3 Domestic
violence is a crime that enables victims to obtain protective injunctions
214against the perpetrator. Since violation of an injunction for protection
215
against domestic violence is a misdemeanor of the first degree, those who
breach protective injunctions are repeat offenders. House Bill 2513 clearly
was an attempt by the legislature to contain such recidivism through the
deterrent effect of civil remedies. The Gort Act, with its enhanced penalties
for habitual felony offenders and violent career criminals, is also an attempt
to contain repeat criminal behavior. Since both bills dealt with repeat
criminality, it was natural and logical for the legislature to combine House
Bill 2513 and Senate Bill 168 into one act.
206. ANALYSIS PCS/HB 197, supra note 194. House Bill 1789 incorporated
recommendations found by the Governor's Task Force on Domestic Violence. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. ANALYSIS PCS/IHB 197, supra note 194.
211. See ANALYSIS HB 2513, supra note 194.
212. Compare ANALYSIS HB 2513, with ch. 95-182, § 9, 1995 Fla. Laws 1665, 1674
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.35 (1995)).
213. See ANALYSIS HB 2513, supra note 194.
214. See id.
215. FLA. STAT. § 741.31 (1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida does not violate Article H,
section six of the Florida Constitution. An examination of its provisions
reveals that each addresses the single subject controlling repeat criminal
behavior. The cases relied on by the Thompson court to invalidate chapter
95-182 are distinguishable. Chapter 95-182 is not comprehensive
legislation. No explanatory preamble is needed to explain the correlation
between its parts. On the contrary, it is relatively narrow legislation akin to
numerous chapter laws previously upheld by the Florida courts. The
legislative history of chapter 95-182 discounts any suggestion of logrolling
and reveals a natural and logical relationship between its parts.
Statutory interpretation is complicated by the fact that "words in
statutes have multiple meaning. 216 Traditionally, it has been the role of the
judiciary to ascertain the meaning of indeterminate statutory language and
develop tests to ascertain the lawful boundaries of those statutes. Court
decisions interpreting the single subject rule illustrate the difficulty of
statutory construction and the challenge of defining a single subject.
America's body of law continues to move further away from the common
217law, becoming increasingly statutory. Acts of the legislature tend to be
conglomerations of provisions born of multifarious sources. They are the
product of debate and compromise. As the law becomes increasingly more
statutory, single subject rule challenges to legislative acts may comprise a
larger segment of future court dockets.
VI. ADDENDUM
On December 22, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida published its
218decision in State v. Thompson. In a per curiam opinion, the majority held
that chapter 95-182 of the Laws of Florida violated the single subject matter
rule. 9 In its opinion, the court assimilated most of the reasoning of the
Second District Court of Appeal.Y The majority adopted the Second
District's observation that nothing in the Gort Act "addresses any facet of
domestic violence" and that "nothing in sections eight through ten [of
chapter 95-182] addresses the subject of career criminals or the sentences to
216. L.H. LaRue, Statutory Interpretation: Lord Coke Revisted, 48 U. PrrT. L. REV.
733, 733 (1987).
217. See generally, Abner J. Mikva, Reading & Writing Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV
627 (1987) (describing the difficulties of statutory interpretation).
218. 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999).
219. Id. at 649.
220. See id. at 648.
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be imposed upon them."'21 It analogized chapter 95-182 to chapter laws
invalidated in Johnson and Bunnell.m The court concluded that the
legislative history of chapter 95-182 indicated the presence of logrolling.2
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Wells adopted the reasoning of the
First District Court of Appeal in Trap v. State, which upheld chapter 95-
184 against a single subject attack. Justice Wells concluded that all
portions of the chapter 95-182 dealt with remedies for criminal acts, and
therefore the subject of the act is crime prevention.225 The dissent reiterates
the strong presumption favoring the constitutionalityof a statute, and the
wide latitude afforded the legislature by the courts. Justice Wells also
noted that "three district courts out of the four which have ruled on this issue
have found the statute sustainable against the one-subject challenge."227
According to Justice Wells, "the decisions in favor of constitutionality by
these three district courts, at the very least, demonstrate that the statute is not
unconstitutional.2'n
In its opinion, the majority took cognizance of a jurisdictional split
regarding the window period within which an individual had standing to
raise a single subject rule challenge to chapter 95-182.2 9  The Second
District Court of Appeal concluded that the window period for bringing a
single subject matter challenge to chapter 95-182 was between October 1,
1995, the law's effective date, and May 24, 1997.230 The court concluded
the latter date was the date of its reenactment as part of the Florida
Statutes.23 1 However, while Thompson was pending before the Supreme
Court of Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided Salters v.
State. 2 2 In Salters, the Fourth District concluded that the window period
expired on October 1, 1996.2 3 The Supreme Court of Florida, however,
declined to reach a decision on this matter because Thompson's offense,
which occurred on November 16, 1995,234 fell within either period.235 Thus,
221. Id. (quoting Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998)).
222. Id.
223. Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 646.
224. Id. at 649.
225 Id.
226. Id. at 650.
227. Id.
228. Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 650.
229. Id. at 646.
230. Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315, 317 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
231. See id. (citing 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-97).
232. 731 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
233. Id. (citing Scott v. State, 721 So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
234. Thompson, 708 So. 2d at 316.
235. Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 646.
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the window period in which an individual has standing to raise a single
subject matter challenge to a chapter law is presently unresolved.
Ivan J. Kopas*
* The author wishes to thank Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General,
Tampa, Florida, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, Florida for their
assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Stranger. Third party. Nonparent. All three of these titles are
meaningless to a child who loves her mother. The child has a different name
for this stranger. She calls her "mommy." She calls the stranger by that
name because that is who she has been told this person is by her relatives,
her biological mother, and even by the stranger herself.
She also calls the stranger mommy because the stranger has been there
for her throughout her short, yet fulfilling life. She has cooked, played
games, tucked her into bed, told her bedtime stories, and taught her all that
she knows about the world in which she lives. The child does not know that
her mother is denied the legal right to care for her, but she feels the effect
when her mother is taken away from her. She may not understand why her
mother cannot see her anymore, but she knows that for the rest of her life,
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whether or not she ever sees her mother again, she will never think of her as
a stranger.
The lesbian nonbiological mother, sometimes called the "other mother"
or "psychological parent," is often treated in court as a stranger to her
children So long as she and the biological mother remain a couple, the well
being of the children remains intact and the relationship between mother and
2child is protected. However, in the event of death or separation, the lesbian
mother can lose all contact with her child.
3
Although the interest and participation of lesbian partners in donor
insemination have continued to rise since its introduction, the legal system
has been resistant to align itself with the medical field when it comes to
recognizing the family created by this procedure.4 Florida has treated this
type of family as anything but how they have attempted to define
themselves, likening the situation instead to a grandparent verses parent
visitation rights case.5 This state has removed the other mother from the
family unit and treated her as an outsider, as if she was never considered to
be a parent from the start.
The true irony of this situation is that the state, in implementing this
standard, uses the same reasoning to support it as is used to allow for the
creation of the family-the fundamental right to privacy.6 The right to
privacy in child bearing allows for artificial insemination of a woman in a
lesbian relationship. The state cannot demand that she not have a child
because she is gay. But then, after fostering this relationship, the state once
again uses the right to privacy, this time in child rearing, to forbid the other
mother from maintaining a relationship with her child. In other words, the
same right-the fundamental right to privacy-is used both as the creation
and destruction of a family.7
This article will examine the recent decisions in Florida based upon this
fundamental right that have destroyed a lesbian nonbiological mother's
chances of maintaining a relationship with her child after separating from the
1. E.g. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
2. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Recognizing Gay and Lesbian Families: Marriage and
Parental Rights, 5 LAW & SExuALitY 513, 513-14 (1995).
3. Id. at 514.
4. See Diane K. Shah & Linda Walters, Lesbian Mothers, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12,
1979, at 61.
5. See Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 107.
6. See Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 513 (Fla. 1998); Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d
at 109.
7. This right to privacy is found in both the United States Constitution and the
Florida Constitution. However, as this note will discuss, the Florida Constitution speaks
expressly to the right to privacy. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, with FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 23.
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biological mother. It will propose a test that, in spite of the recent decisions
stripping a lesbian mother of her rights, will carve out a path for her to
continue to be a mother to her children. This new path will avoid a
restructuring of well-settled principles of family law in Florida. Part II of
this article will discuss the nontraditional types of parenthood recognized by
law. Part I consists of a discussion of the Florida Statutes and case law
affecting the nonbiological lesbian mother. Part IV will examine a recent
Florida case concerning custody rights between the mothers of a child. Part
V will discuss why there is no legal label that can truly identify the role of a
nonbiological lesbian mother to her daughter. In Part VI of this article,
Wisconsin's answer for the lesbian mother will be examined to see how that
state handled a problem that its statutes had not addressed. It will
demonstrate how the test created in Wisconsin can be altered slightly to fit
the needs of Florida. Part VII will conclude this article.
II. THE LEGALLY RECOGNIZED PARENT
As a starting point, it is important to understand the definition and
rights of a parent verses those of a nonparent. A parent is "[t]he lawful
father or mother of a person."8 The definition suggests that:
[Tihe word comprehends much more than mere fact of who was
responsible for the child's conception and birth and is commonly
understood to describe or refer to a person or persons who share
mutual love and affection with a child and who supply child
support and maintenance, instruction, discipline and guidance.
9
"Parent" includes the natural or biological mother and father of a child
and parenthood created through adoption.' "Biological parent" is "a parent
who has conceived or sired a child rather than adopted a child and whose
genes are therefore transmitted to the child." I An adoptive parent does not
have biological ties to the child but has gone through the legal process of
becoming a parent. 2 Florida statutory law has also defined "parent" as
such.1
3
The definition of nonparent is not found in the dictionary per se.
However, the prefix "non" means not and implies the negative of that which
8. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRDGED DICTIONARY 210 (2d ed. 1993).
12. See id. at 27.
13. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (1999).
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it precedes. 14 This would therefore make the term nonparent meaning the
reverse of one who brings up or cares for another. Nonparents who care for
and raise children know that this classification is anything but accurate.
Both a parent and a nonparent can essentially perform the same
functions for a child. Many times, the nonparent has a closer relationship
with the child than does the parent. However, the parent has legal ties to the
child whereas the nonparent does not. Because of this distinction, numerous
theories of parentage have emerged in an attempt to maintain the relationship
between a nonparent and the child that the nonparent has raised.
A nonparent must first acquire standing to fight for custody or visitation
of his or her child.15 In order to acquire standing to fight for parental rights,
nonparents must first show that they have created a relationship with their
child whereby they have assumed the role of the child's parent. If this can
be proven, the law affords alternatives to these parents who do not share
biological or adoptive ties with their children. 17 Nonparents may attempt to
meet the standing requirement by proving that they are either a psychological
parent, that they stand in loco parentis with their child, or that they are an
equitable parent. 1
A. Psychological Parent
A psychological parent, also called a de facto parent, is "'one who, on a
continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay,
and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as
the child's physical needs." ' 19 The psychological parent theory was first
used in legal proceedings in 1963. 20 At that time, the theory was described
as "'mutual interaction between adult and child, which might be described in
such terms as love, affection, basic trust, and confidence."'
14. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1306-07 (2d ed. 1993).
15. See Elizabeth A. Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother:
Legally Recognizing the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her
Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177, 187 (1991).
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Theresa A. Nitti, Comment, Stepping Back from the Psychological Parenting
Theory: A Comment On In Re J.C., 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1994) (quoting JOSPEH
GoLDsTEINE. AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OFTHE CHILD 98 (2d ed. 1979)).
20. Id. at 1010.
21. Id. at 1010 n.57 (quoting Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody
Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963)).
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The psychological bond may, if the two are separated, lead to
socialization problems for the child.22 This is because the bond is formed
through daily interaction between the parent and the child.Y The
psychological parent theory often occurs when children are placed in foster
care. This theory of parenthood does not protect parental autonomy. It
can be a problem because the parents who are recognized by law do not have
to intend to have this relationship develop between their child and another in
order for a third party to assume the role of psychological parent.
26
B. In Loco Parentis
Similar to the psychological parent theory is the in loco parentis
doctrine, wherein "a person who intentionally provides support or takes
custody without adopting may incur the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood." 27 This relationship is often created by marriage and terminated
by divorce.2 8 However, some courts have extended the relationship, rights,
and obligations past the termination of marriage.29
The theory is that the person stands in the shoes of an already existing
parent.30 This most likely occurs in situations where there is a stepparent
that cares for the children of the spouse. That person, although not the
biological or adoptive parent, acts like the child's parent. Furthermore, the
stepparent in assuming this roll, takes the place of an already existing parent.
The nonparent gains standing through the marriage, which has created the in
loco parentis relationship.
The in loco parentis relationship can occur without the consent of the
biological parent. The relationship is also nonexclusive, meaning, "the
doctrine does not arbitrarily limit the gender or number of people who may
stand in loco parentis to a child.
' 3 2
22. Id.at100-11.
23. Id.
24. See Nitti, supra note 19, at 1010-11.
25. Lisa M. Pooley, Note, Heterosexism and Children's Best Interests: Conflicting
Concepts in Nancy S. v. Michele G., 27 U.S.F. L. Rav. 477,487 (1993).
26. Id.
27. Kovacs, supra note 2, at 523.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Delaney, supra note 15, at 194.
31. Pooley, supra note 25, at 488.
32. Id.
2000]
160
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
C. Equitable Parent
An equitable parent, although not the biological or adoptive parent of
the child, "desires such recognition, is willing to accept the obligations of
supporting the child and in return wants the 'reciprocal rights' of custody
and visitation. 33 This doctrine has its roots in the doctrine of equitable
estoppel and equitable adoption. 34 The comparison creates a type of
parenthood by action:
Equitable estoppel is the doctrine that a person may be precluded
by his actions, conduct, or silence when he is obligated to speak,
from asserting a right that he otherwise would have possessed.
Fundamental fairness prevents a party from benefiting from prior
inconsistent conduct upon which others have relied to their
detriment.
35
In terms of family law, equitable parenthood is the result of a nonparent
who because of prior conduct and actions, is estopped from claiming
36
nonparenthood . Therefore, because others have relied on the nonparent's
actions as a parent, the nonparent is precluded from claiming that he or she
is not a parent. This title is often given to people who hold themselves out to
be parents and then deny biological ties.37 However, in the context of
lesbian parents, it is the nonparent who most often tries to label herself as an
equitable parent.38
Unlike the psychological parent and the in loco parentis relationship,
equitable parenthood cannot be created without the consent of the legally
recognized parent.39 The circumstances giving rise to the equitable parent
relationship must be created by the legally recognized parent.40 If they are
not, the equitable estoppel doctrine cannot be used.41
33. See Delaney, supra note 15, at 201-02.
34. Id. at 202.
35. Id. (footnotes omitted). Equitable adoption refers to an oral contract to adopt a
child which is fully performed, resulting in a legal adoption usually for the purposes of
inheritance. Id.
36. See id.
37. See Delaney, supra note 15, at 201-02.
38. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991). Michele
G.'s attempt to classify herself as an equitable parent was unsuccessful as it had never been
applied as a title for the challenger of parental rights. Id.
39. Pooley, supra note 25, at 488.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Because lesbian couples are incapable of creating a child with
biological ties to only the two of them, when the couple wants to start a
family, a decision must be made concerning donor insemination.42 Couples
often choose one parent to be the birth mother and then choose a donor with
similar characteristics to the other mother.43 When lesbian couples separate,
after years of planning and raising a family, it is not uncommon for the
estranged pair to disagree about custody and visitation arrangements. The
legal system's willingness to recognize the rights of the nonparent, or other
mother, has not been as generously applied to lesbian parents as to
heterosexual "other mothers." 44 The nonbiological mother has traditionally
had to prove that she has rights to her child by classifying herself as one of
the titles above, mainly a psychological parent.
III. FLORIDA LAW CONCERNING THE LESBIAN MOTHER
In Florida, a lesbian mother, who through donor insemination of her
partner, planned for and raised a child, is banned from creating a legal
relationship with her family. 6 Although such a lesbian mother is anything
but a stranger to her child, the law treats her as one.47
A. Florida Statutes
Because the lesbian other mother has not given birth to her child, they
share no biological ties. Statutory law in Florida does not permit her to
adopt her child because of her sexual orientation." Section 63.042(3) of the
Florida Statutes allows adoption by married and single persons whether they
are adults or minors. 9 This same statute forbids a lesbian woman in a long-
42. Shah & Walters, supra note 4, at 61. But see Kyle C. Velte, Note, Egging On
Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. .
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 431,434 (1999). New reproductive technology called Tri-Gametic In
Vitro Fertilization creates an embryo with the genetic combination of two women. Id. Even with
this technology, the couple still requires a sperm donor to complete fertilization.
43. Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 98-2854).
44. See, e.g., Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
45. Delaney, supra note 15, at 187. The author noted that even when the lesbian
parent proves that she is a psychological parent to her child, she is often times not afforded the
same rights as the biological mother. Id.
46. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212 (1999).
47. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212.
48. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
49. Id.
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term committed relationship from adopting the child she planned for and
raised solely because she is a 
homosexual.  l
Statutory law in Florida also forbids homosexuals from marrying.
Section 741.212(1) of the Florida Statutes states that "[m]arriages between
persons of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction, whether within or
outside the State of Florida... are not recognized for any purpose in this
,,52state. In prohibiting homosexuals to marry, it has been noted that Florida
"denie[s] homosexuals the rights granted to married partners that flow
naturally from the marital relationship. 5 3 Notwithstanding the validity of
these statutes, Florida's acceptance of the creation of the lesbian parented
family through artificial insemination gives rise to a biased protection of one
mother over another.
B. Florida Case Law
In 1925, Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a child could not be taken
away from its natural mother without a showing that the mother was unfit.5
4
Since that ruling, courts in Florida have been hesitant to recognize the role of
a psychological parent in terms of custody disputes.5 Additionally, there
was often disagreement concerning the standard that would apply to these
proceedings.56  In some cases, the courts accepted the showing of
psychological parenthood as meeting the standing requirement.5 7 In other
cases, courts held that a showing of demonstrable harm or unfitness was
required before the state could intervene in a person's private life concerning
58
child rearing.
Along with the noncohesive standing requirement, came the scattered
approach to deciding the proper test for a transfer of custody. In some
50. Id.
51. FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
52. Id.
53. Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
54. Parker v. Gates, 103 So. 126 (Fla. 1925). Although Parker had allowed her son to
be in the custody of Gates for the greater part of his life, she had not relinquished her right to
custody of her child. Id. at 126.
55. See infra notes 57-59.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Simmons v. Pinkey, 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The
court reasoned that it was in the best interests of a teenage girl to remain with her foster
mother after her father was released from jail. Id. at 524. The decision was made after a
showing that the father had not been honest in his relationship with his daughter. Id.
58 Webb v. Webb, 546 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Paul v. Lusco, 530
So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Sandor v. Sandor, 444 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
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opinions, the courts used the best interests of the child standard.59 In others,
the best interests of the child would only be considered after it was proven
that the child's welfare was at stake.6° One district held that the law did not
recognize the role of psychological parents.1
Throughout these decisions, the belief that the natural parent had a right
that was superior to all others challenging that parent for custody remained.
However, there was the opportunity for a nonparent to gain custody in
certain circumstances. 62 Despite this, lesbians, who considered themselves
to be psychological parents of their partners' biological children, had been63
unsuccessful in their fight for custody. But, prior to the Supreme Court of
Florida decision in Von Eiff v. Azicri,64 the lesbian other mother still had a
remote chance of persuading a court that she deserved to be considered in
the custody decisions of her child.65  Although Von Eiff was a visitation
rights battle between the parents and grandparents of a child, the reasoning
behind the case and the resulting decision laid the groundwork for denying a
lesbian other mother rights to her child.6
1. Von Eiff v. Azicri
In Von Eiff, maternal grandparents sued their grandchildren's father and
his wife for visitation rights.67 Von Eiff and the Azicri's daughter, Luisa,
were married and had a child the following year.68 Luisa died, and after Von
Eiff remarried, his new wife adopted the child.69 The grandparents sued for
visitation rights under section 752.01(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which
59. Simmons, 587 So. 2d at 524; Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Heffernan v. Goldman, 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1971).
60. Paul, 530 So. 2d at 364.
61. Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Swain v.
Swain, 567 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1990) (finding that "[tlhere is no such thing
[as a psychological parent] recognized in law," and that the duty to support children is only
laid upon natural and adoptive parents).
62. See, e.g., Simmons, 587 So. 2d at 524.
63. See Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1995) (holding
that a woman who planned to raise a child with her lesbian partner as the biological mother
was not considered a de facto parent).
64. 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
65. Id. at 510.
66. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
67. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 510.
68. Id. at 511.
69. Id.
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grants such visitation to grandparents in certain circumstances.70 The Third
District Court of Appeal granted visitation to the grandparents, 1 however,
the following question was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida:
IS SECTION 752.01(l)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1993),
FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IMPER-
MISSIBLY INFRINGES ON PRIVACY RIGHTS PROTECTED
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITU-
TION?2"
The Supreme Court of Florida answered affirmatively, and "focus[ed]
exclusively on whether it is proper for the government, in the absence of
demonstrated harm to the child, to force such interaction against the express
wishes of at least one parent."73  The court reasoned that government
intervention in the life of a parent, absent a showing of demonstrable harm to
the child, violated that parent's fundamental right to privacy.
74
The court began by reviewing the right to privacy in child rearing that is
offered by the United States Constitution.5 One of the liberties afforded by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 76 is the right to
personal privacy.77  The court stated that it is "'clear that among the
decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government
interference are personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.'
Furthermore, there is a specific liberty afforded to parents concerning the
"'care, custody, and management"' of their children.75
After discussing the right to privacy granted by the United States
80Constitution, the court explained the extra protection that Florida provides.The right to privacy in Florida is not only protected by the United States
70. FLA. STAT. § 752.01(1)(a) (1999). Section 752.01(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes
states that a court shall award reasonable visitation rights to grandparents when it is in the
child's best interests if one or both of the child's parents are deceased. Id.
71. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 512.
72. Id. at510-11.
73. Id. at 511.
74. Id. at 514.
75. Id. at 513.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
77. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 513. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977).
78. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 513 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 684-85 (1977)).
79. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
80. Id. at 514.
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Constitution.81 Article 1, section 23 of the Florida Constitution states that
"[e]very person has the right to be let alone and free from government
intrusion into his private life."82 The court concluded that Florida's explicit
right to privacy affords more protection than the implied federal right to
privacy in that it "is much broader in scope, embraces more privacy interests,
and extends more protection to those interests than its federal counterpart."
8 3
The court reasoned that because the right to privacy had been classified
as a fundamental right in Florida, the highest standard of scrutiny must be
applied when determining whether the government may infringe upon these
rights. 84 The state has the burden of justifying the intrusion of privacy by
showing that there is a compelling state interest.85 The state must prove that
the challenged regulation serves the compelling state interest and that the
interest is served by using the least restrictive means.
8 6
The court stressed that the compelling state interest required to be
proven by the government before interference with a natural parent's
decision-maling was the existence of a "significant harm to the child
threatened by or resulting from those decisions."' The court held that the
best interests of the child analysis can only be explored after the state
established significant harm. ss Therefore, the court concluded that section
752.01(1)(a) was unconstitutional because it granted visitation to
grandparents only upon a showing of the best interests of the child instead of
first requiring proof that the child had suffered demonstrable harm. 9
Furthermore, the court provided examples of compelling state
interests.90 These interests included protecting children from the threat of
abuse, neglect and death,91 preventing sexual exploitation of children in the
home,92 and ensuring reasonable medical treatment for children.93 Therefore,
there are many different circumstances that can cause demonstrable harm to
a child-it does not automatically result from the death of one parent.9
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
82. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 513; FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23.
83. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 514.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 514.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 515.
91. Id. (referring to Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.
2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991)).
92. Id. (following Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404,415-16 (Fla. 1991)).
93. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 515 (relying on M.N. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 648 So.
2d 769, 770 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
94. Id.
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In quashing the decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court of
Florida agreed with and followed the dissenting opinion of Judge Green.
95
Judge Green, arguing for the interests of the natural parent, noted that "it
appears to be an unassailable proposition that otherwise fit parents... who
have neither abused, neglected, or abandoned their child, have a reasonable
expectation that the state will not interfere with their decision to exclude or
limit the grandparents' visitation with their child. 96 Therefore, because the
grandparents had not proven that their grandchildren suffered demonstrable
harm under the care and supervision of Von Eiff and his new wife, they
failed to meet the standing requirement to argue their case.97
Finally, the court in Von Eiff noted that despite the constitutional
hurdle, using a best interests analysis instead of mandating proof of
demonstrable harm to the child "permits the State to substitute its own views
regarding how a child should be raised for those of the parent. ''g The court
reasoned that doing this would be "stripping [the parents] of their right to
control in parenting decisions."
99
2. After Von Eiff
Von Eiff strengthened the rights of the natural parent. By requiring a
showing of demonstrable harm to the child before entertaining a change of
custody from a natural parent to a nonparent, the court solidified the biological
mother's right to care for and make decisions for her child without government
intervention. °° Interpreting the right to privacy in Florida to include the right
to privacy in child rearing grants natural parents the autonomy deeply rooted in
our belief system as free individuals! 1 However, requiring a showing of
demonstrable harm adds an additional hurdle for a lesbian mother to overcome
in her battle to maintain a relationship with her child.
In Florida, the statutory ban on the creation of the nontraditional family
has forced the nonbiological mother in a lesbian partnership to use the
psychological parent status in order to gain standing at a custody hearing.1' 2
Proving the existence of her relationship was, until Von Eiff, her only
avenue. Although it had not been persuasive when applied to the lesbian
95. Id.
96. Von Eiff, 699 So. 2d 772, 781 (Green, J., dissenting).
97. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 516.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Von Eiff, 699 So. 2d at 780-85 (Green, J., dissenting). Judge Green noted that
only four other state constitutions contain an explicit right to privacy. Id. These include
Alaska, California, Hawaii, and Montana. Id.
102. See Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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psychological parent relationship, a small body of precedent was available to
work with.1°3 Due to the Von Eiff decision, those opportunities for relief are
no longer available to her.1°4
Although the interpretation of the right to privacy in Von Eiff leaves
grandparents and stepparents with the same hurdles as the lesbian parent,'
0 5
it does not have the same crushing effect on heterosexual psychological
parents. If the natural parent consents, a heterosexual can adopt the child of
his or her spouse, which then places the new parent on equal footing with the
biological parent.106
Furthermore, the other parent in heterosexual unions is introduced as a
third party. Children in that situation either know or they are told about their
original parent. Often times, children maintain the relationships with their
natural parents while creating and fostering new relationships with their
psychological parents. Therefore, the effect of Von Eiff is different on a
lesbian who has been treated and considered an equal parent by her partner
and her child.
IV. Kazmierazak v. Query
A. Background
Penny Kazmierazak and Pamela Query were involved in a long term,
lesbian relationship. 107 During the course of the relationship, the couple
decided to have a child through donor insemination!08 They chose Query as
the parent to carry the child. 9 Query delivered the couple's daughter on
December 24, 1993.0 On their baby's medical records, Kazmierazak was
103. See, e.g., Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
104. The decision took away a lesbian, nonbiological parent's ability to claim status as
a psychological parent because the existence of that relationship will not be acknowledged as
a compelling state interest. Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 516. The Von Eiffinterpretation of the
right to privacy changed the standing requirement in that it solidified the standard that
demonstrable harm to the child must be proven as the interest justifying state intervention. Id.
105. Seeki.
106. Id. The court noted that in adopting the child, Von Eiff's new wife had created
the same relationship between herself and the child as would have been had the child been her
biological daughter. Id.
107. Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 98-2854).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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listed as a "parent" and "responsible party.""' She was also listed on the
baby's family tree as "moM. ' "2  Despite the family's belief that
Kazmierazak was a mother of their baby, she had no biological ties with the
child.!1 3 Because Florida law bars homosexuals from marrying or adopting,
the couple could not legally make Kazmierazak a parent of their child. 
4
On April 7, 1998, soon after the couple ended their relationship,
Kazmierazak filed a Petition for Custody of their child." 5 Query responded
by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Kazmierazak was not a
legal parent of their child, she did not have standing to obtain custody or
visitation rights. 16 The trial court agreed that IKazmierazak lacked standing
and granted the motion to dismiss. Kazmierazak then appealed to the
Fourth District Court of Appeal.1 8 This appeal was filed prior to the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Von EifJ.
-19
B. Kazmierazak's Argument
Kazmierazak argued that determining a grant of custody turns on the
best interests of the child.12' She claimed that denying her the opportunity to
fight for her child based on a statutorily imposed lack of standing "disallows
any and all proof of the appellant's relationship to her little girl, treating a
loving parent as a total stranger and threatening a five-year-old child with the
permanent loss of her primary caretaker."'
121
Kazmierazak's first contention was that Florida law allowed a
psychological parent to show that the best interests of the child are served
through continuing contact between the child and the psychological
parent.122 She relied on Wills v. Wills,123 wherein a stepmother, given
standing as a psychological parent, was able to gain visitation rights over her
nonbiological, nonadoptive daughter based on the psychological and
111. Record at 77, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (No. 98-2854).
112. Id. at 78.
113. Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
114. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212 (1999).
115. Record at 1-3, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
116. Id. at 10-12.
117. Id. at 24-25.
118. Id. at 26-28.
119. Id. The notice of appeal was filed on August 11, 1998. Von Eiff was not decided
until November 12, 1998. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510,510 (Fla. 1999).
120. Initial Brief of Appellant at 32, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
121. Id. at 6.
122. Id. at 7.
123. 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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emotional ties that had developed during the relationship. 124 In that case,
Kazmierazak noted, visitation was authorized based on the best interests of
the child:
It seems to us that if an adequate record can be made demonstrating
that it is in the child's best interest that such visitation be
authorized the trial judge's discretion in the matter is sufficiently
broad to allow him to authorize visitation with a non-parent.
Certainly this type of visitation, contrary to the wishes of the
custodial parent, should be awarded with great circumspection. But
if the welfare of the child is promoted by such visitation and there
is no other substantial interest adversely affected the trial judge
should be allowed that latitude.
125
Kazmierazak continued by arguing that denying her a hearing to determine
whether she possessed a relationship with her daughter worthy of granting
custody was a violation of her privacy rights as a parent. 126
Second, Kazmierazak argued that there was a large body of case
precedent that granted standing to persons similarly situated who had shown
themselves to be in a parental relationship with a child.'2 She added that
this precedent supported her claim to be given the opportunity to establish
the same type of relationship.12
Kazmierazak's third argument focused on the court's protection of
children of lesbian parents. 9 She argued that across the country cases
involving lesbian parents had been decided based on the best interests of the
child.130  Kazmierazak reasoned that, similar to these cases, the Wills
124. Id.; Initial Brief of Appellant at 8, Kazrmierazak (No. 98-2854).
125. Initial Brief of Appellant at 8, Kazierazak (No. 98-2854) (quoting Wills v.
Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1981).
126. Id. at 11.
127. Id. at 11-18. Kazmierazak relied on Florida cases Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d
1271 (Fla. 1996), Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565
(Fla. 1991), Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1953), Spence v. Stewart, 705 So. 2d 996 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), Simmons v. Pinckney, 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
Golstein v. Golstein, 442 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and Heffernan v.
Goldman, 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
128. Initial Brief of Appellant at 13, Kazinierazak (No. 98-2854).
129. Id. at 18-26.
130. Id. JAL v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1996), Holtzman v. Knott, 533
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), and A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. App. 1992), are three cases
wherein the petitioners were lesbian nonbiological mothers who were granted the opportunity
to fight for custody and visitation rights of their children.
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decision required the court to hear her case and determine what would best
promote her child's welfare.
131
The fourth argument focused on the family that she and her partner had
worked to create and maintain.132  Kazmierazak argued that the couple
intended to make a family with her being the parent of their child.133 The
medical records and family planning records showed that the couple
intended to create a family-not that Query had a daughter for whom
Kazmierazak would be a caretaker. 13 She argued that these arrangements
were sufficient to establish standing as a psychological parent.
135
Kazmierazak's final argument was one made on behalf of her
daughter.136  She supported her argument with research showing that
children able to maintain relationships with both parents were more
content.1 37 She also stated that Florida law supported the proposition that
children and noncustodial parents should partake in "frequent and continuing
contact."
138
When she petitioned for custody and again in her brief, Kazmierazak
mentioned that Query may not have been a fit person to care for their
daughter alone.139 However, she offered no proof to validate this contention.
Kazmierazak concluded that she deserved an opportunity to establish the
bond between her and her daughter.14° Moreover, she claimed that precedent
turned on the best interests of the child and not on the family into which she
was born.'
4
'
C. Query's Argument
Query considered Kazmierazak a stranger to the relationship between
Query and her biological daughter. 142 Query first argued that in a custody
suit between a parent and a third party, the natural parent's rights must be
131. Initial Brief of Appellant at 25, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
132. Id. at 26-30.
133. Id. at 27-28.
134. Id. at 27.
135. Id. at 26-30.
136. Initial Brief of Appellant at 30-31, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
137. Id. at 30. Kazmierazak explained that whether children are raised in straight or
gay households, they have the same needs for stability and security. Id. at 31. Denying
children of gay parents relegates them to second-class status. Id.
138. Id. at 30.
139. Record at 2, Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(No. 98-2854); Initial Brief of Appellant at 3, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
140. Initial Brief of Appellant at 32, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
141. Id.
142. Initial Brief of Appellee at 4, 7, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
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considered.1 43  She claimed that although the best interests standard is
applied when the dispute arises between two natural parents, this tougher
standard applied to her case as she was a natural parent in a custody battle
with a third party. 44
Secondly, Query argued that she should not have to defend her rights to
her child against a stranger without a showing of unfitness or
abandonment. "T45 She stated that because a third party does not have legal or
financial obligations toward the child of another, a third party does not have
any rights to the child either. 46 Furthermore, she argued that natural parents
should not have to fear that their children could be taken away from them by
one who is not related by blood or marriage. 47
Query's third argument focused on the visitation rights of a
nonparent.148  She claimed that visitation rights of a nonparent were
established by statute.149 She therefore contended that because Kazmierazak
was not recognized by statute as having any type of relationship with her.... 150
daughter, Kazmierazak was barred from claiming custody rights.
Finally, Query argued that no cause of action arose in that a stranger
sought custody of a child without a compelling state interest defined by
statute.' 51 Because Kazmierazak was unable to involve state action through
a dependency proceeding, an adoption petition, or a dissolution of marriage,
Query argued that Kazmierazak was unable to state a cause of action for
taking her child.1
52
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 4-6.
146. Id.
147. Initial Brief of Appellee at 4-6, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
148. Id. at 6-7.
149. Id. "Visitation rights are, with regard to a nonparent, statutory, and the court has
no inherent authority to award visitation." Meeks v. Gamer, 598 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992). See also Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995). In Music, the court refused to grant standing to a lesbian nonbiological mother
who had not argued her case under any statutory scheme. Id.
150. Initial Brief of Appellee at 4-6, Kazmierazak (No. 98-2854).
151. Id. at 7-8. The government has the power to intervene in a family only when
there is a showing that the welfare of the child is at stake. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271,
1275-76 (Fla. 1996).
152. Initial Brief of Appellee at 7-8, Kazinierazak (No. 98-2854). The nonparent
seeking to take a child out of a detrimental environment has three statutory options. Id. The
nonparent can file a petition for dependency. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (1999). A grandparent
may file for visitation during a divorce. Id. § 61.13(2)(b)2.c. The nonparent may petition for
adoption proving that the biological parent has abandoned the child. Id. § 63.072(1).
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Query concluded that Kazmierazak had not even shown that it was in
the best interests of their child to give her custody or visitation. '5 As far as
claiming rights to their child, Query argued that Kazmierazak was not on
equal footing with her but rather was at the level of a stepparent,
grandparent, or sibling.14 Because custody or visitation is not granted to
persons identified by those categories absent a compelling state interest,
Query reasoned that custody or visitation should not have been granted to
Kazmierazak absent that same showing.
55
D. The Decision
Three months after the notice of appeal was received, the Supreme
Court of Florida decided Von Eiff.156 This decision, which defined Florida's
constitutional right to privacy in terms of child rearing, shattered any chance
Kazmierazak had of claiming rights to her child as a psychological parent.
Because she identified herself as a psychological parent, the issue before the
Fourth District Court of Appeal was whether a psychological parent has the
same rights in terms of child rearing as a biological parent.15 7 By definition,
a psychological parent can never be on equal footing with a biological
parent. 18 The court recognized this fact and noted that Von Eiff changed the
legally recognized status of psychological parents.
5 9
First, the court noted that common law did not recognize a
psychological parent. 6° The court also noted that Kazmierazak had not
petitioned for custody under a statutory scheme. 61 Second, the court stated,
that concerning a custody battle between a nonadoptive, nonbiological
parent and a natural, biological parent, the law recognizes the biological
parent's constitutionally protected right to privacy.162 Applying Von Eiff, the
court equated Kazmierazak' s rights to those of a grandparent or a stepparent,
instead of equating her rights to those of a natural parent. It is this
distinction and categorization that required the court to decide the case based
153. Initial Brief of Appellee at 7-8, Kazmierazak, (No. 98-2845).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
157. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
158. Nitti, supra note 19, at 1003.
159. Kazmnierazak; 736 So. 2d at 110.
160. Id. at 107.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 110. The court stated that "in light of Von Eiff, [it could not] construe
these cases as holding a psychological parent is entitled to parental status equivalent to the
biological parent." Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 110.
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on whether Query's decisions would cause demonstrable harm to their child.
Because Query had a right to privacy in making parental decisions,
Kazmierazak first would have to prove that livinawith the biological mother
would cause her daughter demonstrable harm.' Only after Kazmierazak
proved this would she have met the standing requirement permitting her to
request custody and prove that placing their daughter in her custody would
be in the child's best interests. 6s  Specifically, it would have to be
Kazmierazak's burden in proving that Query was an unfit mother that
granted her standing./6 Due to the Von Eff decision, proof of her role as a
psychological parent would no longer suffice.167
However, as the court noted, Kazmierazak did not argue that leaving
their daughter in the custody of Query would cause her to suffer
demonstrable harm.16s She only argued that it was in the child's best
interests to keep a connection with her psychological mother.169 Because the
child's best interests falls short of the compelling interest required before the
state can invade the privacy of a biological parent, the court was compelled
to rule in favor of Query.
7 ,
The court examined the cases Kazmierazak relied upon to support her
position.171 The court pointed out that each case was decided before Von
E/if, and, therefore, did not address the issue of standing.172 The court also
noted that the cases Kaznierazak relied upon were decided without meeting
the threshold requirement of demonstrable harm to the child.173 Because
Von Eiff changed the standard, Kazmierazak was left without authority to
contradict Query's right to privacy.174 Therefore, she had not met the more
arduous standing requirement to argue for her rights as a mother.
164. See id. at 109.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 110.
168. Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 107. The court felt that this argument was not pushed
to the forefront of the case to make an argument of demonstrable harm. See id. at 109. Harm
to the child was mentioned by Kazmierazak in a footnote of her brief. Id. However, it was not
incorporated as a main argument for relief. Id.
169. Id. at 107.
170. Kaznierazak, 736 So. 2d at 110.
171. Id. at 108-09.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
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V. THE MISIDENTIFICATION OF LESBIAN OTHER MOTHERS
The error in this case is not in the decision, but rather in the labeling of
Kazmierazak as a third party, as a stranger, and even as psychological parent.
Grandparents, stepparents, foster parents, and anybody who assumes the role
of a parent can be classified as a psychological parent. They are all third
parties to the nuclear family that at some point in time existed. In situations
like these, the biological or adoptive parents should be given that extra layer
of protection from the state constitution to guard their families from outside
individuals.
Contrary to this, in a lesbian relationship that utilizes donor
insemination, there is no third party. The other mother is not thought of as a
third party until the couple separates. The intention of the two women from
the first moment of family planning is to have two parents. The fact that
they are two women is only a legal problem when the nonbiological mother
wants to continue the relationship with her child.175
The cases Kazmierazak relied upon were distinguishable from her case.
However, the difference was not that the cases were decided before the right
to privacy in parental decisionmaking was clarified. The distinguishing
factor was that Kazmierazak's situation was one where no other remedy was
available. 176
In Wills v. Wills,'" the court awarded visitation rights to the
psychological mother of a twelve-year-old girl. The father and mother
adopted the child when she was only three years old just prior to the
mother's death.179 When the girl was four years old, her father remarried,
and the new couple raised the child together for seven years until the time
they were divorced.180 The court held that the psychological bond that had
developed between the psychological mother and the daughter was strong
175. Because of the right to privacy afforded by both the United States Constitution
and the Florida Constitution, the state cannot interfere with the right of a woman to procreate.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CoNsr. art. I., § 23; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). The state then
uses the same constitutional right to privacy to deny the other mother in that lesbian
relationship from maintaining the relationship that the state allowed her to create. See
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
176. Because she is statutorily precluded from creating the legal relationship, the
lesbian other mother is treated as a third party.
177. 339 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
178. Id. at 1131.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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enough to irant visitation even though there was no legally recognized
relationship.
In Simmons v. Pinkey,l8 the child was a fourteen-year-old girl who had
been living with her foster mother for thirteen years. When she was less
than two years old, her father killed her biological mother and was sent to
prison.1 4 The court denied the father custody of his daughter, and instead
ruled that she should remain in the custody of her foster mother.- 5
In Heffernan v. Goldstein, 1 6 the court granted custody of the two
children to the stepmother against the natural mother after the death of the
children's father.' The children had been living with their father since their
mother and father divorced eleven years earlier. r  The court did this despite
the fact that the father and stepmother had only been married six months
when the father died.189 The court weighed heavily the children's request to
remain with their stepmother.1 °
Kazmierazak's argument cannot be supported by the authority she cited.
First, the nonbiological parents in the cited cases were not barred from
creating a legal relationship with their children. Because they were
heterosexual, they were able to marry the biological parent or adopt the
children.'91 Although adoption and marriage are both options that require
the consent of the natural parents, these actions were legal options for the
people involved in the cited cases.M
Second, in Wills and Heffernan, the nonparent had created the in loco
parentis relationship with the child through marriage.193 Statutory law
permitting couples of the opposite sex to marry formed this relationship. In
addition, it and provided a legal opportunity for these parents to be afforded
rights to their stepchildren.1 4
181. Id.
182. 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
183. Id. at 523.
184. Id.
185. Id. at524-25.
186. 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
187. Id. at 523.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212 (1999).
192. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042(3), 741.212.
193. Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Heffeman v.
Goldman, 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
194. See FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
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Third, and most importantly, the psychological parents in these cases
had taken the place, or filled in, for the natural parent. At no time did any
of them claim to be the real parent. Each knew that they were a replacement
for the already existing and absent parent. These de facto parents
represented the true definition of a psychological parent.196 They had
fulfilled the child's psychological and physical needs for a parent."
' 97
Distinguishing these cases from the present situation, it is clear that
Kazmierazak is not a psychological parent. She did not take the place of an
already existing parent. Her daughter knew only two parents from birth.
Kazmierazak planned for the child, coached her partner through lamaze,
watched the birth of her daughter, and cared for her for seven years. It was
not as if she began dating a woman who already had a daughter or made the
choice to care for a child that was not hers. Kazmierazak was denied her
daughter because the couple was biologically unable to create a child
together. The previous choice to have Query as the birth mother now keeps
her from continuing the parent-child relationship. Furthermore,
Kazmierazak and Query's daughter did not have psychological or physical
needs for a parent, because she had two parents present in the home.
Currently in Florida, a legal title does not exist that defines
Kazmierazak's relationship to her daughter. Although she is her mother, she
cannot be recognized as such because she and her daughter do not share
biological ties. Although the only title she can give herself is that of
psychological parent, this grossly under classifies the relationship and is no
longer recognized as a threshold determination of standing.
This narrow fact pattern, where two women plan for and raise a family
together, must be examined differently than the biological versus
psychological parent battles. It must also be examined differently than from
a situation where both of the parents have biological or adoptive ties to the
child. Essentially, in lesbian planned parenting situations such as that which
existed between Kazmierazak and Query, there should be a threshold
standing requirement. This requirement should fall between the compelling
interest of a person's right to privacy and the best interests of the child
analysis.
The biological parent's right to privacy must, in a custody battle with a
psychological parent, continue to be a pretext to determining with whom a
child belongs. Concerning two biological or adoptive parents, the best
interests of the child standard is a favorable way to determine custody
disputes. However, between a lesbian couple, the biological mother's right
to privacy should not be a barricade to the other mother's chance to continue
195. Simmons v. Pinkey, 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Wills, 399 So.
2d at 1131; Heffernan, 256 So. 2d at 523.
196. See Nitti, supra note 19, at 1003.
197. See id.
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in parenting her child. The other mother in a lesbian custody battle should
be required to prove her relationship to her child before progressing to the
best interests of the child analysis. However, legal decisions based on a
mother's sexual preference preempt her from proving that relationship.
198
Because the Florida Legislature bars a lesbian mother from becoming a legal
part of her family, the courts should provide her alternatives.
VI. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
At least one jurisdiction has permitted parents to show that continuing a
relationship would be in the child's best interests after a threshold showing
of a parent-like relationship.1 9 Holtzman v. Knott," is a case which stands
on all fours with the Kazmierazak and Query's situation.2°1 In that case, the
lesbian couple chose to have a child by donor insemination, raised their son
together, and separated when he was five years old.2°  The trial court
reluctantly decided against granting Holtzman custody or visitation rights.203
The court reasoned:
[Tihis [is] a case where a family member ought to have the right to
visit and keep an eye on the welfare of a minor child with whom
she has developed a parent-like relationship. Unfortunately because
the law does not recognize the alternative type of relationship
which existed in this case, this court can not offer the relief
Holtzman seeks.2
4
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin analyzed the case beyond the
statutory hurdles. 205 It developed a test enabling a nonparent to prove first
that a parent-like relationship with the child exists and then that a
"significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the child's
relationship with a biological or adoptive parent." 206 The court held that the
four elements required to prove a parent-like relationship were:
198. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Music
v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
199. Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
200. Id. at 419.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 421-22.
203. Id. at 422-23.
204. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 422-23.
205. Id. at 424-25.
206. Id. at 421.
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(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the [nonparent's] formation and establishment of a parent-
like relationship with the child;
(2) that the [nonparent] and the child lived together in the same
household;
(3) that the [nonparent] assumed obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education and
development, including contributing towards the child's support,
without expectation of financial compensation; and
(4) that the [nonparent] has been in a parental role for a length
of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded,
dependent relationship parental in nature. 
2W
The court further held that the two elements required to prove a significant
triggering event which would justify the state interfering in the relationship
between the child and the natural parent were that the biological or adoptive
parent "has interfered substantially with the [nonparent's] parent-like
relationship with the child and that the [nonparent] sought court ordered
visitations Within a reasonable time" after the parent's interference. 208 The
court reasoned that after this showing, the nonparent may then proceed in
persuading the court as to the best interests of the child.21
The test created in Holtzman has since been adopted by New Jersey.210
In March 1999, the Superior Court of New Jersey, in V.C. v. M.J.B.,21 1 used
the test to determine that the lesbian nonbiological mother was entitled to
visitation rights. 
2
Because Florida law treats all nonbiological and nonadoptive parents as
"third parties" who have to show demonstrable harm to the child in order to
cut through the protective right to privacy layer surrounding the natural
parent,21 3 this test, in its original form, is inapplicable in Florida. However,
with some alteration, but without chipping away at the biological mother's
right to privacy, this test can be formatted to address those in the same
position as Kazmierazak and Query.
The altered test would have to require proof of a committed relationship
between two homosexuals who planned a family through donor
insemination. There would need to be proof that prior to the baby's birth,
the couple prepared together for his or her arrival. Most importantly, the
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421.
210. V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
211. Id. at 13.
212. Id.
213. Von Eiffv. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
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nonbiological parent would have to prove that she is the only other person
the child considers a parent beside the biological mother. The revised test
for Florida could require that, in order for a lesbian nonbiological mother to
be awarded visitation of the biological child of her former partner, she must
first prove: 1) that she and the biological mother planned and prepared for
the birth of the child together;214 2) that the biological mother took specific
steps to recognize her as the other parent of their child, consenting to and
fostering her formation and establishment of a parental relationship with the
child; 21-3) that she lived with and was a member of the household with the
biological mother and the child, assuming the characterization of a family;2
16
4) that she assumed the parental obligations by taking significant
responsibility for the child's care, education, and development, including
contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial
compensation;217 5) that she maintained her parental role from the prebirth
stage, building a bonded, dependant relationship with her child, and
attempted to continue in that role after the couple separated; 218 and 6) that
the child has always known the biological and nonbiological mother to be
her only two parents.1 9
Applying this test as a threshold standing requirement would not
conflict with the existing statutory law forbidding adoption and marriage by
homosexuals.22 Neither would it open the door to all persons, not
biologically related, seeking custody or visitation rights.221  The bond
between a biological parent and a child should be afforded special
protection. The right to privacy in child rearing is a protection for the
natural parent that should not be violated absent an interest of the highest
214. The act of planning for the child separates the lesbian other mother from all other
situations where a person takes the place of another, already existing parent.
215. This is similar to the first element of the Holtzman test. See Holtzman, 533
N.W.2d at 421.
216. See the second element of the Holtzman test. Id. at 421. This is another way of
distinguishing the lesbian other mother from those that are not part of the nuclear family who
try to gain rights to the child, for example, a grandparent. See id.
217. See id. See the third element of the Holtzman test. Id. at 421.
218. See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421. This is more stringent than the fourth element
of the Holtzman test. Id.
219. This final element is added to reinforce the importance of the plan by the two
women to create a family from the beginning with two parents, both of them women. Id.
220. This test would not challenge sections 63.042(3) and 741.212 of the Florida
Statutes. Instead, the test challenges the court system to look beyond legislation to find the
best result instead of being irrevocably bound by it.
221. The fear that this test would create a slippery slope, leading to a deterioration of
the right to privacy, is without merit. This test is specially designed for the limited cases of
lesbian nonbiological mothers who have been left without any legal options because of the
Von Eiffdecision.
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degree. This standing requirement should continue to apply to psychological
parents. However, similar to a married couple who plans an adoption or a
married couple who partakes in donor insemination, the decision by a
lesbian couple to raise the child is a two-part team effort from the first time
the topic is discussed. The nonbiological parent in this situation creates a
stronger relationship than the title "psychological parent" affords. This
established relationship should not only be granted the opportunity to
continue after a showing of unfitness of, or abandonment by, the natural
parent.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is easy to conclude that lesbian mothers who fight for custody of their
children are a minority, and, therefore, will never make a deep enough
impact in family custody battle for which they would deserve a special
standing requirement. However, as the nontraditional family continues to
grow, the law will be forced to grow with it. The result of this special
requirement affects the child of this broken partnership more than it does the
mothers. Children in nontraditional families are as entitled to remain in
contact with their parents after a separation as are children whose mother
and father get divorced. The law functions to protect children from being
pawns in their parents' games of hate. The lack of legal recognition of the
lesbian nonbiological parent in Florida means that the battle is over before
she enters the courtroom.
Although this battle may be between the two parents, or even between
the nonbiological parent and the law, the effect is most strongly felt by the
child. Unfortunately, the only thing the child understands is that her mother
has been taken away.
Stacy A. Warman
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